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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The developmental stage concept is an important concept in developmen-
tal psychology iind educational theory Describing human development in 
terms of a pattern of developmental stages enables us to understand 
development as both creative and constrained at the same time I contend 
Uiat theories of development must at least be able to account for the mere 
possibility of such development and that to do so requires the concept of 
stages However, this is not to claim that all phenomena relevant to 
developmental psychology or educational theory must be understood in 
the framework of stage-theories Not everything changes as humans grow 
up, and not everything that changes can be attributed to development, 
neither is all development stage-like Probably, there are only very few 
instances of clear stage-like development Nevertheless, and despite 
(recent) criticism, I take it mat stage-theories are indispensable for 
understanding important and interesting phenomena concerning the 
change (or development) in reasoning, understanding and experiencing 
Ilns contention requires that it is sufficiently clear what conceptualiza-
tions of developmental stages are acceptable 
Part One aims at such clarification The opening chapter sketches the 
way the concept may have evolved The second chapter ot Part One 
offers a systematic reconstruction of the most important conceptualiza-
tions in theories ol bolli intellectual and moral development In Part Two, 
consisting of four chapters, a deeper analysis ol a lew interesting prob-
lems is conducted In chapter 3 ideas about stages in the tradition of 
research in mural development and in die tradition ol research in intellec-
tual development arc contrasted In chapter 4 a methodological problem 
regarding strong claims about a hierarchical stage pattern in mural devel-
opment is addressed In chapter 5 a paradox is analyzed regarding 
Piaget's claims about constructivist structural learning In chapter 6, also 
pertaining to intellectual development, Piaget's notion of equilibration is 
analyzed in detail Both chapters on Piaget give a conceptual analysis thai 
serves to clarify Piaget's more recent ideas about stage-like develupment 
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PART ONE 
HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC 
RECONSTRUCTION 
Developmental stages are olten, either implicitly or explicitly, presup-
posed in developmental and educational studies and in practical interven-
tions Nevertheless the theoretical implications of the concept develop-
mental stage are not yet completely understood Untortunately, a more 
thorough analysis of die concept and its implications is hampered by die 
fact Üiat Uicre can be found a wide variety ot interpretations and a multi-
tude of implicit connotations in the actual use of tins term Because it is 
rallier unclear what a developmental stage exaeüy is and how die concept 
should be defined, two studies were undertaken that are reported here 
First, I reconstruct how die concept developmental stage has developed to 
Us present form(s) Second, I try to sort oui assumptions and problems 
around the concept stage in present day discussions It is not die aim of 
Part One, however, to find die one and only right interpretation I present 
die most viable options without pretending to have solutions to all the 
problems reviewed I believe diere are several interesting theoretical posi-
tions W1Ü1 ditlerent accents .md ditlcrent theoretical or practical aims in 
research In Part Two, my preferences tor a specific interpretation will 
become clear, and I discuss some implications of Uns specific interpreta-
tion 
Chapter 1 contains a schematic historical reconstruction of important 
developments culminating in a rich collection of features, connotations, 
and pretensions characteristic tor die concept stage as used in early 
developmental psychology Although the contemporary debate is influ-
enced deeply by die early theory of Piaget, die concept stage is much 
older and several characteristics dial might seem peculiar and connota-
tions of it make more sense when placed in historical perspective 
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Starting witli the Greeks the development of the concept is followed 
through the history of our western culture. In tins schematic reconstruc-
tion specially theories of social evolution and biological evolution are 
addressed because these theories have influenced the concept of 
developmental stage in interesting ways. However, this chapter has 
limited pretensions It cannot be a historical survey of all the influences 
on early developmental psychology It is aimed exclusively at identifying 
interesting lines of thinking about developmental stages These are, for 
example, interesting ideas about stages that are less well known in the 
field of developmental psychology because they come from outside tins 
discipline. 
Chapter 2 offers a systematic reconstruction of the developmental 
stage concept, which concentrates upon the more recent debate. This 
systematic reconstruction is organized by the effort to lay bare the 
structure of the debate Granted that there are several approaches and 
different perspectives on what the essential aspects and defining 
characteristics of developmental stages are, I have identified a few issues 
and questions that were common to these different approaches and 
perspectives In tins way, developmental theories can be ordered by the 
positions they take concerning those issues. 
First, two such issues concerning stages are discussed, and second, I 
present two more issues concerning (lie patterning of stages This means 
Uiat there are four issues and for each several options are possible In this 
way I can distinguish and place the different approaches and perspectives 
I feel justified in speaking of different approaches whenever Uie differ-
ences in positions are so profound that researchers arc really doing differ-
ent tilings, pose different questions, pursue diflcrent aims, and can 
scarcely communicate I speak of different perspectives when the differ-
ences, as I see them, are less profound and there is some agreement about 
Uie ultimate objectives Thus, in some cases, the diversity of assumptions 
and characteristics related to Uie concept of developmental stage repre-
sent mutually exclusive approaches, while in oilier cases they merely 
reflect complementary perspectives 
1 HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPT DEVELOPMENTAL 
STAGE 
Ideas about development are old and varied Dividing die lifetime into 
stages or periods, and assigning different qualities to these stages, specific 
roles and (asks, is something dial can be found in all times and in most 
cultures Neverdieless, the first systematic reflection on developmental 
stages pertaining to individual development, and relevant to tins enquiry, 
can be dated to the fillies when Piaget initialed a review of die use of die 
notion stage (Osterrieüi, 1956) and widi Inhelder published dieir now 
well known "entena for stages" Illese criteria -invariant sequence, inte-
gration, achievement and preparation, total structure, and equilibnum-
were die result ol die discussions held at die conference of die "World 
Healüi Organization Study Group on die Psychobiological Development 
of the Child" (1953 - 1956) attended by such diverse scientists as 
Bowlby, Margaret Mead, Konrad Lorenz, von Bertalanffy, and Tanner 
(Piaget, 1960, see Chapter 3) I lake diese formulations of the criteria for 
stage as a pivotal point üiat is, I will trace back die succession of ideas 
that culminated in dus influential definition (and what was excluded from 
dus definition) in this chapter, while in the next chapter I will review die 
contemporary positions that have all been heavily influenced (eidier 
positively or negatively) by Piaget's early formulations 
In going back into this history of ideas it is fruitful to take up die 
distinction between diree diiterent areas of intellectual concern with 
development dial correlate widi die diree diflerent lime scales on which 
development can be and has been studied Firstly, development on die 
scale of a life time ol an individual The term ontogenesis is olten used 
for the biological (organic) changes trom die moment ot fertilization to 
die moment ot death Secondly, development on die scale of social 
evolution, which addresses changes on die socio-cultural level dial stretch 
over many generations Finally, development on die scale of (biological) 
evolution or phytogeny, which involves a much longer time-scale In tins 
case the relevant dala relate to changes dial occurred long before any 
histoncal account, and are bodi lragmentary and few For each of diese 
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Üiree scales of development the idea of stages may be used, but in each 
case this concept has a different function, meaning, and history. This 
scheme can be refined because ontogenesis is not only used for the 
biological changes in an individual but also for the psychological 
(cognitive) individual development (see figure 1), and this is an 
unfortunate ambiguity, as I hope to make clear below. 
Γ Organic Λ 
^Development 
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1950 
Present 
Fig. 1 Three roots for the concept developmental stage 
Only connections relevant for my argument are indicated with arrows. 
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With regard to Uie history of the idea of stages in the life of the individ­
ual, clearly stage-like schemes have always been used to divide up a 
lifetime. The following quotation of Cicero is particularly illustrative: 
"Cursus est certus aetalis et una via naturae eaque simplex, suaque cuiquc 
parti aetalis lempestivitas est data" [Life's racecourse is fixed; Nature has 
only a single patii and that patii is run but once, and to each stage of 
existence has been allotted ils own appropriate quality.] (cited from 
Burrow, 1986, p. 1). In medieval times the notion of the "Ages of Men" 
was well known (at least among scholars). 'Піеу spoke of three, or four or 
six, or even seven aetates hominum (e.g. pueritia, iuventus, adolescenlia, 
and senectus). Burrow (1986) has documented ihese ideas extensively. 
Many more examples could be given to illustrate dial thinking in terms of 
stages is not a modern or a 19di century invention. Some sort of stage 
concept to describe individual development has always been there. In this 
respect there is no interesting development or history of ideas to report. 
However, if we focus on die specific characteristics of slage concepts, 
specifically those dial were prominent in 19di century thought, such as 
Uie idea of progress, and if we look beyond the individual life, some 
interesting and illuminating developments are suggested. 
It will be fruitful dierefore to tum attention to thinking about social-
evolution (section 1) and biological evolution (section 2). The following 
short historical reconstruction does not pretend to be exhaustive and is 
only intended to give a clearer picture of die connotations and potential­
ities of die stage concepì as it is used today. It is better not to speak of a 
history because il is Uie development of die concept radier than its history 
diat we are concerned with, as will become clear below. I begin widi 
social evolution dicories and postpone discussion of die impact of non-
Darwinian and (neo-) Darwinian evolution theory lo the second section 
because, although bolli have influenced thinking in terms of stages and 
the emergence of developmental psychology (cf. Koops and Van der 
Werff, 1987), die influence of (lie latter has been overstated (see Morss, 
1990). The sparse treatments of die hisiory of developmental psychology 
are mostly cryptic, precisely because odier influences than Darwin's are 
either ignored or nol distinguished properly from his influence. Il is 
crucial to separate bodi traditions of thinking about stages because at 
times die ideas en vogue when cultural history (e.g. change and direction) 
was at issue, were not accepted when nature itself was at stake (cf. die 
believe until 18lh century in a completely fixed universe). Mixing bodi 
traditions up would make it impossible to dale die emergence and trace 
die influence of several importimi ideas. 
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1 Social Evolution and Developmental Stages 
The first intellectual root of the concept stage I want to trace back is con-
cerned with ideas about the development of culture and social institu-
tions. I contend that this will reveal and illustrate some interesting and 
unexpected aspects of the concept developmental stage. It is demon-
strated, for instance, that thinking in terms of a progressive sequence of 
stages which succeed each other by some immanent force is not an 
exclusively modern western idea dating from the Enlightenment, nor 
exclusively popular in the 19th century. The basic metaphor of growth 
and stages is much older and dates back to the Greeks and Romans albeit 
in a different form. This claim, which may sound controversial to devel-
opmental psychologists, is based on Nisbel (1969; 1980; cf. Peeters, 
1978). 
Briefly, what I propose is that die original idea of development and 
growth -incontestably very old and of an organic origin- was modified 
by using it as a metaphor for die social evolution of mankind and, after a 
long time, relumed (though modified) to its original locus: the single 
organism thai constitutes the subject. This "development" of the concept 
of development led, however, to a modification in the notion of stages 
that made it possible or at least easier to focus an understanding of 
conceptual development in human beings. In particular, the idea of stages 
was enriched. Of course several (potential) problems in present day 
conceptualizations of stages are also due to Ulis heritage. The term 
conceptual development is used here to refer to development in thinking, 
conceptualizing, judging, and can be contrasted with development in the 
general organic sense. Conceptual development encompasses, amongst 
others, cognitive, logical, moral, and socio-moral development. 
Historical Reconstruction 
Taking three major steps through the history of the Western civilization, 
we can reconstruct die oudine of our modern stage concept. In this way, 
the assumptions that relate to die entity of development, to change, and to 
the characteristics of die pattern, that influenced early developmental 
psychology and particularly Piaget can be traced to the moment of Üieir 
emergence. 
Cycle 
The first step is exemplified by the Ancient Greeks who provide a clear 
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early formulation of a basic analogy between organism and society, 
expressed in the idea of recurrent cycles of development. According to 
Nisbet, plant or animal life was the pervasive model of growth and 
development. Of course, other aspects of nature, such as the rise and fall 
of the sun and the seasons might have suggested a cyclical model of 
change, and through contact with older idea-systems, Egyptian, Persian, 
Babylonian, etc., cyclical conceptions were available. Nevertheless, the 
most pervasive model was that of the seed that becomes, in a succession 
of changes, the tuli plant succeeded by the decline and death ol the plant, 
and then giving rise lo a new lite-cycle starting with new seeds, etc. This 
type of recurrence involving not an exact repetition but a more global 
kind of endless growth and decline without an exact time schedule was 
more to their liking. Figure 2b gives a three dimensional representation of 
tins recurrence. In figure 3 and 4 the Y axis is a measure of evaluation 
and the X axis is the time-axis. 
This metaphor of growth was often used by the classical writers to 
describe the story of society and culture However, contrary to what is 
often claimed, it would be a mistake to identify tins idea ot recurrence 
with the idea of a fixed and unchangeable universe and to deny the 
Greeks any sense of progress There was a clear notion among the 
Greeks, of an advancement caused by man's own faculties, leading to a 
present that was clearly superior, in cultural and technological terms, to 
anything that had been known in remote antiquity Even those who saw 
only moral decline were aware of the advance of knowledge and culture. 
This advance was, in fact -for those pessimists- thought to be the very 
cause of the moral decay (Nisbcl, 1969, p. 46 If ). 
Fig. 2a The Circle Fig. 2b Recurrence 
Although several examples ol the notion of stages can be found in Greek 
literature, e g the speech of Prometheus in Aeschylus' "Prometheus 
Bound", the idea ot a progressive sequence of such stages was commonly 
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framed within the larger perspective of recurrence. For example Plato, 
speculated that such a cycle for civilization might have terminated in a 
great catastrophe such as a flood. 
Epic 
In the fifth century, St. Augustine modified the analogy and the 
metaphor, leading to the Christian conception of change that we call epic, 
which is cyclical like the Greek doctrine from which it was drawn but 
without recurrence. Indeed Augustine argued explicitly and forcefully 
against the Greek doctrine of recurrence. To the Christian mind the 
recurrence was repugnant to their sense of the uniqueness and sacrcdness 
of the drama of Christ in history. It is the fusion of Judaic and Greek 
thought, exemplified by Augustine's works, which is die basis of our 
modem view on Hie development of humanity. 
The result can be depicted as 
die upper half of a circle (see 
figure 3). The collapse of the 
Roman empire at üiat date, 
liad its culmination with die 
invasion of Rome, and it was 
generally fell diät die world 
was in a period of decay and 
Fig. 3 Epic model decline. However, for 
Augustine the future held no 
starting over with a new cycle. For him this decline signalled the final 
stage which was a necessary part in die history of mankind, after which 
would come an eternal unchanging period in which only the virtuous 
(from whatever age Üiey have lived in) were to be restored to die state of 
purity and felicity. There would be renewal, but not in the form of a new 
cycle gradually coming into being. Apart from diis last fundamental 
transition die half circle is an acceptable schematization. 
Most derivations from the Greek conception of growth, such as 
immanence, genetic continuity, purpose, cumulation, fixed stages, and 
progress and degeneration were placed wiüiin die developmental cycle 
but widiout die idea of recurrence. In addition, Augustine introduced die 
notion of a single entity undergoing over long periods of time a necessary 
sequence of unfolding, self-realizing stages of development (Nisbet, 
1969, p. 64). lliis characterizes the second stage in my reconstruction of 
die history of die idea of stages. 
ГЛ 
Historic Reconstruction 11 
Progress 
The third stage of tins reconstruction addresses the period from the 17th 
through the 19th century The analogy between society and organic life, 
still popular in the 17th century, was again modified, tins tune to produce 
the modem idea ot linear progress, die vision of mankind without old age 
and decline, will» ever increasing knowledge ahead The main argument 
was, as Pascal has put it, that as we know now all Uiat was known before 
us, we are in fact older in terms of accumulated knowledge than the so 
called "ancients" (Nisbet, 1969, ρ 109) This can be depicted as in figure 
4, W1Ü1 linear progression as a straight line. 
This idea was, 
however, at first disputed 
The "querrelle des 
anciens et des modenies" 
was precisely about the 
question of whether the 
literary, philosophical 
and scientilic works of 
classical Greece and 
Rome were superior to 
die works of die modern 
Fig 4 Linear progress
 wori,j 0f ц 1 е sixtcenüi and 
sevenleenüi century The 
following quotation from Fontcnclle in his defence of progress and 
superiority of the moderns is illustrative "A good cultivated mind 
contains, so to speak, all the minds of die preceding centuries, it is but a 
single identical mind which has been developing and improving itself all 
die time the man in question will have no old age , that is to say, to 
abandon the allegory, men will never degenerate, and liiere will be no end 
to the growdi and development ol human wisdom " (cited Iroin Nisbet, 
1980, ρ 155, orig trom 1688) 'Ihe disappearance ot die stages ol decline 
and deaüi illustrates the modification ot die metaphor what develops is 
no longer comparable lo an individual organism 
The 18th century was die era of natural history (e g Rousseau, Adam 
Smith, Diderot) Note diat die temi natural history is used here not in die 
sense of biology but truly in die sense of a history ol die natural flow of 
dungs A general interest emerged in die process of human development 
Uiat is, in die successive steps or stages through which mankind had 
passed to reach its present "eminence" The temi natuial lusioiy, accord-
^ 
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ing to Nisbet, thus meant something quite different in Uiose days than it 
does now It was opposed to conventional history, and really came down 
to what we would now call developmental studies What was required 
was a conception of man's advancement through the ages in terms of 
what was fundamental and natural to man, by cutting through the morass 
of customs, superstitions, traditions, etc to the underlying forces of the 
natural order An example is Rousseau's second "Discourse on the origin 
of Inequality" in which we can find the much caricatured statement. "Let 
us begin (hen by laying the facts aside, as they do not affect the question" 
(cited from Nisbet, 1969, ρ 144) This was not a testimony to his anti-
rationalism but a methodological point expressing the need for hypotheti­
cal reasoning and thought experiments in order to eliminate irrelevant 
details There was a conscious distinction between growth and develop­
ment (natural history) on the one hand and (conventional) history on the 
oilier, in which development concerned the natural, sell contained process 
ot change in a persisting entity and conventional history was conceived as 
the record ot the unique, the fortuitous, and die external 
The idea of developmental progress reached its culmination in the 19th 
century theories of social evolution (cf Hegel, Comte, Marx, Morgan, 
Tylor, Spencer) which came out of die 18th century Uicory of natural 
history The idea that the history of mankind can be sliced up into stages 
or periods found its most typical expression in diese great "traditional" 
theories of social development These theories have influenced theories 
of cognitive and moral development more liian is normally acknowl­
edged In them, the precursors of the present conceptions of stage can be 
found as well as illustrations ot the problematic use ol Uns smite notion 
(et Korthals, 1990) 
However, some contusion first must be cleared It is often suggested 
that social evolutionism is simply an adaptation ot die ideas of biological 
evolutionism, chiefly those of Darwin, to the study of social institutions 
This is plainly false First, the basic ideas of the social evolutionists were 
conceived independently of Darwin (Nisbet, 1969) Most of the principal 
works ot die aforementioned authors had in tact appeared before "The 
Origin of Species" (1859) Second, in as tar as die underlying assump­
tions really are shared, it is probably just as much die case that Darwin 
was influenced by social evolutionism as that they were subsequently 
influenced by Darwin Tor example, it is Spencer who introduced die 
tenu evolution and notions like survival oj the fittest (Peelers, 1978, ρ 
94) However, the degree of sameness must not be exaggerated there 
Historic Reconstruction 13 
remains a substanüal difference between the traditional theory of social 
evolution and the theory of biological evolution Whereas the first is 
mainly based on typological classification die second is based on classifi-
cation Uiat is statistical in nature (in terms of means and variation, sec 
section 2) Theories of social evolution arc predominandy typological 
because Uiey are concerned with such entities as social class, culture, law, 
society as a whole, etc I he ontological status of these entities is however 
far from clear (cf chapter 2) Later variants of social evolutionism, which 
have indeed been modelled alter Darwinian ideas, provided no new 
assumptions other than those provided by Darwinism itself I will come 
back to die radier complicated relation between Darwinism and social 
evolution diconcs in the next section 
In the following, I will focus on die major assumptions regarding the 
nature of development which underlie the stages postulated by the social 
evolutionists, but will not go into the actual stages Üiat they suggested 
Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Development 
The list of the major assumptions in vogue in die 19di century dieones of 
social evolution provides a uselul summary of this concise historical 
reconstruction (cf Nisbet, 1969) Of, course, several of these assumptions 
originate earlier üiat die 19di century, as we have seen above It should be 
noted, however, diat widi die description of diese ideas I am characteriz-
ing a certain stream of dunking widiout denying diat there existed differ-
ent views For example, die cyclical model of history widi decline and 
regress to a barbarous state was very persistent (e g Vico and Spengler). 
The major assumptions underlying stagc-diconcs of social evolution 
can be ordered in üiree groups, widi regard to (a) die entity of develop-
ment, (b) die nature ot change, and (c) die characteristics ol die stage 
pattern For each of diese, I will add critical remarks and spell out some 
parallels widi contemporary developmental psychology 
I he Entity of Development 
As regards die question of what it is that develops, die social-evolution-
ìsts were very clear that diey were interested solely in an abstract wliole 
for which natural development in time was claimed The entity under 
consideration was, tor example, human knowledge (Comte), or freedom 
(Hegel), or principal institutions (Spencer) 
Abstract 'I he social-evolutionists retrained from considering acciden-
tal variations Ot course, diey were well aware of die concrete record of 
multiple events, and ot die frequent obstructions of growth, etc , but diese 
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were not supposed to affect the abstract entity. 
Whole: They subscribed to a form of holism. There was no interest in 
very specific kinds of development (such as the development of child 
rearing practices in 19ih century rural northern part of Holland) nor in 
aggregates of heterogeneous kinds (such as the totality of the geographic 
and historical record of man). 
Universal: A universal whole also in the sense that over a long lime 
period all kinds of phenomena were brought together in one grand design. 
In the 18th century the idea was formed that the whole history of 
mankind is one process since all men are rational beings (cf. Condorcet, 
1794). Because of this rational core, universal history and development 
were thought to be possible. 
Metaphorical: The notion development as used by the social-evolu-
tionists has a metaphorical meaning. What was held to develop was not 
an individual organism as a biological entity. This might explain how it 
was possible that the final stages of decline and death disappeared from 
the theory of social evolution. Because development was attributed to 
ideas, institutions, etc. die "modems" in the 17th century could conceive 
of social evolution as human achievements built on top of the achieve-
ments of previous generations. Otherwise, we might have expected 
decline and death as the final stage in a developmental pattern. 
Typological: The subject in any given theory of social evolution tends 
to be social class, kinship, culture, etc. All these typifications are orga-
nized by a central lypologizing idea mainly related to institutionalized 
and normative human behavior. 
The problematical aspects of the abstractness and the holism are firstly 
that all aspects (e.g. of a society) are taken intrinsically together and no 
differences in the pace of development within such a whole were recog-
nized. Secondly, a detailed account of the developing entity was almost 
never given; and finally it remains totally unclear how the development of 
the abstract entity is related to actual history. 
Nevertheless, several elements and connotations of Illese ideas are 
relevant to an understanding of psychological stage-theories. For instance 
Piaget was likewise concerned with a very abstract entity of development 
(the epistemic subject). The same holds for theories of moral develop-
ment, at least if moral is taken in a broad sense. In analyzing the devel-
opment of these abstract entities, Piaget and Kohlberg refrained from 
considering such accidental variations as individual differences and 
extreme circumstances. In this respect liiere is a parallel with what the 
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social evolutionists were doing. 
liiere is a fair degree of resemblance between (lie entity of develop-
ment in cognitive or moral development (or forms of conceptual devel-
opment) and die entity of development in dieories of social evolution. 
"Logical thinking" does not die and is not bom again. In fact, develop-
ment as it is used in cognitive development is just as much a metaphor as 
it was for the social evolutionists and it is therefore rallier difficult to 
specify exactly die ontological and epistemological identity of the object 
(die entity) for which development is claimed. The entity is related to 
individuals but also transcends diem. However, this docs not "solve" die 
problem, it only brings it to the fore. I will discuss several attempts to 
give a solution in die next chapter. 
Nature of Change 
Another important set of assumptions concerns die nature of change. 
Change being natural and immanent is of course a very old theme origi-
nating from the Greeks. 
Natural change: Change in lime was diought of as a natural process 
for the specific entities that social evolutionists were studying. This 
meant dial change was considered natural and normal, while fixity was 
either abnormal or merely apparent. There was dierefore no need for 
explanation of the "why" of change, only for die "how" and for any 
arrests. Ncverüieless, none of the evolutionists was blind to facts of 
inerda or fixity in history. 
Immanent change: Social change was regarded as immanent for die 
entity being considered. It was assumed that diere is a normal pattern of 
inherent change provided that nothing interferes widi its course. Of 
course diere was awareness of forms of chiingc dial were not immanent to 
die subject at hand -the events, accidents, interferences of actual hislory-
but Ulis did not alter the fact diat the abstract entity (institutions, struc-
tures, etc.) had its own course of development. Here Leibniz's ideas are 
relevant: as he wrote in 1714 "I mean diat each created being is pregnant 
widi its future state, and diat it naturally follows a certain course if 
nodiing hinders it" (cited in Nisbet, 1969, p. 170). Note diat diere was no 
implication of predetermination in diis line of thinking (but sec the 
section on biological evolution below). It is wordi noting too dial die 
source of die immanence was not and could not have been seen, at dial 
time, a hereditary mechanism in our modem sense. 
Uniform causes: It was presumed dial change proceeds from uniform 
causes, meaning basically that die processes at work in die present must 
explain also die whole process of development in die past (and future) 
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and which, for example, excluded recourse to divine interference Tins 
notion fitted in also with Darwin's acceptance of die doctrine of natural 
selection 
The problematic side of tins naturalness and immanence is that Hie theory 
seems immune from falsification by facts (ct die citation of Rousseau 
above) However, the most important problem is (wiüi exceptions such as 
Marx) die total lack of any specifying transformation mechanisms Here 
some sort of üieory ot structural learning on a societal scale is painfully 
missing 
Neverdieless, many characteristics of die Piagetian stage notion have 
their counterpart here too According to Piaget too, change is natural, 
immanent, and explained by more or less unitomi (Junctional) mecha-
nisms Immanence is a key feature because external lactors were thought 
to be ot minor importance for die form ol development (but see chapter 
5) 
Not only for Piaget, but for psychological stage-üieories in general, 
die idea of normal and natural development functions in very much saine 
way as it did for die social evolutionists No explanation or reduction to 
odier phenomena was dioughl to be required 
Піе Pattern of Development 
The next set of assumptions underlying 19di century theories of social 
evolution are also closely related Uiere was a strong belief dial develop­
ment was gradual, continuous, and ordered in a pattern that was 
directional, necessary, and progressive The pattern was consequently 
also unilinear and irreversible 
Continuous Change was regarded as continuous (uns was also known 
as die doctrine of gradualism) in die sense of a gradation of steps in a 
single series (see following section on biological evolution for a more 
extensive treatment of dus point) 
Directional Widiout direction we have merely changes but no 
development Each of die social evolutionists was well aware üiat it was 
essential to specify a direction for any allegedly developing entity For 
this reason a sequence ol Mages was specified A succession of changes 
might be observed, but only through analysis and deduction or analogy or 
metaphor it is possible to bind die plurality ot observed changes into a 
single, ongoing process, mid it requires still lurther analysis to reach die 
conclusion dial uns single ongoing process has beginning, middle and 
end 
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Necessary: The idea that development is necessary liad already been 
introduced in the middle ages. Social development, being directional, 
immanent, and continuous, simply had to be necessary. That is, it was 
thought that free from the accidental and the merely causal it was neces-
sary that a given social entity had developed through time as comparative 
researches showed it had in fact developed. For example, for Comte the 
development from the religious to the positive stage was necessary in its 
pattern because of the very pattern of the human mind itself. Even 
Darwin saw necessity in progressive development. 
Progressive: The final assumption is that development is progressive. 
This assumption goes back to the moderns of the 17lh century. For the 
modems social evolution was conceived as human achievement built on 
the achievements of previous generations. This resulted in a conception 
of progress as a cumulative series of learning steps (see fig. 4). Although 
the 19lh century social evolutionists came more and more under the 
influence of ideas about organic evolution (see next section) they were 
still bound by the "modern" conception of progress. Progress in this 
sense, sometimes referred to as "rationalization", is exemplified by the 
theoretical advances of the sciences and is opposed to progress as biolog-
ical adaptation exemplified by the natural evolution of species. 
These assumptions, however, have their problematic counterparts (cf. 
Habermas, 1981; Korthals 1990). First, they led to the use of time as a 
yardstick for nonnative evaluation. Later in time was thought simply to 
imply better. However, this conclusion is not warranted: time can be a 
contingent means of ordering events but no evaluation can follow from it. 
Secondly, the inherent teleology combined with the observation that the 
theorist himself belonged to the society that was the shining example of 
the final state suggests clhnocentricity. Their own position was too easily 
posited as the universally valid normative final point, while this norma-
tive yardstick that was in fact used to distinguish the stages of human 
development was often hidden behind a merely factual and chronological 
description. Third, this often led to inconsistent practical implications. 
For example, the theory was written in order to improve the historical 
situation (cf. Marx), even though the general tenor of it was that history 
has a logic of its own. Fourth, no distinction was made between technical 
improvements and moral advancement. Fifth, negative aspects of 
progress were disregarded. 
Nevertheless, most of these above assumptions were taken up in 
psychological stage-theories. According to Piaget development is direc-
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tional in the sense described above. On careful reading, however, I am 
not convinced that Piaget considered development necessary in the above 
sense, although in the popular interpretation he is said to take such a 
position(cf. Chapman, 1988b). 
The notion of progress has become discredited in theoretical papers 
but still is influential in actual research and practice (cf. chapter 2). 
The objection of ethnocentricily is levelled against Piaget and particu-
larly against Kohlberg (cf. Schweder, 1982) as well. The fact that a final 
point for moral development was proposed by Kohlberg (1973) has 
unleashed an enormous amount of discussion. According to some he has 
embraced a male conception and a typically western view (Gilligan, 
1982). These objections, however, are not generally accepted (e.g. 
Snarey, 1985). 
The optimistic conclusions drawn for education were often just as 
inconsequential as the suggested practical implications of theories of 
social evolution. This was one of the reasons why developmental theory 
has lacked popularity among Dutch educational theorists. 
Before drawing up final conclusions, I will, in section 2, address the 
influence exerted by ideas in biology. The stage-theories reviewed above 
concern collective forms of development but I hope it is clear that the 
assumptions and problems discussed are relevant to psychological stage-
theories as well (cf. White 1983). Not only is their influence greater then 
I found acknowledged in the official history of the field, their influence is 
-in my opinion- also more fortunate for the field than is normally 
acknowledged. In any case, the classical Piagetian notion of stages 
includes many of the aforementioned characteristics. This does not imply 
that all the associated problems are relevant: his notion of stages has itself 
evolved during its use for individual cognitive development and of course 
Piaget is influenced by other sources too, as will be reviewed below. 
General conclusions will be presented in section 3. 
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2 Biological Evolution and Developmental Stages 
Several conceptions which (once) figured in the complex and intriguing 
history of biology are relevant to our search for the roots of the concept 
of stage in developmental psychology Confusingly, their influence has 
not been very consistent Both older and more recent ideas from the life 
sciences still remain influential, even when abandoned by biology 
Further, as widely divergent opinions have existed in biology, their influ-
ence on developmental psychology has been likewise varied In addition, 
some influences run contrary to those drawn from theories of social 
evolution reviewed above Nevertheless, it should be noted (hat Piaget 
was trained as a biologist and that he explicitly staled that the 
taxonoimcal function ot stages can be traced back to biology Varied as 
they arc, all these influences must be considered 
Evolutionary theory is regarded as the most important influence on 
the stage concept by most textbooks m developmental psychology 
However, whatever the merits of Darwinian evolution theory may be, it 
has not been the blessing to dunking about stages that it often is 
suggested it was I propose that it has been a kind of Irojan horse for 
stagc-theones Ot course it stimulated thinking in terms of progression 
and so was responsible (e g through Hall and Baldwin) tor the boom of 
developmental psychology towards the end of the 19th century It made 
the study of children a more respectable task with the result that several 
baby biographies were published In addition, later on, neo-Darwinism 
provided interesting ideas tor transformation mechanisms in develop-
ment, for the first time a serious idea of a mechanism to connect the 
stages was proposed whereas social evolutionists remained silent on these 
matters It seems logical Üierelorc that most textbooks in developmental 
psychology take Darwin as starting point for their history of developmen-
tal psychology (Case, 1985, Cole & Cole, 1989, Koops & Van der Werff, 
1987) In fact, however, not only is the influence of Darwinian thinking 
on developmental psychology actually very lmuted, as is slowly begin-
ning to be recognized (Morss, 1990), but in addition, evolutionary theory 
introduced ideas thai in the long run have been counterproductive for 
understanding cognitive development as a form ot stage-wise develop-
ment Notions like "chance variation" and "natural selection" undermine 
die idea of sharply delineated stages, the idea of adaptation gives a par-
ticular twist to the idea of progression, and population thinking as 
opposed to esseniialism or typological flunking has resulted in a largely 
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unsuccesslul search for empirical indicators of stages 
Historical Reconstruction 
In order to argue for these contentions I have to go back beyond Darwin 
to ideas about the inherent ordering of nature in order to reconstruct 
biological thinking relevant to the idea of stages 1 his reconstruction will 
reveal a development ol thought which is at variance with previously 
discussed developments within and predating social evolution theory Of 
course, diere have also been points of connection between the two lines 
of dunking, as for example in Social Darwinism Subsequently Darwinian 
assumpuons will be considered and finally, influential ideas trom non-
Darwinian evolution theory will be reviewed 
The Great Cliain of Being 
"The Great Cham of Being" is die title of a now classical book by Artur О 
Lovejoy (1978, original 1936) in which one of die oldest ideas relevant to 
our treatment of stage-theories is brilliantly expressed die inherent order­
ing of nature From antiquity onwards die classification of lite-forms had 
been a problem Beginning widi Aristotle, however, diere was a strong 
tendency to arrange all living creatures on a scale (The Great Chain) from 
die lowest vegetable through die animals to man who was gittcd with a 
rational soul Thus die classification of lite was considered to demon­
strate an ordering from die most simple to die most perica tonus widiout 
gaps in Uns ordering An interesting example ot such a scale is provided 
by Charles Bonnet (1764) see figure 5 
In dus view, die classes of organisms are sharply delineated and fixed, 
it was undnnkable diat diey could transform into somednng else They 
formed an inherent hierarchy in diat each subsequent class (or step) in die 
chain was superior to die former Created by God's infinite wisdom and 
power the chain was pertect, so diat diere could not be intermediate 
stages, since all possible positions of die scale had been filled However, 
die chain could be extended so as to encompass higher beings (such as 
angels) In fact, many were convinced diat man was to be placed no 
higher dien halfway on this scale and diat all kinds ot "higher beings" 
-possibly living on odier planets- occupied die rungs on die ladder 
between man and God 
It is wordi noticing that although diere was a clear sense ot the 
hierarchy (degrees of perfection) associated widi die scale, diere was 
absolutely no implication ot any sort of change or progress In contrast, 
die scale implied a completely fixed and unchanging universe (cf Mayr, 
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1982, p. 300 ff.). This idea goes back to Aristotle (cf. ter Laak, 1983). 
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Fig. 5 The scale of nature according to Bonnet 
According to Lovejoy this "Scala Naturae" was until the 19tli century 
"the most widely familiar conception of the general scheme of (lungs...". 
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However, the popularity of the concept crumbled because it was slowly 
discovered that diere is an enormous diversity of life (Mayr, 1982, p. 
133.) The voyages around the world, the microscope, the geological 
record, better observation as such, etc. led to die discovery of such a 
diversity Uiat the problem of classification became urgent. Of special 
importance was die discovery of the diversity of kinds and discussions 
about the notion of species. How to distinguish between one species and 
anodier was already a question for Buffon in the 18th century. A related 
question was whether diere are "real" distinct species at all or whether die 
concept of species is a purely artificial device to facilitate classification. 
A species could never be defined as a group of identical individuals since 
small variations were known to be possible, but what criteria should be 
used instead? It was not until Darwin dial an answer to this pressing 
question was offered. 
The lime-scale of history itself also underwent a tremendous change. 
It was long believed that die past had a span of no more Uien seven to ten 
millennia and diere was no idea of evolution. However, since the 18th 
and 19Ü1 century this time span increased so enormously that a new view 
of history was needed and die idea of evolution emerged (Goudsblom, 
1990). 
Temporalizing of the "Scala Naturae" 
The next step in diis reconstruction came widi die "temporalizing of the 
chain of being" (Lovejoy, 1978, p. 242). A new idea -dial it was possible 
to move up die ladder- was formed. In die beginning of die 18di century 
diere was still a strong belief diät "Піегс not only is not, but diere never 
will be, anydiing new under die sun. The process of time brings no 
enrichment of die world's diversity; in a world which is die manifestation 
of eternal rationality, it could not conceivably do so."(Lovejoy, 1978, p. 
242). However, in diat same period a reaction against this kind of 
thinking emerged (Open University, 1974). For example, die French 
philosopher Robinet argued that diese ideas were at variance widi die 
evidence dial was becoming available (see above). 
The result was die idea diat die higher beings on die scale were trans­
formed descendants of the lower ones. In odier words it was considered 
possible to ascend die ladder. This temporalizing is of course directly 
relevant to the concept of stage. The idea of developmental transforma­
tion is fused widi die concept of hierarchical classification. Development 
already implies, at least in a weak sense, steps or states but in this fusion 
several elements arc added to form die concept of developmental stage in 
a more strict sense. Added to die idea of transformation were die follow-
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ing connotations of Üie Great Chain of Being: that there is an intrinsic 
hierarchy, that there are no gaps in the sequence, that there is only one 
sequence, and that differences are small but essential. Although the idea 
of change or transformation was introduced no mechanisms in our 
modern sense were proposed, there were no clues as to how the stages 
were connected. 
It should be noticed that the possibility of transformation raised a 
paradox for those who thought about species. On the one hand, if 
transformations were accepted, how then was classification in terms of 
species possible? No demarcation can in thai case be fixed. On the other 
hand, if classification as species was deemed possible, how dien was 
transformation into new species to be understood'? There is a comparable 
paradox for stages: how can sharply delineated stages be transformed to 
higher ones (see chapter 5). 
Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Development from a 
Darwinian Perspective 
Several of the previously mentioned ideas finally became integrated in 
evolution Qieory (Darwin 1859). Evolution theory provided a theory of 
actual transformation-mechanisms (e.g. through random variation and 
natural selection) with nevertheless distinct species, and provided thus a 
model for the emergence of new species. It is often suggested Uiat 
evolution theory has in this way provided a model for developmental 
psychology and was responsible for the boom of stage-theories (e.g. Cole 
& Cole, 1989). 
However, litis suggestion is not entirely justified. In the first place, if 
we take Darwinism as the set of claims headed by '"natural selection and 
chance variations" it is more appropriate to speak of neo-Darwinism as 
Darwin himself was not strictly Darwinian in this sense (see Morss, 
1990). Secondly, this neo-Darwinism provided some ideas that could 
have been relevant to developmental psychology but, contrary to what 
textbooks of psychology often suggest, were mostly eidier ignored or 
totally misunderstood (Ghiselin, 1986). Following the grouping of 
assumptions as in the section on social evolution, the most important 
characteristics of (neo-)Darwinian evolution theory can be summarized as 
follows. 
The Entity of Development: 
Because in Darwinian evolution theory the idea of a grand design was de-
emphasized and eventually abandoned, there was consequently not so 
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much interest in the entity of development For (neo-) Darwinism there is 
not really one entity for a given developmental dimension, instead 
evolution and development were taken to refer to species and thus to 
classes of individuals 
Classification Neo-Darwinism introduced a way of classifying which 
is statistical in nature Statistical classifying was founded in die belief that 
as all organisms and organic phenomena are composed of unique 
features, they can be described collectively only in statistical terms, that 
is, in abstract tenus like means and variation Only the individuals of 
which the populations are composed, have reality In contrast, theories of 
social evolution are predominantly typological because they are 
concerned with entities like social class, culture, law, society as a whole, 
etc that cannot be approached as the mean ot something This idea of 
"statistical" classification, however, was not taken up by the early 
developmentahsts 
Individual differences Also important for biology was the introduc­
tion of population thinking (Mayr, 1982, ρ 487), which focused on indi­
vidual variation The uniqueness of every individual had largely been 
ignored by scientists and philosophers until the days of D.irwin as we 
have seen above However, Irom the Darwinian perspective, variation 
was considered to be essential and not something irrelevant Again, 
however, these ideas played no substantial role m early developmental 
psychology Only recently has 1 eldman worked out a model that is based 
on these assumpuons (Feldman, 1980) 
It is very well possible that the classilication of cognitive achieve­
ments poses problems more like those of social evolution than like those 
ol biological evolution (see next chapter) 
Nature of Change 
The idea ol chance variations combined with natural selection suggests a 
natural process of change caused by a uniform mechanism which is not 
immanent, and which results in a new conception ot what "normal" 
development is 
Normality Normal is taken to mean natural without human interfer­
ence, without any evaluative sense or the ide.i ot a telos 
Blindness An important idea introduced by Darwin was bottom up 
explanation I he process was assumed to be blind I he proposed mecha­
nisms were revolutionary precisely because ol their lack ot teleology In 
contrast, in social evolution theory the process was taken as a sort of 
(unavoidable) learning process, while in prc-Darwinian evolution theory 
it was seen as divine design, and in non-Darwinian evolution theory as 
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bchaviorally acquired (Lamarck) Thus, in the alternatives to Darwinism, 
and even partly with Darwin himself, ideas of a design and progressive 
transformation continued to exist The idea of a blind process was not 
taken up by the early developmentahsts 
Emergence It was considered possible for something really new to 
appear (cf Dixon, 1990), an idea which did play a role for Piaget 
although his stage sequence is often presented as closed 
The Pattern of Development 
Continuity Leibni/'s dictum "Natura non I acit Sallum" (nature 
makes no leaps) was endorsed by almost everyone, including the social 
evolutionists Tins may not sound compatible with stage-theories, but 
what was meant was that there must be intermediate forms, and tins is 
consistent with the idea of stages Gradualism (cf Kagan, 1983, Costal 
1986) might be a beuer temi since, due to the continuity-discontinuity 
controversy, the term "continuity" has picked up an anti-dcvelopmcntal 
ring Gradualism suggested dial there must be all kinds of in between 
forms, a gradation ol steps in a single series as in die Great Chain of 
Being Even if changes were to result in something really new there 
always remains a clear connection to die older forms new species were 
not the result of spontaneous generation An important consequence was 
the idea of a continuity between animal and man Given tins presupposi-
tion Darwin was disappointed that die geological record mostly showed 
such "imperfection" or lack ol ihese intermediate forms 
No design The alleged lack of design or planned progress in 
evolution is characteristic for the pattern also 
Multidirectional^ The liiechanisms of neo-Darwinian evolution 
Uieory suggest a branching oft model without endpoint that might provide 
a ideological explanation Hiere was Uieretore no unilinear pattern to be 
expected, only a common beginning These ideas, however, were not 
taken up by die developmentalists Only recently Chapman (1988a) 
argued for such a position 
Adaptation I he idea ol adaptation was a more acceptable alternative 
dian die idea of progress In trying to explain evolutionary changes a 
regulatory principle was needed Such a principle lor developmental 
progression could now be defined in tenus ot adaptation and survival of 
die fittest The idea ot adaptation is actually quite ditterent trom the 
notion ot progress as entertained in die teleological systems ot die social 
evolutionists Whereas in biological evolution dieory "progress" was 
Üiought ol as result ol purely mechanical forces, in theories about social 
evolution progress took on the meaning ot immanent progress as an 
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increase in rationality. This latter kind of progress as a sort of rationaliza-
tion (cf. Habermas, 1981) is certainly relevant for psychological stage-
theories: freeing oneself from animistic thinking, for example, figures in 
both contexts (social evolution and individual cognitive development). 
Piaget (1985) was influenced by both die adaptation involved (in his 
equilibration model) and die trend toward becoming more rational and 
reflective by internal constructive activity (in his theory of reflexive 
abstraction). In chapter 6 I will address this issue in more detail because 
the relation between adaptation and constructive reflection is not wiüiout 
problems. 
It should be noted that die more recent varieties of social evolutionism 
that have been modelled after neo-Darwinian ideas present no new 
assumptions. Wiüiout denying die importance of diese social-Darwinian 
dieories, diey provide no relevant new ideas concerning die developmen-
tal stage concept odier üian those addressed here. 
Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Development from a non-
Darwinian Perspective 
In contrast to die popular view in die field of developmental psychology, 
Darwinism was not die clear and victorious alternative it might seem in 
hindsight. Darwinism was just one influence on the emergence of 
developmental psychology. For dunking in terms of developmental stages 
certain non-Darwinian influences, which are extensions of the earlier pre-
Darwinian ideas in biology, are even more important (cf. Morss, 1990). 
One of die most influential ideas in early developmental psychology 
coming from non-Darwinian biology was the notion of recapitulation. 
The last step in my reconstruction dierefore should be supplemented wiüi 
discussion of die contribution of non-Darwinian ideas. 
Lamarck assumed dial die different animal series could be seen as 
climbing up dirough a fixed hierarchical sequence. Ljunarck and neo-
Lamarckians held to die assumption of direction and design in evolution-
ary change and believed in a single track of developmental progress. 
According to Morss (1990), even Darwin himself sometimes endorsed 
certain aspects of diis Lamarckism and used die single track model which 
is nodiing but an echo of die "Scala Naturae" discussed above. 
Widi die idea of recapitulation we return to the three different time 
scales and dieir interrelaüonsliips. In die strong version of Haeckel's 
"phylogeny causes ontogeny" die adult forms of the ancestors were 
supposed to be retained (ancestral recapitulation). This version of 
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recapitulism is regarded as completely untenable by present day 
biologists. In the weaker version of recapitulation some analogies 
between the different time-scales are postulated without any apriori 
claims about causation. Although there is reluctance to use the term 
recapitulation this weaker version of recapitulation is still quite popular 
(cf. Gould, 1978). 
The brief success of recapitulation-theories was influential in stimulat-
ing the birth of developmental psychology. Via Haeckel through Stanley-
Hall (1904) and Baldwin (e.g. 1906) an interest in die process of intellec-
tual development emerged. The subsequent failure and degradation of 
recapitulation theories is (by association) sometimes used as an argument 
against developmental stage-theories. 
Although, recapitulation theories did not contribute much that was 
novel to the concept developmenial stage, they did offer models for 
representing stages. Firstly, in all claims of recapitulation the essential 
phenomenon is that a certain sequence is repeated. The sequence here is 
taken as a quite abstract property not dependent on the nature of the entity 
that develops, thus resulting in a focus on a unilinear ordering in lime. 
The different series represent die same ordered sequence of events and 
the same hierarchy, which is why Morss (1990) calls diem hierarchical 
recapitulation. Secondly, die issue of recapitulation is closely related to 
die study of embryology. Embryology suggested a very impressive model 
for stages. It provided an example of a predetermined unfolding of very 
distinct forms with minimal external influences (not-branched, unidirec-
tional). If the principle that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is accepted, 
die first series (in phylogeny) provides for clearly distinct classes (e.g. 
fish, vertebrates, man) which, Üirough Ute analogy, suggested demarca-
tions in the second sequence (ontogeny). 
The most important assumptions of non-Darwinian evolution dieory 
are: 
The Entity of Development 
Taxonomy: Depicting development as a sequence of stages is first of 
all classifying. From die older ordering of nature as "Scala Naturae" die 
idea of a fixed classification system that is complete and hierarchical 
resulted, which does not differ much from what social evolutionists came 
up widi. For example, for Linaneus (1707-1778) classification was 
equivalent to determining die essence of a species. Like for die social 
evolutionists, classification consisted of a somewhat arbitrary slicing into 
periods. In fact each theoretician made his own variant of this 
classification. Whereas classification in Darwinian Uiinking was "upward 
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or compositional classification" based on die comparison of individuals, 
the classification of the pre-Darwinians was "downward classification" 
based on a logical system and aimed at a search for the essence or the true 
nature of each group (Mayr, 1982). 
Although Darwinian classification became quite refined due to the 
notion of common descent, this gain in precision not necessarily resulted 
in an increase in usefulness as a metaphor for classification of cognitive 
development (see chapter 2). 
The Nature of Change 
Ideas about change were not much different from what we have seen in 
discussing social evolutionism. 
The Pattern of Development 
For Lamarck and the later neo-Lamarckians the assumption of direction 
and design in evolutionary change gave rise to a linear picture of devel-
opment: A single track of developmental progress up which all organisms 
and civilisations have lo climb (Morss, 1990). Many of the ideas used in 
Ulis context are consistent with social evolutionism (see above) but the 
following assumptions may be added. 
Design: A very influential notion was the idea of a design in nature. 
Whether due to the essence of nature (e.g. Lamarck) or as divine wisdom 
or as striving for a telos, there was a strong feeling mat life and nature 
exhibit a planned development. 
Hierarchy: The taxonomy implies qualitative differences and 
classification and was mostly used in an evaluative sense. Hierarchical 
classification therefore is relevant for the idea of progress. 
Unilinearity: Unilinearity and a sequence without gaps are also ideas 
consistent with die notion of Uie "Scala Naturae" but no less with ideas of 
recapitulation, and with what embryology seemed to suggest. 
As chapter 2 will testify, nearly all these assumptions are invoked in 
relation to the classical psychological stage models though with altered 
status. 
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3 General Conclusion 
The concept of developmental stage is interpreted in diverse ways and 
has many connotations Ί he historical reconstruction in this chapter has 
revealed and illustrated some long-standing assumptions involved in 
these diverse interpretations These underlying assumptions are some­
times present but not recognized in the contemporary debate Even the 
classical criteria provided by Piaget and Inhelder -invariant sequence, 
integration, achievement and preparation, total structure, and equilibrium 
(Piaget, 1960, see chapter 3)- leave important underlying assumptions 
unexphcated However, I do not argue that all such features of traditional-
stage-fheoncs are part ol modern psychological stage-theories Some 
problematical features have their modern counterpart, others have been 
resolved more or less 
I have sketched the development of the notion of developmental 
stages in two fields of thinking about change I take it that developmental 
psychology is not only influenced by older ideas about individual devel­
opment but also by ideas about social and biological evolution From 
these two sources with each their own separate development, I have 
extracted several important assumptions 
The metaphor of organic growth has been used since the Greeks for 
describing development on a societal scale Due to the specific character 
of historical change the metaphor became modified during tins use to 
describe social evolution Starling with a cyclical conception also known 
as recurrence, through an epic model depicted by a semicircle that was 
supposed to reveal one grand design, uns reconstruction culminated in the 
conception of cumulative achievements that can be represented by a 
straight line These modifications in the concept of growth in turn 
influenced the emerging developmental psychology of the 19th century 
Virtually all contemporary stage-theones use stage patterns that can be 
typified more adequately by straight upward lines than by a semicircle 
The entity of development in theories of cognitive and moral devel­
opment is conceived of as an abstract whole not unlike that invoked for 
social evolution Ilic idea ol progress as employed in Piaget's develop­
mental psychology (cf the notion of reflective abstraction, see chapter 6) 
shows interesting teatures shared with social evolution theories 
Accounts of biological evolution belong to more recent centunes, 
since nature was long believed to be somcüiing fixed and eternal Exactly 
what contributions to the idea of stages in cognitive development are 
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iraceable to the tradition of biological thought and Us precursors is more 
difficult to summarize Although the emergence of Darwinism stimulated 
developmental psychology, all early developmentahsts (e g Haeckel, 
Preyer and Romanes) were not, as far as their actual theories were 
concerned. Darwinians In their work, in spite of the fact that they 
declared themselves followers of Darwin, prc-Darwinian ideas of design 
and progress in a unidirectional single track with qualitatively different 
stages were still important These ideas were rooted in older conceptions 
of nature such as the idea of the "Scala Naturae", which entails the 
ordinal and hierarchical character of the line of development These pre-
Darwinian ideas about nature together with ideas borrowed from social 
evolutionism have shaped developmental psychology Only a few of the 
important Darwinian assumptions (multidirectionality, importance of 
individual ditterences, continuously random changing, and adaptation 
through selection), were employed by the early developmentahsts 
Particularly important in tins respect was the idea of adaptation, which 
provided a new interpretation of progress that seemed scientifically more 
acceptable and more objectively founded than the speculative normative 
ideas of the social evolutionists 
Recent publications that acknowledge that Darwin's influence on 
developmental psychology was quite limited, at least it we look at the 
actual theoretical premises endorsed in (early) developmental psychol-
ogy, differ in their evaluation of this situation Most propose to make 
good tins ignorance and go back to Darwin himself or to the new 
synthesis of neo-Darwinism (Charlesworth, 1990, Ghiselin, 1986, 
bcldman and Toulmin, 1985, Nossent, 1988) Others such as Morss 
(1990) share the disdain for the pre-Darwinian influences on (early) 
developmental psychology but do not plead for a true Darwinian alterna-
tive 'I he hypothesis I would like to bring forward is still another one I 
take it that for some areas of development it is fortunate that the influence 
of Darwinian assumptions was limited First, some ot the non-Darwinian 
assumptions effective in developmental psychology, which can better be 
understood in relation to ideas in social evolution, may have persisted 
because they are quite adequate given the nature of die object of study 
For example, the assumption of a hohstically defined entity still plays an 
important role -though modified of course- in the structural and 
hermenéutica! approach discussed in chapter 2 Second, even more 
radical, it may be the case that some Darwinian notions were counter-
productive Habermas (1981) suggests thai we go back to the 18th 
century modems (Condorcel) lo find a perspective on progress that is not 
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"damaged" by the Darwinian idea of adaptation, which according to him 
leads to a view that is too much focused on an instrumental, narrow 
conception of rationality 
Whatever the evaluation of the assumptions encountered in tins 
chapter, it is always usetul to explicate them 'Піе set of assumptions may 
seem trivial once formulated and they certainly do not make up an 
acceptable definition ot stages tor a contemporary perspective They do, 
however, provide an archetype of developmental stages and explain the 
persistence of the idea of developmental stages We may summarize tins 
set of assumptions as follows Developmental stages imply a single track 
without branches, with a tixed clear sequence without gaps, forming a 
hierarchy of qualitatively distinct steps with an implied direction and 
progressive nature Individual differences and all other kind of irrelevant 
variation can be disregarded because what develops is an abstract and 
holistic defined entity In addition the sequence is undergone by a largely 
autonomous process, natural (as long as no extreme circumstances are 
present) for and inherent in the developing entity and guided by some sort 
of overall principle 
These are the main assumptions underlying the notion of developmen­
tal stages and which set the scene for early developmental psychology, 
and have in this way influenced Piaget and the reception ot Piaget In the 
next chapter I will critically analyze several of these assumptions in the 
framework of a systematic reconstruction inspired by the contemporary 
debate 
2 SYSTEMATIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPT DEVELOPMENTAL 
STAGE 
Chapter one's historical reconstruction resulted in an "archetype" of a 
developmental stage Ideas about developmental stages, which were cur-
rent when Piaget first formulated his views on stages, consisted of a neh 
collection of features, connotations, and pretensions Although tins 
archetype of the stage concept is a bit of a caricature it is useful to under-
stand the diversity of present day interpretations Part of the explanation 
for the persistence ol the discussion about stages can be found in the 
richness, complexity, and long history of die concept Often when a par-
ticular (dominant) interpretation of the notion developmental stage has 
been discredited, alternative interpretations, highlighting oilier assump-
tions, have been put forward, as we will see below Some of diese as-
sumptions, suil lingering in the background, may have formed a reservoir 
from which inspiration for "new" interpretations has been drawn 
However, to actually prove historical links of tins kind is beyond the 
scope of tins chapter 
Having documented die richness of its explicit and implicit meanings 
in the previous chapter, it is now time to see whether some order in the 
uses (and abuses) ol the concept of developmental stage can be intro-
duced I will draw up a systematic inventory of die assumptions, the 
problems, and die associated criticisms related to tins concept, as lar as is 
relevant to die contemporary debate Because it is impossible to treat all 
issues at length, I will concentrate on diose issues dial stand out because 
they arc more general, or more basic, than the parlicuLir slage-theoncs in 
which diey have become visible Several themes dial figured in die histor-
ical reconstruction ol chapter 1 will reappear and where possible die con-
nections will be indicated 
My aim is to show, first, diat diere are still, after some weed cutting, a 
few dieoretically fruitful conceptualizations of developmental stages for 
developmental and educational dieones, and second diat, as some of the 
differences between diese remaining positions are lundamenial, care must 
be taken not to confiate diem 
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After the rediscovery of Piaget in North-American psychology (following 
Flavell's [1963] overview) the notion of stages gained widespread popu-
larity. This was based mainly on Piaget's early work (1952, 1954, 1960) 
in which the idea of stages played an important role. Soon, however, the 
developmental stage concept came under attack, and especially during the 
1960s and 1970s, the so called "stage issue" generated considerable con-
troversy. 
As a consequence of these criticisms all kinds of reactions emerged 
which make this review difficult to conduct (cf. the open peer commen-
tary in reaction to Drainerd, 1978). There is no agreement about the core 
characteristics of the notion of stages. Appropriation and denunciation of 
the concept comes from u wide variety of backgrounds. That is, different 
philosophical and scientific frameworks clash over the issues (cf. 
Overton, 1984, 1991a; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986). Structuralist, func-
tionalist, rationalistic, realist, posilivistic and empiricist positions all give 
different assessments of what are development, explanation, structures, 
etc. which results in a variety of candidates as die core phenomenon for 
stage-theory. 
Notwithstanding this variety, and regardless of die philosophical or 
scientific background, it is always possible to distinguish the stages taken 
by dicmselves from the pattern thai is formed by the stages and I will or-
ganize this review accordingly. 
The (single) stage: A stage is believed to characterize general features 
of a person's activities during a certain period of her life. More generally 
formulated: there must be some sort of underlying unity (organization, 
competence, form, structure etc.), which is related to a surface diversity 
(behavior, performance, content, appearance, etc.). Many controversies in 
the contemporary debate about stages are confined to this claim. 
However, there are some fundamental differences between different 
stage-theories with respect to dieir view on the relation between unity and 
diversity and on the nature of such unity. 
The patterning of stages: Several stages togeUier constitute a devel-
opmental stage pattern. Issues and problems that play a role here pertain 
to the types of patterns proposed, die relations between the stages and 
their ordering in die developmental pattern, and dieir overall properties. 
A diird cluster of issues, one diat is largely outside die scope of Ulis 
chapter, is related to Hie question how developmental^ relevant domains 
and dimensions should be defined. The term "domain" is used in two 
senses in die relevant literature. The term domain in the broad sense per-
tains to a few categorically distinct domains widi dieir own peculiar ways 
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of reasoning. In genetic structuralism Kant's distinction between theoreti­
cal reason, practical reason, and aesthetic reason is often referred to, lead­
ing to a distinction between the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic domains 
(e.g. Kohlberg, 1981, ρ 116; see Korthals, 1992; van Haaften & Korthals, 
in press). Within the domain in which a development lakes place (e.g. the 
moral domain), one or more developmental dimensions might be dis­
cerned. A dimension of actual development might be quite narrow (e.g. 
the development of justice reasoning). Not every aspect of a domain is 
subject to development. If one adopts this interpretation of domain, it is 
unlikely that one single comprehensive structure could explain regulari­
ties in all different dimensions in all different domains. 
However, the term "domain" is also used in a narrow sense. In that 
case the term "domain" denotes specific sorts of abilities which are sup­
posedly related to a specific family of tasks. From this perspective it 
makes sense to speak of domain independent knowledge. An oft-men­
tioned candidate for such domain independent knowledge, or rather for 
knowledge and abilities believed to be valid for each domain, is logic. 
However, I will not go any further into discussions about the domain, as 
these exceed the scope of developmental stages proper 
In section 1, an overview of relevant theorists and die conceptual land­
scape is sketched to provide the background. In addition, a preliminary 
definition of die developmental stage concept is given. In section 2, some 
important and persistent questions and controversies concerning die sin­
gle stage are reviewed. 'Піеу are placed against die background of two 
basic decisions for stage-dieories. First, contemporary stage-theories, de­
spite dieir differences, have to choose from diree basic options concern­
ing the distinction between surface and depth (structure). Secondly, some 
stance on die problem of the relative stability of stages is required. In sec­
tion 3, die problems of die stage-paltem are discussed following a similar 
strategy. The first choice pertains to the type of pattern dial is proposed, 
while the second, more basic choice pertains to die perspective from 
which die ordering of stages is seen. In section 4 die results are summa­
rized and discussed. 
The degree of attenúon given to each issue does not necessarily reflect 
die number of articles and books devoted to tliis topic but radier my as-
sessment of its dieoretical, metadieoretical or philosophical importance. 
In addition, I must point out dial no definite conclusions can be given in 
diis chapter. However, in Part Two, I address a few of die problems in 
more detail and try to bring diem closer to a conclusion. 
Systematic Reconstruction 35 
1 Background 
The term "developmental stage ' is used in a wide variety of contexts I 
will confine mysell (trom now on) io those contexts in which Ihe cogni-
tive development ol an individual human is at issue Cognitive develop-
ment is used here in Ihe broadest sense including development in the in-
tellectual, moral, and aesthetic domains The individual is taken as a so-
cial being that docs nol exist in isolation Indeed, many of the relevant 
developing capabilities are incomprehensible without recognizing their 
inherently intersubjcciive character 
For this systematic review I have made use of all kinds of develop-
mental theories Although it is difficult to conceive of a developmental 
theory wiüiout some use of the stage concept there are relatively few 
stage-theories that justify their use of the concept A Uieory can be con-
cerned with die nolion of stages in different degrees of abstraction First, 
in many stagc-lheorics stages, periods, etc are simply used (or "found") 
but without defining whal conditions have to be fulfilled to justify the use 
of stages Secondly, there are siagc-theones that provide explicit entena 
for stages Tliird, in some theories a meia-thcorctical level can be dis-
cerned In such theories systematic reflection on die concept stage is 
provided lor example, stage-üieones are compared, the criteria arc sub-
jected to critical reflection or a general theory ol stage is looked for 
Stage-theories with explicit criteria for stages can be divided into 
classical theories and more recent theories, related mainly to cognitive 
and moral development Among the classical stagc-Uieories that use ex-
plicit criteria tor stages, Piaget's (1952, I960, 1970a) theory stands out 
Oüier classics are Baldwin's (1906), El'konin's (1972), Vygotsky's 
(1986), and Werner's (1957) theories Kohlberg's (1984) work on moral 
development provides a classical position, but of a second generation 
According to Case (1986), ihe recent history of siage-üieories as far as 
cognitive development is concerned can be divided into three periods 
first, the classical structural analysis from 1945 to 1965 dominated by 
Piaget's works ol die fillies Secondly, the penod ot process analysis 
(1965 until 1980) in which die critics of die structural approach domi-
nated the scene lor example die histonco-cultural tradition exemplified 
by Bruner (1964), and die empiricist tradition where Klalir and Wallace 
(1976) should be mentioned However, Pascual-Leone who is a neo-
Piagetian, also belongs to this period The Uiird penod dien is the "neo-
structural analysis" trom 1980 on, represented by post- and neo-
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Piagetians such as Case (1985), Halford (1978), and Fischer (1980). This 
scheme is biased, however, towards die neo-Piagctian position of Case 
(cf. Tumure, 1986). For ехшпріе, an important contribution that does not 
fit into this scheme is the work of D.H. Feldman (1980). As far as socio-
moral development is concerned Kohlberg has been the most influential 
theoretician. The label neo-Kohlbergians might be used for Rest (1979, 
1983) and Eckensberger (Eckensbcrger & Rheinshagen, 1980) although 
they never have labelled themselves as such. Fowler (1981) and Selman 
(1980) also fit within the Kohlbergian tradition. Regarding identity de­
velopment, Erikson (1950) has postulated "functional stages", and 
Loevinger (1974) works in the tradition set by Erikson. All these authors 
have not only formulated a theory about a certain dimension of develop­
ment, thereby postulating several stages, but also provided a specific 
(partly new) view on how the concept stage should be understood, includ­
ing explicit criteria to delineate stages. 
Some of the above (Piaget, 1960; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) and sev­
eral other theoreticians who are not themselves known for proposing de­
velopmental theories, have provided meta-reflections on stages. 
Influential contributions come from Brainerd (1978), Campbell and 
Bickhard (1986), Carey (1991), Chapman (1988b), Commons and 
Richards (1984), Flavell (1972, 1982), Overton (1991b), Vuyk (1980), 
and Wohlwill (1973). Outside psychology too the idea of stages has at­
tracted attention: for example by Flanagan (1984), Habermas (1984), 
Mischel (1971). This list is certainly not exhaustive. 
However, it is not only the theories above that form the background of 
this chapter. It is also useful to analyze the meaning of the term 
"developmental stage" wilhoul going into dieoretical debates. Although 
die term developmental stage seems a pleonasm, its double name serves 
to underscore Üiat Ulis concept is formed by combining two separate clus-
ters of ideas. On the one hand, it shares elements with the concept of 
classification -classification implies ordering and demarcation-, while on 
the other hand, it shares elements with the concept of change -die latter 
implying differences and transformations. In chapter 1 the roots of both 
these ideas of change and classification were presented. 
The stage concept belongs io a particular subset of die family of con-
cepts associated with classification, namely those in which the connota-
tions of qualitative difference, hierarchy, and evaluation are essential (e.g. 
stage, level, rank, and grade). It should be noted üiat a developmental re-
lation between the classes is not necessarily implied for each member of 
diis set (e.g. rank and grade do not). Indeed the "Great Chain of Being" 
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(see chapter 1) is the perfect example of a classification without the 
slightest suggestion of the possibility of change and development. On the 
other hand, psychologically relevant classification is not confined to this 
subset (cf. Kagan, 1983) die classificatory perspective could ¡ust as well 
be concerned with something totally different, such as individual differ-
ences (referring to children of the same age) or comparative (referring to 
animals). 
The stage concept at the same tune belongs lo a particular subset of 
the family of concepts associated with change, namely those in which die 
connotations of immanence, connectedness, irreversibility, and the pass-
ing of time are essential, such as development, evolution, growüi, matu-
ration, and aging. 
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Fig 1 Conceptual Landscape 
The concept of developmental stage must be located at the intersection of 
these two groups of concepts (evaluative hierarchical classification and 
tune-bound irreversible orderly change) It is therefore a very neh notion, 
precisely because ol the fusion ol elements of bolli groups (see the tern-
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poralizalion of the chain of being m chapter 1 as an illustration of tins 
point) Not all members of the family of concepts dealing with change 
necessarily share die connotations of ordering, hierarchy, and evaluation 
that can be tound in die concept developmental stage, while the other 
members ol die tainily of concepts to which classification belongs do not 
necessarily share die connotations of transformation, connectedness, irre-
versibility and die passing of tunc 
Thus, although it must be admitted that die notion of development 
implies a very elementary lorm ol classification in üiat at least two states 
are necessary for development, die begin state and end state, dus is not 
enough to argue dial development by itself is a concept belonging to the 
class of classificalory concepts I prefer to speak of states and not stages 
when relemng to such development m general 
The ordering of die stages results in a stage pattern Developmental 
stages and die stage pattern define each oüier mutually Developmental 
stages arc die parts of a developmental pattern and a sequence of such 
developmental stages tonus (lie developmental pattern A consequence of 
dus neh notion of developmental stage is dial at least dirce stages are re-
quired to make an inicresüng patterning possible 
The assignment ol certain (lask)behaviors or verbal responses to a de-
velopmental stage is a two step process In die first step ol classification, 
die performances must be assigned to dieir associated competence In die 
second step of classification, die dius identified groups of reactions 
(competence) must be ordered in -and classified as instances (stages) of-
a developmental pattern This is based on die belici that die competencies 
can be ordered due to dieir developmental relation to each odier What 
tins developmental relation exacdy implies is not always clear, but widi it 
odier characteristics of die stage patterning follow, such as, for example, 
die classical Piagetian characteristics invariant sequence, integration, to-
tal structure, and equilibrium, (Piaget, I960, cf chapter 3) 
I can now formulaic my provisional definition A developmental stage is 
a conceptual construct dial serves to classily, Irom a developmental per-
spective, in order to describe or understand or explain or justify changes 
in human pertoniiance and competence Opinions differ about how dus 
should be undertaken and whether indeed more dian a simple descriptive 
classification is at issue Notice that dus definition docs not include all 
connotations reviewed above 1 leave open as much as possible in order to 
avoid exclusion by definition of certain, more exotic, positions For ex-
ample, many dieones Like it for granted dial development is progressive 
but my definition has place tor neutral and degenerative patterns too 
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2 The Stage 
Controversies 
According to Piaget a single stage is a set of structures in equilibrium, 
giving unity and stability (structure d'ensemble) in the cognitive function-
ing (constant activity) of an ideal (epistemic) subject Tins integrated set 
of structures can be described comprehensively and he sought tor tasks 
that would show the structural unity in the sense that individual differ-
ences could be left aside 
Since then, much research effort by others has been directed to 
demonstrate empirically that there are no such structures d'ensemble The 
strongest objections -as lar as single stages are concerned- are associated 
with wifhin-domain inconsistencies A domain is taken here in the narrow 
sense for example, Piagetian classification The basic idea is that per-
formance on task X, which is supposed to involve structure S, should 
predict performance on task Y, if that task is likewise supposed to involve 
structure S However, empirical evidence does not unequivocally support 
tins contention (cf the reviews by Gelman and Baillargeon, 1983 and 
Halford, 1989) The following research findings are relevant first, in nu-
merous empirical studies considerable timclags (décalages) were found 
between successtul performance on different tasks belonging to different 
domains ot knowledge thai were supposed to require the same structure 
But more importimi, even between different tasks that belonged to the 
same domain ol knowledge, olten a considerable limelag was lound 
Although these findings -which were considered to have disproved stage-
theories by some- are often presented as a problem of timelags 
(décalages), Üiey can also be cast as indicating that liiere is no consis-
tency in the use of structures underlying the behavior In fact, upon closer 
scrutiny, it appears thai several important questions that are related to 
these inconsistencies are not so much problems of the pattern but pertain 
to the single stage In any case, in the field of cognitive development tins 
state of affairs has dominated the scene In social and moral development 
research, however, the notion ol stages remained more in vogue and 
gained a different accent (see chapter 3) 
If we consider the research findings mentioned above, the critical is-
sue is the comparison between different tasks Of course, task behavior is 
not exactly similar lor die two (or more) tasks because ihey are not die 
same tasks, it is only Uieir form that is supposed to be identical For ex-
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ample, few people apart from a developmental psychologist would ever 
think of, or bother about, the relation between conservation of number 
and conservation of volume Tins example illustrates dial die struclure(s) 
implied in die tasks must first be identified and compared betöre wc can 
conclude diat diey are die same It diere are problems in finding an ex-
pected conunon structure dien diere are several possibilities it might be 
die case diat die structures appealed to m bodi tasks are not identical after 
all Question What is die relation between .structure and task content'' It 
might also be die case dial die structures are identical, but dial the struc-
ture is not die major independent variable in die actual performance 
Question. What is die relation between structure and behavior or perfor-
mance'' It might be dial diere is a structure S but diat it is not specific to a 
certain age If die same structure systematically pops up at different ages 
for different content, may we not say that diere arc structures but no 
stages, and that possibly several structures reside in die same individual 
at die same time9 Question What is the relation between structure and 
subject '? If die previous questions have not led lo a satisfactory explana-
tion for die inconsistencies alluded to above, can we dien conclude diat 
there is no structure (d'ensemble)? Question What is exactly meant by 
structure d'ensemble11 Finally diere might be measurement problems, 
apart from the questions so far Question How can siiiiüures be as-
sessed'! 
In discussions concerning moral development, basically die same sort 
of problems can be found -aldiough some of them are conceptualized dif-
ferently Ί he question about structure and sub]ect, for example, is con­
ceived not so much as a problem ol décalages but as a problem of homo-
geneity The main problem is diat different structures show dicmselves in 
one interview, and much less diat a particular structure is effective at dif-
ferent (mterview)ages ITns phenomenon, dial is known as stage dispar-
ity, underscores diat die problem of décalages can be seen <LS pertaining to 
the single slagc The same uneasiness results as described above it is 
difficult to find a satislactory correlation between behavior (or judgment) 
and underlying structure In fact, die discussion revolves around die ques-
tion of whether a subject can be said to "be in" a stage or "have" a stage 
(see chapter 3 and 4) as Kohlbcrg suggests James Rest (1979) opposes 
his former teacher Kohlberg in dus Rest has proposed a so-called com-
plex developmental model in which a subject is thought to be capable of 
displaying reactions which are typical for several stages What changes 
widi development is die proportion of answers (reactions) belonging to 
the different stages Гог example, die proportion of suge 3 answer first 
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rises and then from a certain age onwards declines while the use of stage 
4 answers is rising, and so on The maxima of the stages in use can be or­
dered along a developmental continuum This model is certainly psycho-
metncally more sophisticated since it accommodates the stage disparity 
Nevertheless, it presupposes a classification in stages Another example 
of the slightly altered form in which some of the questions posed above 
came up in moral development research, concerns doubt whether know­
ing the good does imply conducting oneself accordingly This introduces 
the question of the relation between knowing (conceptualization) and 
doing (behavior) and is therefore related to the question about structure 
and behavior above ІЪеге is, however, also an additional question that 
can be extracted Because in moral development research interview mate­
rial is often used the need for interpretation arises, leading to a question 
not included above about the relation between structure and meaning-
content 
These six questions are relevant to the judgement of the consequences 
of the empirical investigations described above Of course, the questions 
cannot be answered in general The answer to the questions will depend 
largely on the stance of a particular üieory concerning a few basic issues 
regarding die notion of developmental stages For example, any particular 
view taken on how (some) unity in the diversity must be conceived will 
determine die answer to die question of whcdier prediction of behavior 
should be possible or not Therefore, my strategy is to outline basic deci-
sions involved m setting up a stage-Üicory Any stage-theory has to make 
at least two of these decisions, widi respect to die single stage Any die-
ory must choose trom a few options for each of bodi issues The first 
decision concerns the conceptualization of die unity in the diversity of its 
manifestations and die second concerns the stability of uns unity In both 
cases a dieory must commit itselt to one ol several possible approaches 
The two basic issues more or less correspond to the questions posed by 
Feldman and Toulmin (1975) who argued that as mentili structures are 
thought to underlie behavior, the questions are "how are both related" and 
"do these structures exist m die mind of the child (or what is dieir onto-
logica! status)" 
Basic Options with regard to Unity and Diversity 
Stage-Uieories always imply die idea of underlying unity m a surface di-
versity But, as die examples will show, die relation between surface di-
versity and the underlying unity can be conceptualized in very diverse 
ways I propose to distinguish three points of view regarding the relation 
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between diversity (parts, surface) and unity (whole, depth) (a) the purely 
structuralistic relation between structure and element, (b) the causal rela-
tion between structure and behavior, and (c) the henneneutic relation be-
tween structure and meaningful content Each of these frameworks forms 
a relatively consistent viewpoint and has its own focus Nevertheless each 
approach is taken by most of ns adherents as complete, while the alterna-
tive approaches are often (miss)construed as merely imperfect or 
marginal varieties of their own approach It is my primary aim to distin-
guish die points of view as clearly as possible to avoid unwarranted bor-
rowing of assumptions that arc valid exclusively lor one ot the frame-
works 
a) Structure and kleinem 
Piaget, although not a structuralist in every respect, used and introduced 
specific structuralist ideas precisely in regard to the issue of characteriz-
ing a stage Because these ideas provided a (partial) answer to the prob-
lems of traditional stage-theories (see chapter 1), structuralism makes a 
good starting point in tins review ol the basic options However, Piaget's 
position is rallier complex, so (hat it is impossible to present the full story 
here riicrefore I will not discuss structure and tunction lrom the biologi-
cal perspective (see Chapman, 1988b) I will confine the discussion here 
to structuralism as relevant to the question of how a stage must be charac-
terized 
One of the problematic features of traditional stage-Uiconcs (cf chap-
ter 1) was the opacity of the hohstically defined entity of stage-like de-
velopment The social evolutionists argued Uiat it requires analysis and 
abstraction and filtering out irrelevant data in order to arrive al a devel-
opmental pattern Development was simply not something that showed it-
self openly in the raw concrete material of historical descriptions and bi-
ographical data However, although there is much to say for tins view, 
these traditional stage-theories lacked the theoretical tools to give a sys-
tematic account ol the abstract entity and in tins they were seriously de-
fective Structuralism provided more adequate means to analyze the ob-
ject of development while retaining the idea ol a self-contained holistic 
and global entity 
Structuralists were convinced thai there is an organization (or struc-
ture) underlying mental functioning They believed that the structure can 
be discovered through orderly analysis and they entertained the notion 
that structures have a generality and a cohesivencss that extends beyond a 
specific instance (Tomlinson-Keasey, 1982, Gardner, 1973). 
Structuralism is rooted in linguistics De Saussure (1916) introduced this 
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structural analysis in the beginning of our century in linguistics but the 
approach was generalized beyond linguistics by thinkers like Lévi-
Strauss (1963), Barthes (1964), Lacan and Piaget. Piaget never saw him-
self as a structuralist but he wrote a monograph on the subject (Piaget, 
1970b). 
Дале idea 
Central to the structuralist approach is the relation between structure and 
element. These are not independent entities that can influence each other, 
rallier they form two sides of the same coin. Ilie basic idea is that ele­
ments do not exist in isolation. An element is an element in virtue of its 
place within a larger structure. Therefore structures are conceived as 
holistic entities. This has two important consequences: first, to grasp the 
structure, it is considered unnecessary to refer to something outside the 
structure, and second, in order to know an element within a structure, die 
structure as a whole musi be grasped. Unfortunately, this last suggestion 
is not very practical if we consider structures with a potentially infinite 
number of elements such as language or mathematics. The consequence 
would be that, taking language as an example, in order to understand the 
meaning of one word we have to know all words and sentences, etc. and 
even more: the particular language must be grasped in its wholeness (cf. 
Parker, 1991). 
How Ulis problem was overcome can be illustrated with the notion of 
transformation rules. Transformation rules serve to generate the larger 
structure from a relatively small structure of generative rules. Such a 
transformation rule always generates elements that fit in the structure and 
hence the structure is closed in Ulis sense. By knowing a finite structure 
of transformation rules il is possible to grasp the whole infinite target 
structure. A corollary of these assumptions is that the description of die 
structure (in terms of the constituting rules) does not pertain to the ele­
ments as such but (o the types of relations between elements. This implies 
furüiermore that die structure has properties that are not reducible to 
properties of die elements (nor vice versa). Therefore, structures can be 
considered in formal terms apart from die particular elements that consti-
tute their content, but Ulis is not to say diat they exist apart from their el-
ements. 
A favorite example of Piaget concerning natural numbers illustrates 
this point. Let us assume ihal the elements in this case are the isolated 
numbers. They have characteristics like being even or uneven or being a 
prime number, but die whole of natural numbers has properties of its 
own. The ordering of (he numbers points to structural properties, which 
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have nothing to do with the isolated numbers For example, an important 
structural characteristic of the natural numbers is that they form a mathe­
matical group One of the tour properties of a group is that each trans­
formation (such as adding) has an inverse transformation (here subtrac­
tion) which undoes the first transformation For Piaget die group is the 
prototype of one ot the three basic forms of structure die algebraic struc­
ture (Piaget, 1970b) In tact, most of die possible operations on die class 
of integers together have such distinctive features and diese features re­
tain dieir validity, irrespective of die combination of integers involved 
There are endless possibilities for applying a certain set of operations 
while still retaining specific structural properties 
Other properties of structures are discussed by Piaget (1971) 
Isomorphisms exist between structures to die extent dial one-to-one cor­
respondences can be established between die various relations among 
dieir respective elements Піе same (fomud) structure might apply to two 
different sets of elements Structures may be described in terms of in­
creasingly abstract or more general "types", diere may be structures of 
basic elements, structures of structures, and so on Hnally, a structure 
may also be characterized by substructures dial constitute parts ot die to­
tal organization (cf Chapman, 1988b, ρ 268) 
It will be clear from the above that the notion of structure is very flex­
ible and difficult to come to grips widi Piaget characterizes ways of rea­
soning and acting through structures d'ensemble These structures 
d'ensemble pertain, however, to operations Hence, in dus respect the op­
erations are die elements Tins legilimi/cs die use of, for example, madi-
emalical/logical models to find uniformity in a relatively large range of 
cognitive functioning Piaget has constructed logical models termed 
groupings to represent the classificatory and relational behavior of chil­
dren at approximately age 6 to 11 (cf Overton, 1975) Applied to moral 
development dus conceptualization could lead to the following in all 
moral judgments of a certain type only tew operations are used and only 
in a specific constellation Such an operation could be taking die perspec­
tive of anodier person widiout being able to coordinate it widi one's own 
perspective These possibilities then result in a specific kind of moral 
judgment which we conveniently reler to as a certain stage in moral de­
velopment 
Structuralism offered a very important and fruitful insight, but it has two 
limitations First, it introduced die problem ot reference, which can be 
found already in Saussunan structural linguistics and is echoed m con­
temporary problems in structuralist developmental dieory Because ele-
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ments derive their meaning trom the structure, and hence from all other 
elements, there is no natural unmedialcd relationship with anything out­
side the structure Гаке lor example semantics according to the struc­
turalist view the meaning oí a word is not determined by its relation with 
the world, but by its» relationships with oilier words or signs and with lan-
guage as a whole Hie consequence, however, is that in Piaget's theory 
there is no direct relation between the subject (as knower and guided by 
this knowledge) and the world (see chapter 6) Whereas the idea of 
structure unites ways of reasoning and forms of knowing and understand-
ing it does not necessarily unite behaviors and task performance For 
those interested in behavior tins is a serious limitation 
The second limitation is that the static, ahistonc character of struc-
tures is ditficult to reconcile with the dynamics of development 
Structuralism is often associated with an ahistonc point of view, probably 
due to its roots in Saussunan linguistics 
However, Piaget's specific chnamic form of structuralism is particu-
larly relevant because it pretends to compensate tins last limitation It 
should be noted that Piaget's kind of structuralism is not confined to the 
general structuralist principles (ci Campbell and Bickhard, 1986, Seiler, 
1989) nor to the specific tonnai models of logic, which he used as his 
prime model to represent structures such as formal operations The use of 
formal logico-mathematical models, however, has some problems which 
Piaget recognized limiseli in his later work I will not go further into this 
discussion of logic because it is not the particular formal structural model 
that is of interest here Perhaps some different fonnal model would do 
better More important is (hat Piaget uses die notion structure in a dy-
namic sense That is, not only do the structures consist of transanima-
tions, they themselves are supposed to be open lor reorganization and 
transformation too Piaget's biological background accounts for his spe-
cific form of dynamic structuralism with its close relation to systems-lhe-
ory Since Piaget's solution is a highly specific and complicated one, I 
will not go into it here, but this dynamic fonn of structuralism will be ad-
dressed in chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Conceptualizing the relation between unity and diversity in a strucÌuralis-
tic way seems to uncover an important aspect of a developmental stage 
Fach bit of reasoning and understanding can be seen as part of a larger 
whole This whole has properties that can be understood through fonnal 
models with an isomorphic structure I he idea of whole structures 
(structures d'ensemble) must be understood and makes sense only in tins 
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structural ibi framework 
From tins perspective, stages provide a way of classifying based on 
the formal properties of the cognitive system Stages, then, are used pri-
marily in a morphological and taxonomie way, not in relation to behavior, 
but in relation to forms ot reasoning and understanding llie attractive-
ness of tins conceptualization is precisely that, without the need to con-
sider too many details, a precise formal classilicalion is possible at a 
rather abstract level, such that developmental^ relevant connections can 
become visible 
Piaget's position presupposes that there is a parallel between the 
mathematical and logical structures he reconstructs mid the self-organiz-
ing properties of the cognitive system The same claim might be made 
concerning moral development In studying moral development, making 
use of ethical theories is supposed to provide the necessary structural 
framework Kohlberg hoped that he had adequately reconstructed moral 
judgment capabilities in general Whatever the merit of these particular 
theories, the utility ot the structural approach is clear 
Nevertheless, tins structural approach (for example, as it was used by 
Piaget in his early work) has several important drawbacks The main 
"problem" is located precisely where the next approach is more clear the 
theoretical vagueness of the relation between the logical models and per-
formance The structuralist approach is inherently hampered by the fact 
that the elements in a structure are ot a totally different order than the be-
havior or judgments of concrete persons Questions about the relation be-
tween structure and behavior are just not the kind ol questions which 
structuralism provides an answer tor 
Briefly, the structuralist approach has manoeuvred itself into the posi-
tion thai it cannot give answers to Ihe questions that are considered im-
portant by many developmentahsts The approach leaves us in the dark 
regarding the question ol how concrete persons and concrete behavior fit 
in, since the correlation between structural stage and behavioral data is 
often low It otters no direct explanation tor actual behavior and conse-
quently denies the relevance of predicting behavior Giving up ihc preten-
sion to exact prediction ot behavior may eliminate the problem of the low 
correlation, but it does so at a heavy price Another and perhaps more se-
rious problem is related to accounting tor stage change When structures 
are taken to be closed it will be very difficult to maintain thai structural 
change must be adaptive to an external reality (see next subsection, cf 
chapter 5) 
We may now turn to the causahstic appi ouch in which it is assumed 
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that the relation can be profitably conceptualized as one of causal connec-
tions between structures as underlying traits and behavior, and the 
hermenéutica! approach, which conceptualizes the relation as one be-
tween structures as foundational concepts and meaningful utterances 
However, whether they can do better remains to be seen 
b) Struttili e and Behavior 
The basic relation between unity and diversity, implicit in the idea of a 
stage, can also be conceptualized in a non-structuralist framework Many 
researchers in developmental psychology make a sharp distinction be-
tween observable behavior and underlying latent organization or struc-
ture, and they conceptualize the relation between the two in a framework 
in which the relations are causal connections (at least in principle) This 
lramcwork is an instance ot what has been designated as the mechanistic 
world view within developmental psychology (ct Overton & Newman, 
1982, Overton 1991a) Methodologically, tins means that the relation is 
approached with statistical tools in order to eliminate variation that is 
considered irrelevant In ellect, a probabilistic model is thus used, and of-
ten a simple one too (often no more than the mean group scores arc pre-
sented) Nevertheless, tins (quasi) causal or (quasi) deterministic perspec-
tive leaves room lor several sophisticated models it it is recognized that 
liiere may be two directions ot causation, that there may be interaction ef-
lects and all kinds ot co-determinations by other factors Although the 
term structure is olten used by those working in this Iramework (and I 
will subscribe to this convention), the relation between diversity and 
unity here proposed is not structuralist in the sense described above (cf 
Overton, 1991a) This may very well be the cause ot frequent misconcep-
tion 
Tins causohstic perspective on die relation between unity and diver-
sity characterizes much ol the Norüi-American scene Well-known dc-
velopmentahsts like Tlavell (1972) and Wohlwill (1973) have 
(re)interpreted die Piagetian structural approach lrom this perspective 
This perspective is also taken by neo-Piagetians (e g Pascual-Leone, 
1988, Case, 198*5) who still use the notion of stage in one way or another 
and even by a post-Piagelian such as Siegler (1983, 1986) who does not 
In tact, many psychologists who oppose stage-theories make use of tins 
conceptualization We might understand the (mis-)inlerpretalions offered 
by diose opponents ol stage-theories better by analyzing how they con-
strue the stage concept 
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Basic idea 
The basic idea is that trom insight into (lie organization (or structure, 
rules, etc ) il must be possible to predict actual task behavior (or whatever 
one is interested in concept attainment, abilities, judgments, etc ). and 
because ol tins, die manifestations of specific task behavior should be 
sufficient to infer the structure 1 his approach lends itself very well to 
empirical investigation and promises direct practical relevance 
Unfortunately, in general, the results of empirical investigations have 
not supported tins interpretation of developmental stages In order to get 
an accurate prediction of behavior an endless refinement and specifica-
tion was needed which had die side-effect that development moved out of 
sight as an issue First, I will give a rather detailed description of an ex-
ample of the classical approach, then neo-Piagetian reactions will be dis-
cussed 
The classic critical studies 
A corollary ol dus basic idea is die typical research strategy of looking 
tor the crucial experiment 1 he focus is on one stage, or even one sub-
stage only, and ollen no more (hat one (or very lew) indicators arc used 
This research strategy follows from the basic assumption dial the underly-
ing organization (structure) (co)dctennmes die behavior. If this is true 
then a task must ideally be so designed dial the postulated structure is a 
necessary condition lor a successful task-solution Passing die particular 
task suggests the existence ot the postulated structure However, since 
neiUier absence of success is a guarantee ot die absence ol die structure 
nor success a gu.irantee ot die presence ot die structure, clever task de-
signs should reduce the occurrence of false positives and false negatives 
I will present an example ot such research in more detail to illustrate how 
refinement increases at the cost of overall clarity Several clusters of stud-
ies and discussions could be used to illustrate die present issue but I will 
limit myself here to infancy since uns is one ot die best researched peri-
ods 
Aldiough Piaget (1952, 1954) claimed Uiat cognitive functioning in 
infancy is dominated by stage and substage over a wide range of tasks 
and problems, he actually used a very limited number of tasks and with-
out much documented systematic variation in die assessment procedures 
Other researchers tried to replicate Piaget's findings using oüier tasks and 
new variations in die procedures According to an authoritative review by 
Harris (1983) diere appears to be little homogeneity when ditterent tasks 
in different domains of conceptualization arc compared Comparing tasks 
Systematic Reconstruction 49 
within one domain shows mixed results One ot die best researched and 
most interesting topics widun dus period concerns object permanence in 
(sub)stage IV or the sensorimotor stage So many results accumulated 
diat a meta-analysis bec.ime possible (and necessary, as die results were 
radier contusing) 
Subslage IV in object permanence development is particularly inter­
esting because children typiCcdly make an liilomiativc error in "seeking" 
a hidden object, an error dial is almost inexplicable widiout attributing to 
die child die idea that "objects" can pop into existence and vanish just 
like diat In odier words, they lack die notion of a permanent object This 
is an interesting "crucial" expenment concerning only one stage (in fact 
one subslage) Substage IV m obiect permanence development is defined 
as "die infant will search lor a completely hidden object, but often at die 
wrong place" 1 hat is, they will look for it under cushion A where il was 
previously hidden several times, while in faci it is now hidden openly be-
lore die child under В Because dus substage IV is detined by producing 
an unexpected error and nol by a "good" reaction, dus so called " A-nol-B 
error" is a strong argument against diosc who hold that object perma­
nence can be attributed even to younger children if task demands are not 
too high bor substages diat are defined by giving the correct response, it 
can always be argued diat lailure is due to die high complexity of die task 
and not to its struttili al demand It that were true it could easily lead to 
an underestimation ot children's capacity, since reducing die complexity 
would lower die age associated widi dus structure However, die fact that 
children around 8 months typically make die A-nol-B error, diat is they 
look under cushion A instead ol li, suggests diey haven't die faintest idea 
of a permanent object because odierwise it would have been just as easy 
to look under 2?, if not easier 
However, the result ol die meta-analysis ot Wellman, Cross and 
Bartsch (19X7), who analyzed 89 conditions from 30 separate studies 
over dus A-nol-B error task, was a rather disappointing conclusion diat 
probably ditterent strategies are being used by die children In some 
conditions they behaved as Piaget suggested and in odier situations diey 
did not As die problem ot décalages will be addressed in die next section 
about die pattern, I want to draw attention to die fact diat this kind of 
study illustrates that the assessment of structure has now become quite 
limited in tact we started widi a general overall stage postulated by 
Piaget "die sensorimotor stage", dien it was narrowed down to one par-
ticular content area "object permanence" Widun dus dimension of de-
velopment the tocus was on one particular substage "Stage IV 
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Coordination of secondary circular reactions" Within tins substage only 
one particular task is looked at A-not-B error task And then finally we 
arrive at task variations such as delay between hiding and seeking and 
number of locations, dial were under scrutiny in the study by Wellman, 
Cross and Bartsch (1987) 
Tins example shows tins approach driven to the limit Concentrating 
on one task per stage in tins sophisucated way still leaves us unable to 
fully explain what children do AlUiough there can no longer be any 
doubt üiat whatever the children do is structured in one way or another, it 
also cannot be denied dial circumstances play a decisive role It is not so 
much a modifying influence that is at stake here, but apparently, depend-
ing on circumstances, a totally different response may occur 
Recent developments 
Failing to get clear results widi classical-Piagetian üieory, die reaction of 
the neo-Piagetians was to refine and alter die üieory They hoped to 
achieve better results dirough detailed task analysis and by disentangling 
the influence ol structural level from so called "resource constraints" 
such as, memory demand, cognitive complexity, and cognitive differ-
ences in general (e g Case, 1985, 1992) The idea of resource constraints 
had already been suggested by Baldwin long before Piaget 
According to neo-Piagetians, die intuition ot an age-related sequence 
of stages and oí a homogeneous functioning of an individual are bodi 
fully correct but must be explained in some oüier way dian had been sug-
gested by Piagctian structural theory Attentional capacity (also referred 
to as "working memory") is postulated as an upper limit constraint on die 
complexity ol cognitive functioning dial can account for die alleged ho-
mogeneity in functioning The horizontal organization is, according to 
Case (1992), not to be attributed to lntercoordinalion ol structures in die 
sense of a sort ot "structures ot die whole", but instead to the malura-
tionally determined upper limit ot cognitive complexity Aldiough diey 
clami to retain die classical Piagetian postulate mat "Children assimilate 
experience to existing cognitive structures" (Case, 1992, ρ 66) dieir con­
ception ot die nature of a stage differs markedly from die classical 
Piagetian conception because the unity is Üiought here to be the result of 
complexity constraints, and consists in levels of problem-solving capabil-
ities This neo-Piagetian conceptualization seems to me radier ambiguous 
Process considerations are not used to explain deviations from a ho-
mogeneous pattern but conversely die maturational tactor (which is in 
dus case a dynamic process factor) is responsible lor the homogeneity At 
die same unie it is claimed dial diere are "mental processes Uiat underlie 
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behavior and which may be presumed to control it" (Case, 1992, ρ 113) 
Task behavior is determined by cognitive structures, but since there is a 
multitude ot such structures tins does not account for homogeneity The 
question now is what the function of the underlying structure could be 
The idea of a stage is relamed, on a smaller scale, while dilterenl de­
velopmental paths are possible, but these different paths are regulated by 
an even more general constraint in complexity so that, given proper as­
sessment, a rather homogeneous picture emerges The consequences of 
tins reconceptuali/.alJon arc that the idea of radical structural or of con­
ceptual differences is discarded and that progression remains unaccounted 
lor 
Conclusion 
The causalistic approach to the problem of stages can be regarded as a re­
action to Piaget's structural approach, either as critical or well-meant mis­
interpretation, or reinterpretalion, or as a constructive transformation of 
thai approach In each case, die point ol departure was the inability of 
Piaget's original structural approach to predict behavior What actually 
happened was that Piaget's ideas were transformed and assimilated to the 
empiricist (logical positivist) tr.unework that dominated the North-
American scene in psychology before the discovery of Piaget. In the 
causalistic approach the complex problem of die relation between unity 
and diversity is reduced to one ot die questions posed in the introduction 
ol this section How to conceive the relation between structure and task 
behavior^ 01 course, tins implies a non-structuralist position since for 
structuralism the mam topic was the relation between structure and ele­
ments and elements can m tins respect not be equated with task behavior 
I-or die critics who interpreted Piaget's structural approach into die 
causatisi framework, the main issue is the unpredictability of behavior, 
fins position is best exemplified by Bramerd's influential commentary 
(Bramerd, 1978) Because structures are supposed to determine the actual 
manifestations, and because the empirical evidence ot predictability was 
radier weak at best, Piaget's theory was declared useless It the aim is to 
explain behavior, and it the structure is accepted as die entity dial ex­
plains, then, tor example, being a conserver means having a mental 
make-up which causes the subieci to approach a task in a specific way 
(absolutely or with high probability) 'Uns was the basis of Bramerd's cri­
tique The structural unity, in this case, was taken to mean reaction to die 
environment in a consistent way However, it turned out dial the empiri­
cal evidence for this kind ol broad stages, implying homogeneous func­
tioning, is absent or much loo weak 
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The followers and revisionists reacted by supplementing or revising 
Uie theory to account lor behavior, but although (he resulting ingenious 
studies contributed much to developmental psychology, they obscured the 
developmeiitally relevant unity 'Ilic problem was dial so much theoretical 
etfort had to be put into accurately grasping behavioral diversity, that the 
idea of underlying unity nearly disappeared into die background The role 
in the theory played by Piaget's structures d'ensemble was replaced by 
many very specific local determinants of behavior Ncverüiclcss, the idea 
of unity was not completely discarded Neo-Piagetians like Case reintro-
duced die idea of a unity by invoking the growüi of die nervous system as 
an explanation 
The causalistic approach therefore suffers from a serious drawback, at 
least, if it wants to achieve üiose dungs a stage-Uicory is -in my view-
mtended for Even it suited to provide a detailed process analysis, it is 
impossible to gain an overall picture of the capabilities and lunctioning of 
an infant, and even less to get a picture ot the logic ot development (see 
next section on die pattern) As Case admits 'there is an opposition be-
tween increasingly refining die analysis ot die process which results in 
detailed descriptions of certain tasks and keeping sight ot die overall pat-
tern of mental functioning across différent tasks at different age levels 
which is aimed at by structural analysis" (Case, 1985, ρ 68) Thus, while, 
we get a belter picture of what a concrete individual might do on a given 
task, dirough die work of die Piagel's followers and critics, we tend to 
lose sight of die stage For nco-Piagetians die situation is slightly differ­
ent, diey present an overall picture, but so far it seems a radier tnvial ex­
planation more dilticull tasks are solved at a later age because they are 
more dilticull 
Several reactions are possible m dus situation one could abandon die no­
tion of general structures, one could -as is done by die neo-Piagetians-
hope dial die combination of structural analysis and functional process 
analysis will eventually bodi describe in an empirically satisfying way 
and keep sight on overall global changes It should be noted, however, 
dial if a totally consistent relation were tound, in that task performance 
were clearly determined by underlying structures, it would be ditficult to 
imagine how structures might change or develop in reaction to experience 
(see next subsection, Fodor, 1980, see chapter 5) Finally, it might be die 
case Üiíil die proposed type oí relation between unity and diversity (which 
was an alternative to die strictly structuralist conceptualization) is itself 
not very fruitful alter all 
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с) Structure and Meaningful Content 
liiere is yet another way of conceptualizing the relation between diversity 
and unity which is also inspired by Piagetian theory. It can be seen as a 
variant of (lie structuralist approach, but the focus is here on meanings 
and conceptualizations rather than on behavior. This approach, which is 
important enough to give il a separate heading, can be designated as 
henneneutic or depth-henneneutic or narrative. Kohlberg's theory of 
moral development is a good example (at least in certain interpretations 
such as Habermas' (1984)) but also Damon's (1977) work and Parson's 
(1987) theory of aesthetic judgment could be cited. An even more radical 
variant is (lie foundational approach (cf. van Haaften & Korihals, 1986; in 
press). It should be noted, however, that the henneneutic approach is not 
confined to moral and aesthetic development. Each of the three ap­
proaches discussed in this section may be used for every domain of de­
velopment, although it must be admitted that there seem to be some 
affinities belween ihc chosen approach and the domain of development 
under consideration. 
It is characteristic of this henneneutic approach that the entity of de-
velopmenl is more clearly acknowledged to be detached from the indi­
vidual person as an organism. What develops is: "the number concept", 
or "conceptions of morality", etc. These are entities thai can be insianti-
aied in many individuals mid in different varieties. Opinions differ as to 
whether development implies that there is one ultimate conception of, for 
example, morality that is slepwise-like approached or whether there are 
several distinct conceptions of morality that may be ordered developmen-
tally. 
Basic idea 
The basic idea is that people have different conceptualizations and make 
different judgments. Notwithstanding these differences, however, there 
are only a limited number of forms for these conceptualizations and 
judgments. Some of these tonus can be ordered in a sequence whereby 
succeeding forms of conceptualizing and judging can be seen as the result 
of a transformation of the previous form. These conceptualizations and 
judgments and (heir underlying forms are the proper subject matter for 
developmental theory. 
Kohlberg (in Kauffman & Kohlbcrg, 1987) is very clear that we must 
start with the diversity of moral judgments of subjects. These moral 
judgments arc the content that musi be taken seriously and interpreted as 
referring to moral re;üity as perceived by those subjects, and therefore the 
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motives, interpretations, and reasons which people give for their conduct 
and decisions are important. These reasons are not treated as excuses or 
masquerades to disguise bad intentions but constitute the basics of moral-
ity. "To assess the moral quality of behavior requires one to confront 
complex issues of interpretation, for both motivation and judgment must 
be considered in such assessments before behavior can be said to be 
moral conduct or action" (Kauffman & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 2). In 
Kohlberg's theory the motives and judgments, the meaningful material as 
seen from the perspective of the subjects themselves, play the role of the 
diversity bound by the unity of the underlying structure. 
For Kohlberg, the underlying unity, or structure, is found in the rela-
tions among ideas in individual thinking. "We assume that there is a pat-
tern of connections within the subject's meaning - a structure or set of re-
lations and transformations" (Kauffman & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 2). 
The hermeneutic approach conceptualizes the relation between unity 
and diversity in a way that deviates from the previous two approaches. 
The underlying unity is thought to structure or organize, but not to deter-
mine actual instances of the diversity. The idea is that people try to give 
sense to their life and normally conduct themselves in a rational way. 
According to tins narrative model we must try to understand people be-
cause they conduct themselves normally in an understandable way. 
However, this understanding presupposes shared background knowledge 
including shared forms of reasoning, conceptualizing, and judging. 
Therefore the appropriate method for inferring the underlying fundamen-
tal stage structures is by trying to understand and interpret utterances of 
subjects. 
According to Kohlberg (1984, p. 218) interpretation requires that the 
interviewer attempts to take the role of the oilier, to sec tilings from her or 
his conscious viewpoint. Secondly, this requires trying to understand in 
terms of the subject's meanings. Thirdly, it requires shared philosophical 
categories of meanings. 
Kohlberg's theoretical reflections remain rallier global and unspecific. 
His position is elaborated in more detail in concrete examples in the scor-
ings-manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Other examples which illustrate 
die distinction between structure (or form) and content (or surface) can be 
found in the Üieory of moral development provided by Damon (1977). 
Consider the following pairs of statements, related to children's verbal 
judgments about their social world, quoted from interviews with different 
children: 
A. The teacher should give more ice cream to the girls, be-
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cause she likes them better. The boys aren't as nice; they 
just make noise and fight all the time. 
B. You shouldn't let a girl be president. Girls are loo stupid, 
and they're not strong enough to make real decisions. 
A. George isn't my friend anymore. After all the times I let 
him play with my toys, he wouldn't lend me his bicycle. 
B. Karen is my friend because she is nice. She gives me jew­
elry and candy ;md I give her tilings too. 
Here we have examples of pairs of statements in which the A and В sen­
tence have a similar structure but a very different contení. In the first pair 
boüi statements are organized by an identical social principle: The alloca-
tion of reward according to personal characteristics attributed to sex. In 
die second pair both statements consider friendship as a relation defined 
by the exchange of material go(xls or favors. However, the conclusions 
drawn in both pairs are opposite. Now consider: 
A. They should split the money up evenly, because it's not 
fair if someone gets more üian anyone else. That just leads 
to a lot of fussing and fighting, and everyone getting mad. 
B. Everyone should get die same amount. P>eryone worked 
real hard to earn Hie money, so they all deserve to get it. If 
someone gels less, he'll just say, "Well, I worked as hard 
as everyone else, so I should get die same," and he could 
get pretty upset. 
Here we have statements (A compared to B) wiüi similar content but with 
a different structure. In dús case (lie content is similar in that die money 
should be divided evenly. However, statement A proposes equality (and 
the resulting "fairness") as a means of avoiding die consequences of dis-
sension and turmoil. Statement B, on die other hand, proposes equality as 
a means of giving everyone his just deserts (for a further analysis of die 
statements see Damon, 1977, p. 27 ff.). 
These principles cannot be read off just like that. The content is orga-
nized by die principles and the principles take die form of some deeply 
held beliefs. No causal determination is implied in moving from die struc-
ture to die ultenuice or vice versa. The only claim is (hat statements with 
a similar structure are generated from die Siune sort of background, for 
example, ideas about whai a "friend" is. Going from die utterance to die 
structure therefore requires interpretation. Kohlberg's distinction between 
form and content may be misleading because by content he refers to boüi 
die concrete moral decisions and die reasons and justifications people 
give to support diese decisions. It is better to distinguish duce levels: 
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first, there are the decisions mid judgments that are normally of a verbal 
nature (but not necessarily so), second come the motives, reasons, situa-
tion-interpretations that were implicitly or explicitly involved in the 
judgments (tins is the diversity according to our analysis), and third 
comes the general tonn underlying the motives (the unity) 
However, Kohlberg's hermeneutic approach (which he also character-
izes as phenomenological), with its focus on meanings, has met severe 
criticism The Kohlbergian tradition is under constant fire from psychol-
ogists who see action and actual decisions as the primary moral phenom-
ena (eg Bandura, 1991, cf Tunel 1990) For Kohlberg there are two 
reasons to focus on meanings judgments and reasons arc essential to un-
derstand morality, and they are developmental^ interesting because it is 
the form ot these judgments and reasons that develops It seems that 
changes in behavior over the life span show a more complex and less 
consistent pattern than changes in the tonn ol moral judgments 
Nevertheless, Kohlberg always has been concerned with moral behavior 
and conduct loo (cl Tunel, 1990) He has tried several times to specify 
how moral judgment and moral behavior are connected He has claimed 
that on the one hand, insight in moral judgments and meanings accompa-
nying behavior is required to know whether the behavior has moral 
meaning The moral meaning of acts should never be decided exclusively 
by the researcher without consulting those affected by these actions. On 
die other hand, he has proposed mediating variables like ego strength, 
attention, and willpower in order to explain and predict morally relevant 
behavior (Kohlberg, 1981) Furthermore, he acknowledged that moral de-
velopment is broader than judgments and reasoning concerning hypothet-
ical dilemmas alone, and invoked responsibility and autonomy judgments 
as mediating factors between judgment and action (Kohlberg, 1984). 
More recently, he has turned attention to moral attachment as an impor-
tant motivational tactor lor moral action (Kohlberg and Dicssncr, 1991) 
Tunel, in addition, pointed out the relevance ol other kinds of social 
judgments (Tunel, 1990) in accounting lor behavior 
A more thoroughly worked out conceptualization of the relation in tins 
hermeneutic approach is the idea that the basic unity is a foundation (in 
the philosophical sense) underlying reasoning and experience For exam-
ple the basic conviction, held by a subject, ot what morality is all about 
also informs him or her how to judge situations and how to make moral 
decisions This conceptualization of development is elaborated by the 
Philosophy ot Development research group in Nijmegen (e g van 
Haaften 1984, 1988, 1990, van Haal ten & Korthals, in press, Korthals, 
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1992; Snik, 1990). Λη underlying "foundational" structure is a system of 
related concepts which is the precondition for (lie possibility of perceiv­
ing, experiencing, reasoning, and judging. It might be argued that, for ex­
ample, experiencing and perceiving are structured, constrained, and or­
dered by these foundational structures (or conceptual schemes, frames of 
mind, etc.) in such a way that some perceptual possibilities are opened 
while others remain closed. In other words, perception is constituted, but 
not determined, by such foundational structures (Snik, 1990, p. 86). 
It is commonly accepted that specific scientific dieories have such 
foundations thai demarcate the logical space in which they operate. 
However, we can interpret developmental stages, in the tradition of 
Piaget and Kohlberg, in such a way loo. Each stage is then characterized 
as a specific basic prc-thcoretical intuition about the character of the do­
main in question. For example, each of the six stages in Kohlberg's the­
ory can be seen as constituting a qualitatively different moral point of 
view. 
There is a crucial difference between the rules that operate within the 
domain and the rules that constitute the domain. The unity is provided by 
the presuppositions or rules, etc. that constitute the domain. The structure 
is not to be equated with the production rules thai describe an ability but 
instead with the rules thai constitute ihc phenomenon as such. One may 
compare this to the rules of chess without which there would be no such 
game at all (van Häuften, 1990). 
In development, these foundations are transformed: in a new stage of 
moral development a different idea emerges of what morality is all about. 
Although the inspiration for this position derives from Kant, foundational 
structures as understood here are not transcendental a-hisioric, but subject 
lo development. In chapter 5 and 6 some problems related to this concep-
tion are discussed, for example: is it possible for novel stages to develop, 
in this interpretation? And can it be argued that they are better than the 
previous stage? 
Conclusion 
In the most radical iind clear expression of this third approach mentioned 
above the relation between unity and diversity is construed as a relation 
between "to be interpreted meaningful material" -mostly in the form of 
utterances- and "underlying foundations for giving meaning". From this 
deplh-hemienculic point of view different stages offer different founda-
tions within a particular developmental dimension. These foundations are 
constitutive for knowing, experiencing, and acting. For example, the 
moral point of view, in whatever implicitly used intuitive form, demar-
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cates which phenomena count as moral phenomena and which are not 
To sum up the main teatures ot this dcptli-henneneulic approach, first, 
three levels are distinguished (a) judgments, expressions and decisions of 
individuals, (b) the reasons they may offer tor these expressions and (c) 
the structure, which demarcates the kinds of reasons that can be invoked 
Secondly, foundations and reasons together cannot be thought of as be-
longing solely to an individual subject nor to behavior They are symboli-
cal entities that, like language, belong to the intcrsub)eclive shared social 
world Third, in moving from reasons and judgments to structures (and 
stages) interpretation is unavoidable 'I hat is, a step of interpretation be-
tween die wide array of diverse actions or utterances ol subjects and the 
structural reconstruction is needed 
Since the depüi-hermeneulic approach has dillerent obieclive than the 
causalistic approach it is not useful to view one ot them as better than the 
other The depth-hermeneutic approach otters no solutions for die prob-
lems of the causalistic approach It we look at a stage as a foundauon for 
reasoning and experiencing, it is not possible to predict what actual rea-
sons will be used by knowing what stage a subject is in hven knowing 
die sort of reasons a subject will use does not determine die actual deci-
sions he or she will reach concerning a particular dilemma, different con-
clusions are still possible Knowing what decision someone has made still 
does not guarantee thai he or she will act on that decision However, 
widiin die perspective ot die deplh-hermeneulic approach, dus kind of 
behavior prediction is not die ultimate goal tor die dieory Much more 
important is a broad characterization of a stage and in dus respect die fo-
cus on meaning and toundalions is truittul brom this perspective, a broad 
characteriiation is sought ol what individuals in such a stage lake as die 
character ol die domain or dimension in question (e g how they under-
stand an "object" or what diey lake "morality" to be) and trom this fol-
lows what diey will find acceptable reasons and ludgments 
Conclusion with regard to Unity and Diversity 
The diree approaches to die problem of die relation between unity and di-
versity nol only differ in die way diat diey conceive die alleged unity but 
also diey dilter on what properly counts as die diversity that relates to die 
unily In structuralism die relation between diversity and unity is best ex-
pressed by die central metaphor of die indivisible part - whole In die 
mainstream causalistic approach the relation is expressed as die an-
tecedent organization (unity) diat codeicninnes die behavior (diversity) 
In die hcrmencutic approach it is die narrative model that expresses die 
relation between meaningful expressions (diversity) and the loundations 
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(in Uic philosophical sense) that make possible these expressions (unity). 
Although the structural approach (and systems theory) was popular 
and promising in the titties and sixties, some serious problems later 
emerged 1 he reaction ol diose who saw die lack of homogeneity and 
predictability as the main problem was to incorporate lunctionalist con-
siderations in order io be better able to explain individual behavior 
(organization) For those who telt üiat Piaget's structuralist approach was 
loo much focused on logical thinking and too vague for die justification 
of educational interventions, the reaction was to incorporate ideas about 
rational reconstruction in order to be beller able to unclei stand human 
reasoning and conceptualization Both reactions offer important new av-
enues for stage-theories 
In die introduction to this section, die problem that different stage as-
sessments oí ten show a low correlation for the same persons over dilfer-
ent situations was discussed II such a situation is encountered six ques-
tions may be posed bor the structuralist approach the question about 
structure and task-content is most important Inconsistencies arc incen-
tives lor seeking better formal models (e g Piaget) bor the causalistic 
approach the question about structure and behavior is most important 
Inconsistencies were the reason eiüier to discard die notion ot develop-
mental stage or to include oilier laclors in the model, such as working 
memory capacity (neo-Piagetians) For die hermeneutic approach die re-
lation widi meaning content is important, and inconsistencies were 
treated as incentive to refine die interpretation system The questions 
about homogeneity and subiecLs touch upon die issue of stability of struc-
tures lo be addressed below Finally, it will be clear diat die notion of 
structure d'ensemble is treated dillerenlly m die three approaches Tins 
notion makes sense exclusively within die structuralist approach, while in 
the causalisiic approach и was understood in such a manner as to lead to 
its rejection as usetul tor the description ol development 
Options with regard to Stability 
I have discussed lliree basic approaches to the relation between unity and 
diversity in a synchronic sense Stages and structures, however, are nor­
mally understood to organize reasoning, behavior, performance, concep­
tualizations, etc , in a diachronic sense loo That is, in many developmen­
tal theories it is assumed lh.it one can be in a stage or use a main stage for 
years Apart from developmental transitions (see next section), a person 
is thought to lunclion al a cerumi stage for quite a long tune This intro­
duces Hie problem ot die relative stabilii) ol the structures Siage-slruc-
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tures are not supposed to change all too easily with time, and according to 
the classical ideas about development, the transition to the subsequent 
stage should come about only when it is due. Normally, no intervention is 
required for this, except for a limited possibility of speeding tilings up. 
Thus, structures have to be relatively stable and Ulis holds irrespective of 
die approach one chooses. It should be noted thai if one argues thai liiere 
is no stability at all ihc implication would be thai liiere are no stages. A 
minimum of stability is required even to speak of stage-structures. 
However, complete stability is just as problematic since it would make 
developmental, structural, transitions impossible (see next section). Again 
diere are very different ideas about how stability should be understood 
and explained: stages could be seen, for example, as inborn, genetically 
fixed, and gradually emerging; they could be considered stable as far as 
they are in equilibrium or as far as they are a result of self-organization; 
they might pertain lo such deeply held convictions that they are difficult 
to change; lliey could be stable because of their structural wholeness; or 
the stability could even be artificial and illusory. 
The issue of relative stability is rather complex. It is not possible to 
reduce all relevant ideas to a few mutually exclusive basic positions or 
options. There are several perspectives on stability, each backed by good 
arguments, and in sonic cases combinations can be made. The issue is 
complex mainly because die assumed stability must not conflict wiüi 
other properties of stage development. A potentially conflicting require-
ment lies in the fact that the stage structures are often believed to undergo 
small changes in order to adapt themselves to the environment, and there-
fore an important consideration concerns the conceptualization of such 
exchanges with (lie environment (e.g. assimilation and accommodation). 
Another potential problem is the requirement thai more radical change, in 
the sense of moving to a new stage, must remain possible (see chapter 5). 
For some, diese problems appear so grave thai they think stage stability is 
a mere illusion. 
At least five questions are relevant: (1) What is die ontologica! status 
of stage-slruclurcs? (2) What is die presumed location of these stage-
structures? (3) How is stability explained? (4) How is the openness for 
small, widiin-stage change explained? (5) How is die openness for die 
more radically structural change explained? I see several options 
-consistent widi die idea of stages in varying degrees- which can be 
grouped in five clusters of positions. 
a) Illusory Stability 
A first option would be to declare die apparent stability illusory and to 
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deny that there really is relative stability as understood above. Stability is 
illusory for example, when there is only a continuous How of small 
changes and when it is only the classificalory systems that suggest stabil­
ity. For example, a division of a lifetime into youth, adulthood, and old 
age suggests three stable periods but Uns may be artificial if the transi­
tions are smooth and borders are arbitrary 
b) Externally induced Stability 
Another frequently adopted position holds thai the socio-cultural envi­
ronment induces stability. For example, living in a relatively simple cul­
tural setting may eliminate the need for structural change, whereas going 
to school stimulates new activities and the emergence of a new stage. 
These effects of social context, together with fundamental biological 
changes, are taken to result in so called bio-behavioral shifts (Cole & 
Cole, 1989) as an explanation for global stage change. According to this 
perspective, development is in large part determined by the environment 
c) Biological-Neurological Stability 
An important cluster ol options is suggested by relating the relative stabil­
ity to neurological maturation Two variants can be discerned When 
structures are supposed ю be lixed genetically, development itself is also 
genetically determined (nalivisin) It is even templing, from this perspec­
tive, to deny all development proper, but as far as Uiai is not the case, we 
have a maluralional position, which accounts tor some kind ol develop­
ment (although nothing really new emerges, see chapter 5) This position 
denies any substantial influence from the environment (Fodor, 1980; cf 
Flanagan, 1984) Alternatively, ihc idea ol resource constraints, as enter­
tained by neo-Piageiian authors, is relevant here All neo-Piagelians in­
corporale such considerations in their system A child remains within a 
stage as long as working memory does not increase beyond a certain 
threshold 
In bolli variants, structures are taken to be real, possibly with a neuro­
logical basis, and located within the person. From bolli illese perspectives 
a person can be characterized by a single stage In conjunction with a fo­
cus on behavior -which is a suggestive combination- this leads to a 
search for a high degree ol homogeneity Stability itself is mainly ex­
plained by the slow growth of ihe neurological substratum. Radical struc­
tural change is possible only it a certain threshold is passed in this neuro­
logical growth 
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d) Stability at the Level of Ideas 
The next option is to locate structure in ideas instead ot in a person 
Subjects can use these ideas Idea-systems, p.iradigms, frameworks, 
foundations, etc can be very strong and difficult to change It is often 
very difficult to forsake «in adopted position, «uid it one adopts a radically 
different perspective it can be an enormous task to reorganize every rele-
vant part of it Ag.un there .ire several varianti 
Intermenlal structures Miller (1986, ct chapter 5) worked out the 
idea ot structures that are located between subjects but are real neverthe-
less Intermental structures describe a sort of intersubjectively shared 
network of unproblematic background knowledge that is presupposed as 
a reality sui generis 
Structural Since structures pertain to networks ot meanings they are 
stable in so far as certain seti of ideas fit together (as a structure) From 
Uns perspective, individual differences are not interesting The stability is 
due precisely to the property ot structures that they are closed and pre-
serve Üieir identity in spue of the continuous How of transformations of 
the elements I his is a plausible option tor (lie structuralist and henneneu-
tic approaches However, the ontological status of these structures of 
ideas is unclear Nevertheless, some consequences can be spelled out 
There is no reason why a person cannot have several structures at the 
Siune time at his disposal lhis latter idea is worked out, for example, in 
Rest's complex developmental model ot moral development (Rest, 1983, 
cf chapter 3 and 4) 
However, uns stability of structures due to its "closedness" must not 
preclude any influence lroin outside It development is taken to imply 
adaptation, experience has to play a role, ot which knowledge acquisition 
is an aspect that cannot be neglected Wiihm-stage changes should still be 
possible and ot course it would be further problematical il the closedness 
of structures is understood in such a way that structural changes are im-
possible (see chapter 6) Therefore Piaget insisted on a dynamic form of 
structuralism According to Piagel, die possibility of change is dependent 
upon die fact that structures are structures ot transformations I his by it-
self is no reason to speak of "dynamical structuralism" Since even a 
structure of transformations might be static However, tins transformation 
of die structure itself (second order transformation) is, according to Piaget 
related to die fact diat structures consist ol transformations As a conse-
quence ot the peculiar relation between structure and element a structure 
presupposes many actualizations It shows Uscii not in one, but in many 
operations, which unphes repetition It is one ol die properties of a stage 
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thai it is a structure, which means dial is a whole entity To describe it 
completely is impossible since dial would require specifying all elements, 
all relations between them, and the more general properties However, 
some of its characteristics can be given and die best way is to specify 
which translomiations (operations) arc possible or allowed in it Thus die 
structure is a structure of translomiations, wiüitn die boundaries of a 
whole, in which the operations (widnn die set) are constantly repeated 
and combined I doubt il one can say that one operation by itself has a 
structure 1-iach operation is real in die sense that it lakes tune and it often 
operates upon die external world, and dierefore each repetition concerns a 
slightly different situation and implies a minor change ot the structure. 
According lo Piaget structures can enrich diemselves in dus way (see 
chapter 6) 
e) Stahtliix ¡inoligli Іщииіітнт or Selfoiganization 
Anodier cluster is lomicd by entertaining die idea ol internal feedback 
mechanisms I Ins is die most purely internal explanation for stability 
The process itsell displays an inherent tendency towards regulation I 
mention two variants 
Equilibiation approach According to Piaget, die exchange between 
die epistenuc subiect and die environment is regulated by feedback and 
teedlorward mechanisms This is described in detail in his dieory about 
achieving equilibrium (Piaget, 1985, cf chapter 6) 'Ihis presupposes 
structures as properties ot .iciual subjects, aldiough Piaget's dieory only 
addresses the abstract level Piaget is an ontological realist but not an 
epistemologica! realist, though he can be said to be an epistemologica! 
constructivist Psychological structures are diought to be psychological 
realities dial allect individual functioning, regulating action (or internal­
ized conduct) and aciion-disposilions The subiect ot diese structures is a 
generalized, so called, episienuc subject, which leaves no room tor ac­
counting lor individu.il dillcrences It is assumed in fact, that individual 
differences in actu<ü development are such that in the long run diey all 
converge to a single (or maybe a tew) general pattern(s) (but cf 
Chapman, 1988a) Il is this sense ol stiucture diat Piaget has at mind 
when he speaks «ibout his descriptive structural theory Seder (1989) has 
given an analysis ol llie main characteristics ot dus kind ol structure in 
die Piagelian tradition ( 1 ) Structures emerge out ol odier structures (2) 
Structures lend to change and lo elaborate diemselves although diey are 
closed in anodier sense (4) All structures have an epistenuc and represen-
tational I unction tor the subiect (4) All structures al feci die subject, diey 
have an internal emotional value (important for die tendency to change) 
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(5) Structures can combine themselves wiUi other structures and substruc-
tures to form new complex and overall structures (6) Structures also 
change as result of their continued repetition, they become more flexible 
and economic 
Non-linear dynamics approach Catastrophe theory has recently at-
tracted attention in developmental psychology (van der Maas & 
Molenaar, 1992) This Uieory is employed to explain die relative stability 
ot complex systems (and die sudden disequilibrium claimed as character-
istic of stage transitions) This explanation is based on mathematical 
models dial display characteristics often expected of developing systems 
Such a model consists, tor example, ot complex mathematical equations 
Üiat have stable solutions even üiough die variables are subject to consid-
erable changes, while, if die changes in die variables go over a certain 
threshold, die system becomes unstable, dial is, die equation has many so-
lutions (Molenaar & Oppenheimer, 1985) 
Conclusion with regard to Stability 
If die relative stability is taken to be an intrinsic property of die develop-
mental process, it could be located at die biological-neurological level, at 
die level ol ideas, or at the level of die structure and organization itself 
Nevertheless, die conceptualization ot die relative stability ol structures is 
still a problem and lurdier work is required belore a linai evaluation of 
die positions can be given There is no basic decision involved nor any 
exclusive choice required, because several perspectives may be com-
bined However, die position taken on dus issue depends in part on die 
model ol unity and diversity adopted (see above) and on decisions about 
die pattern (see below) For die causahstic perspective die biological-
neurological position is most attractive (c g notions as resource con-
straints invoked by neo-Piagetians) For the structuralist perspective a 
combination of biological and ideational might be used From the 
hermeneulic perspective, the stability is tound at die level ot ideas and 
not necessarily persons, so that bodi the logical and die artificial position 
are acceptable alternatives A combination ol dynamical and logical fac-
tors is precisely what Piaget's equilibration theory was aimed at (see 
chapter 6) 
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3 The Pattern 
The pattern ot stages is all important, as indicated by die preliminary 
definition of a developmental stage in section 1 According to Uns defini-
tion a developmental stage serves to classify, from a developmental per-
spective, in order to describe or understand or explain or justify changes 
m human performance and competence A developmental pattern pro-
posed in the context of a psychological or educational theory is always a 
reconstructed pattern What is interesting about Uns kind of reconstruc-
tion is that it is aimed al a üieoretical knowledge of very general charac-
teristics ot developmental tracciones (it is supposed to provide the 
framework tor the description ol some type ol development), and may be 
used to ídenüly deviations lrom the normal pattern (normative function), 
and in some cases it may be used to assist development beyond its current 
limits Such patterns are like the grammatical rules that reconstruct part 
ol our ability to use language, or like rules ot logic, both of which pro-
vide theoretical knowledge, but also can have a normative function and 
can even play a constructive role sometimes It is precisely Uns combina-
tion Uial makes Uicm interesting This was a summary of my answer to 
the first question related to developmental patterns Why is there such a 
persistent urge to find stage patterns7 
However, not all developmental psychologists will find tins prelimi-
nary definition and subsequent remarks acceptable, and I will not Uiere-
tore restrict the discussion exclusively to what would tall under tins defi-
nition in Uie review ot proposals lor collections ot defining characteristics 
dial tollow below 
In addition, it should be noted that many developmental psychologists 
prefer to speak ol sequences instead ol Mage patterns 11ns preference for 
the notion ol sequence is partly based on perceived problems wiUi ше 
presumed characteristics ol single stages, problems winch I have dis­
cussed in the previous section I will also leave open all the options dis­
cussed in the previous section Ilius, classification ot actions or responses 
or reasoning or conceptualizations might be achieved Uirough structural 
analysis or statistical manipulation or through narrative interpretation Uiat 
unites human lunctioning In the present section, me only issue is Uie te-
lation and oidenng ot Uie stages (as classes) Uiemselves What kind of 
claims can be made concerning the pattern ol those stages «aid what kind 
ol evidence would be required to evaluate those claims'' It is important to 
keep Uie two ditterent aspects ol classification (see ρ 47) separate 
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Nevertheless, quite often there is reluctance to accept a stage model 
and as an alternative a sequence model is endorsed. Wc must therefore 
first be clear over the differences and overlap between the notion of a se-
quence and the notion of a pattern of stages. I will use the term pattern for 
die full stage development and the term sequence for die vertical structure 
only, that is, wiüiout speculation about the horizontal structure. The dis-
tinction between horizontal and vertical structure was introduced by 
Wohlwill (1973). Horizontal structure pertains to what normally is under-
stood as structure and implies a high degree of synchronic connectedness, 
while "vertical structure", a cumbersome term, refers to the diachronic 
connectedness in cognitive functioning. It is radier peculiar to speak 
about structure here, but I agree widi Wohlwill that two dimensions of in-
terconnectedness (diachronic and synchronic) can be discerned. Speaking 
of a pattern of developmental stages presupposes bodi a considerable de-
gree of horizontal mid vertical interconnectedness, whereas die notion of 
sequence also presupposes vertical interconnectedness but only a limited 
degree of horizontal connectedness. Many developmentalists consider it 
legitimate to analyze sequences but avoid speaking of stages (Flavell, 
1982b), but I am not convinced dial this is ші adequate response to the 
problems discussed in the introduction of section 2. If it is assumed diat 
the only difference between stage patterns and sequences is one of degree 
of horizontal interconnectedness, dial is, if sequences are just stages but 
without the pretension of covering whole domains, dien the analysis of 
stage patterns to be given below will apply equally to sequences. If se­
quences are understood, however, as pertaining only to very specific task 
behaviors, dien if the degree of horizontal connectedness is almost zero, 
generalization is possible only to a very limited degree. Compared widi 
stage models, Ulis is not so much an alternative but more like a total elim­
ination of all pretensions to stage-Üieories. In view of the discussion in 
section 2,1 do not believe dial we have to adopt such a restricted interpre-
tation. Λ more interesting alternative, using a collection of üiose se-
quences as building blocks for stages, is considered below. 
In the remainder of diis section two issues related to die stage pattern 
will be discussed. The first issue pertains to die type of pattern. Several 
alternatives will be reviewed. The second issue, which I take to be a basic 
issue, concerns die ordering of die stages in a pattern. Three points of 
view are distinguished in this respect: empiricist, laxonomical and devel-
opmental, and die principal ordering criteria correspond widi die perspec-
tive taken. From die empiricist point of view the temporal ordering pre-
vails; while from die taxonomical point of view die hierarchical ordering 
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is primary; whilst from die developmental point of view the ordering is 
based on specific kind of process characteristics (such as reflective ab­
straction and self-organization). 
Options with regard to Type of Patterns 
We have first to deal with alternative forms for the classical stage pattern. 
The classical pattern is a so-called "subsequent displacement" model ex­
emplified by the Piagetian main stages and Kohlberg's stages of moral 
judgment. However, there are several alternative types of patterns: com­
plex additive, branched, and (spirally) recurrent. 
a) Classical, Subsequent Displacement Pattern 
The classical, subsequent displacement pattern is one in which a series of 
stages displace each other in an invariant order. Apart from some transi­
tional overlap a subject is thought to occupy a stage until Uic next comes 
up and the current one disappears. This may seem straightforward enough 
but the notion of "displacement" can be used in tliree very different ways. 
First, the denial that stage /i+l completely displaces stage η expresses a 
commitment to a stage model as opposed to a radical change model in 
which the situation before the change is incommensurable with the sub­
sequent situation (cf. Kuhn, 1962). Thus, in Ulis sense, stages certainly do 
not displace each oilier. However, secondly, in a weaker sense, die idea 
that stages displace each other is characteristic for the classical stage 
model and Uic opposite idea, thai there is much more continuity, is re­
garded as inconsistent wiih the idea of stages. Third, claiming a dis­
placement model may be used lo lake a stance in the issue of the degree 
of change and alteration involved in moving to a subsequent stage within 
die classical model. In this context, speaking of a displacement model 
implies preference for a more radical variety of change, such as reorgani­
zation. Oüier varianis in (his respeel are: addition and integration. 
Addition implies that all of slage η is preserved in the subsequent stage in 
a recognizable form. However, stage /i's meaning is relativized through 
Uie new additions. Integration implies a rather stronger position in dial 
the old slage, although subsumed under die new one, is not necessarily 
still recognizable because the old elements, üiough retained, are inte-
grated into a new whole. Reorganization implies the strongest variant; el-
ements and struciure of ihe previous stage are altered substantially by 
being organized into a new structure and not much of the previous stage 
remains recognizable. 
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b) Complex-additive Pattern 
The first alternative type of stage pattern, complex additive, is best illus-
trated by the "complex" developmental model presented by Rest (1979, 
1983) The standard subsequent displacement model (Hie "simple" model 
according to Rest) assumes that a person can be characterized at any 
given time by just one stage (except in the transitional phase) In contrast, 
the complex developmental model holds dial a new stage is a new way of 
reasoning that is added to die repertoire ot a subject In that case a subject 
can have several stages at her disposal wiUi some ol Uiem more dominant 
üian oüiers (see chapter 4) In Uns model a choice-problem might emerge 
when, in a given subject, several alternative ways ol reasoning compete 
c) Branched Pattern 
The second alternative, branched, can be seen as an alternative to the uni-
lmearity of die classical model Why should diere be only one line in de-
velopment9 Why can diere be no branching'' As we have seen in chapter 
1, biological evolution dicory provides a strong example ol a branching 
model Aldiough dus type of pattern seems promising and several Üieo-
reticians have proposed to build such developmental theories (e g 
Chapman, 1988a), there arc no worked out developmental theories dial 
make use ot a branching model A branching pal tern would imply that 
diere are alternative padis of developmental lor individuals, aldiough, in 
such a model a subject is <dways in, or makes use ol, only one stage and 
diere is no choice-problem Ihe dillerence widi die classical unilinear 
pattern is small In fact, it can be argued (hat by looking back it is possi-
ble to see one particular branch as one speed ie line ot development 
Furdier, it might be argued that it is better to find a formulation diat inte-
grates two apparent branches into one newly defined overarching stage 
pattern 
Branching must not be confused widi differentiations In most devel-
opmental theories it is assumed dial in initial stages certain dillercntia-
lions are not made (e g die adualistic stage coined by Baldwin) which 
later on become separated However, I doubl whether dus amounts to a 
branched type of suge pattern In the first place, the reverse process is 
just as plausible In higher stages, reference and meaning may grow in 
such a way dial dimensions which seemed separate at firsl, become inte-
grated (cf integration, Werner, 1957) In the second place, die question 
of whedier diese process characteristics (dillerentiation and integration) 
can be employed lor die relation between stages, depends to such an ex-
tent on definition of die content of die stages that die consequences lor 
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the form of Ihe pattern are rather unclear. Therefore, I do not think that 
recognizing differentiations (or integrations) forces one to adopt a 
branched (or other alternative) type of pattern. 
d) Spirally Recurrent Pattern 
The third alternative is the spirally recurrent model. Although this model 
has precursors in the form of recapitulation models, a better example is 
the model provided by Eckensberger and Rheinshagen (1980). 
Kohlberg's stage sequence with levels and stages was his inspiration and 
he modified this into a model in which, within each level, an analogous 
set of three stages is passed through. Another example (though not explic-
itly spiral) is to be found in die model presented by Case (1985). He pre-
sents four major stages with the same diree substages reappearing within 
each major stage. At least two levels (main stages) with at least three 
(sub)slages thai are isomorphic with substages of the other level(s) are 
required to spe;ik of a spirally pattern. 
Conclusion with regard to Type of Patterns 
In tliis subsection general characteristics of the pattern of stages were at 
issue. First, the notions of a stage pattern and a sequence were contrasted. 
It was argued thai the notion ai sequence is not really ¡ui alternative to Ihe 
idea of a stage pattern. Subsequently several types of patterns were distin-
guished: subsequent displacement, complex additive, branched, and 
(spirally) recurrent. The complex additive and the branched model require 
weaker assumptions with regard to the nature of development than the 
classical displacement model. Therefore, both can accommodate a 
broader range of empirical results. The spiral model makes stronger theo-
retical assumptions. Empirical findings must lake a very specific form to 
count as support for such a model. If a set of empirical data can be ac-
commodated by all models, the strongest model is to be preferred. 
Therefore, il is mainly an empirical issue which type of pattern is to be 
preferred. 
For my further discussion the classical subséquent displacement vari-
ety is most suitable. The issue of the ordering of the stages, to be dis-
cussed below, poses itself for the other types of pattern as well, but is 
most clear in the classical model. In this respect, I do not see the need to 
force a choice, or compromise, or integration here. 
Basic Options with regard to the Ordering 
The preliminary definition of developmental stages leaves much open yet 
still may be not acceptable to everyone. We have already seen several 
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general cliaraclenslics that could be used instead ol or in addition to this 
definition It is not clear what the most important general characteristics 
ot a stage pattern are (even it we limit ourselves to (he simple develop-
mental model) In the contemporary debate, rather different characteris-
tics of the pattern arc put forward as central and critical aspects of stage 
patterns Different conceptualizations of stage patterns assume a slightly 
different set of defining characteristics and a different hierarchy amongst 
them 1 suggest thai these differences can be belter understood by relating 
them to three perspectives concerning the ordering ot stages The order-
ing of the stages is, in my view, the most important basic issue regarding 
stage patterns I take tins to be a basic issue precisely because it provides 
a way of distinguishing and classifying the different conceptualizations of 
stage patterns in the contemporary literature It should be noted that even 
critical empirical studies, aimed at demonstrating that the idea of stage-
like development is not tenable, necessarily require a perspective on the 
nature of stage patterns and the ordering of stages I will first elaborate 
the Uiree perspectives (options) and afterwards indicate which theory or 
aspects ol a theory fits in where 
The first option (a) is to assume that the ordering of stages is in prin-
ciple (or should be) derived trom empirical data on the sequential order 
of the stage-manilestations in large groups ot subjects and over a broad 
range of performances From tins empiricist point ol view, the quality of 
a proposed pattern depends on the descriptive reliability and validity The 
pattern is supposed to be evident Irom die data The most extreme critical 
question as regards tins quality dimension is wheüier liiere exists such 
stage-like development at all, or whether the whole concept ot develop-
mental patterns is empirically void In fact, tins critical question is pre-
cisely the one at slake in most studies that adopi this empiricist perspec-
tive According to this point of view, the main theoretical function of a 
stage pattern is to provide a general picture ol the course of development 
The second option (b) is to assume that ordering is derived from 
analysis of the qualitative structural differences between the stages 
According to a substantial theoretical criterion each stage is supposed to 
be related lo the others as more (or less) conforming to that overall crite-
rion The additional claim is olten made that the ordering reflects a desir-
able development From tins point of view the quality ol a proposed pat-
tern depends in the first place on its taxonomie adequacy As regards tins 
alternative quality dimension the most extreme question is wheüier we 
can learn something from imposing such a stage pattern on development 
with die implied direction The main theoretical lunction, from uns point 
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of view, is to provide a classification of ways of knowing and experienc-
ing. We should note thai from this point of view the empirical data, al-
though still important, are secondary. This can be illustrated by the high-
est stages proposed by Kolilberg for moral development. Stage 5 is at-
tained at widely divergent ages if attained at all, and stage six is not even 
used anymore in empirical research yet it is retained as an important theo-
retical construct. 
The third option (c) is to assume thai ordering is derived from specific 
characteristics of the transilion process. From this point of view the qual-
ity of the proposed pattern depends on how developmental transitions are 
understood or even explained. As regards this next alternative quality di-
mension the most extreme critical question is whether a comprehensive 
and consistent model of development, with the properties implied by die 
stage pattern, can be given at all. The main theoretical function, from this 
point of view, is to understand transitions. 
I discuss these Uiree points of view in more detail. For each, a differ-
ent set and a different hierarchy of defining characteristics of a stage pat-
tern obtains and consequently different criteria apply. I will give the 
characteristics and where possible discuss empirical or other criteria that 
have actually been brought forward as evidence for the existence or use-
fulness of such defined stage patterns. Subsequently, I will indicate how 
this division relates to actual theories and research. 
a) Empiricist Point of View 
The empiricist point of view takes die stage pattern as a natural ordering 
in time. As stages are assumed to be broad categories of reasoning under-
lying behavior they should display a clear temporal pattern. It is also as-
sumed that, under normal circumstances and for a normal subject, transi-
tion to another form of reasoning will occur only within a restricted time 
period. These assumption suggest that die ordering will be visible from 
empirical data, for example concerning changes in problem solving abili-
ties over large groups over a broad domain of abilities. The descriptive 
adequacy of the pattern is mainly a matter of die tenabilily of this sug-
gested ordering in time. Other considerations, for example about die na-
ture of die used classification and about the nature of development are 
secondary issues from this point of view (see die odier two perspectives 
below). This empiricist perspective on die nature of the ordering of stages 
is the standard view adopted in many (Nordi-American) textbooks on de-
velopmental psychology. 
A more sophisticated type of diis perspective is based on die discus-
sion by Flavell (1972), who gave an inventory of all possible chronologi-
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cal relations between task (solving) sequences. Suppose two different 
tests with two corresponding cognitive abilities xl and x2. According to 
Flavell, x2 can be related to xl in several ways. For example "addition" 
means thai x2 is added while xl is still functioning. "Substitution" means 
that as x2 comes up xl must have disappeared. From this point of view, 
the notions of addition, substitution, modification, etc. take on an entirely 
different meaning compared with the case where these connecting princi­
ples are used for stages (see above). The elaborate discussion by Flavell 
(1972) must be understood in die framework of task sequences which 
imply an empirically driven, bottom up, approach. Now this framework 
could be used to define stages. Let us suppose there are such sequences of 
developmcntally related problem-solving abilities. That is, there are rela­
tively stable points (solving task ρ but not task q in a consistent manner) 
and transitions resulting in a new point (task/; and q being solved but not 
task r, etc.). Now let us assume that a whole collection of these sequences 
together form the building blocks for stages. That is, if die sequences thus 
defined do show enough correlation it is considered legitimate to speak 
of a stage, if diey don not then it is concluded there arc no stages (cf. ter 
Laak, 1991). Although there are serious problems in defining Uiese points 
for those who do not accept the notion of broad structures, this looked 
like a promising approach at that time. In fact, however, this approach is 
scarcely used, which suggests dial there are no stages, at least not when 
they are defined in Ulis way. However, positive results were reported by 
Case (1985). He uses a slightly different stage pattern model (sec discus­
sion above) and claims to have found a clear stage pattern (cf. chapter 3; 
Flavell, 1982a, 1982b). 
Characteristics and criteria 
From die empiricist point of view, die most importimi defining character­
istic of stage patterns is that stages are ordered in time. Oilier essential 
characteristics are that the stages are qualitatively different and that the 
stages have a natural (rather slow) tempo of emerging. Further character­
istics such as dial die pattern itself must be necessary, universal, and uni­
linear, are nol essential, evenüiougli it is often suggested odierwise. In 
critical studies the most important consideration is often whether empiri-
cal evidence supports die proposed ordering in time, and it is this ques-
tion dial has characterized a dominant line ut' research in developmental 
psychology as far as stages were concerned. However, this consideration 
can play a role in each of die perspectives, characteristic for the empiri-
cist perspective on die stage ordering is dial il is laken lo be die prime cri-
terion. In üie taxonomie perspective, empirical evidence for an ordering 
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in lime that corresponds to the proposed hierarchical ordering is also seen 
as relevant. In the developmental perspective ordering in time is also 
used, but taken in a slightly different way. I will now review the three 
most important defining characteristics for the empiricist perspective: 
Qualitative differences: That the stages must differ qualitatively is a 
fundamental defining characteristic for any stage-theory and from any 
point of view. That they are different is indeed assumed by most studies. 
Specific empirical criteria are provided only by critics who argue that 
diere are no stages because there are no fundamental or qualitative differ­
ences in the ways people of different ages think and act. 
There is empirical evidence pointing in this direction. Spelke (1991), 
for example, demonstrates that infants as young as 2'/з to 4 months 
(dramatically earlier than Piaget suggested) know dial objects have spa­
tiotemporal continuity and solidity and she defends die diesis diät diese 
principles remain central to the adult conception of an object. Togedier 
with her assumption that such an early presence indicates innatcness and 
dial die results can be generalized to odier important concepts, radical 
conceptual change seems to be ruled out. Since diere would be only one 
stage in diat case, die idea of stage patterns would lose its meaning. This 
kind of opposition to ihe idea of fundamental conceptual change in de-
velopment is rallier persistent. The enrichment view posits that elemen-
tary concepts are innate (see Fodor, 1975), or dial new concepts arise by 
combination from innate primitives (see Jackendoff, 1989). However, 
Harris (1983) and Halford (1989) conclude, alter reviewing many studies, 
diat diere is sufficient evidence of developmental change with respect to 
object permanence, and according to Carey (1991), Spclke's intriguing 
results cannot be generalized lo oüier concepts. 
A less radical position is taken by critics who argue that die differ-
ences suggested by stage-theories between younger and older children are 
overstated. Sometimes young children have a certain type of competence 
diat only older children are supposed to have (cf. Keil, 1986). Gelman 
and Baillargeon, for example, review several studies: "The general impli-
cation of diese studies is thai the mentality of die pre-school child is 
qualitatively more similar to thai of the older child than Piagclian theory 
leads one to suspect" (Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983, p. 174). Because 
diese pre-schoolers, who normally are considered to be preoperational, 
indeed fail other standard conservation tasks as predicted of preopera-
tional thinkers, the exceptional achievements in the reviewed studies are 
considered evidence against die notion of stage-like development. If die 
conclusion drawn from these studies is dial stages are more heleroge-
74 Systematic Reconstruction 
neous than expected by classical stage-theories, then the argument has 
already been addressed in section 2 above. Alternatively, if the conclu-
sion is that the age norms for preoperational thinking arc wrong, the ar-
gument is addressed under the next characteristic. Finally, if the conclu-
sion is that the difference between preoperational children and opera-
tional children is blurred, then the criterion belongs here and the evidence 
must be taken serious. That is, even if there are stages in one of the senses 
discussed in section 2, there is still a problem when the differences be-
tween two of such subsequent stages are so small and unclear that no neat 
ordering in time is possible. Since there is also evidence thai distinctions 
between the other main stages in Piagetian theory are blurred in this 
sense, serious doubt arises whether die ordering proposed by Piaget (as 
understood from this perspective) is tenable. However, die suggestion 
that Piaget is completely wrong, or that stage-theories are useless, does 
not follow from Ulis. 
Ordering in time: Seen from the empiricist point of view, stages must 
be identified by means of an observed constancy of behavior across vari-
able environmental conditions, with some behavior typical for a certain 
age group and different for another age group, resulting in a sequential 
order of typical behavior over chronological age. Several criteria are used 
in relevant publications to support or refute this notion of a fixed ordering 
in time: fixed age periods, invariance, and no skipping of stages. 
Many studies have addressed die issue of whether fixed age periods 
are associated with different stages. Rased on this assumption many criti-
cal studies were conducted, in the past decades, showing dial Piaget un-
derestimated the cognitive capacities of children. This conclusion is gen-
erally accepted nowadays. However, this provides no argument against 
stages in general, nor lo a particular ordering, but only against particular 
proposals for specific age norms. 
Another highly valued criterion is invariance in the sense dial no 
stage reversals are allowed. The order of stages in actual development is 
assumed to be fixed. Early studies in the field of moral development were 
satisfied widi this criterion. An interesting example of which, diough not 
necessarily of the empiricist position, can be found in Kohlberg's longi-
tudinal study of a group of children followed over 20 years with long 
enough time intervals. The results of this study have been interpreted as 
consistent with the criterion of invariance (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & 
Lieberman, 1983). In the scoring manual for the Moral Judgment 
Interview (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987), invariance is presented as one of 
the two most important validity criteria in support of particular stages 
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patterns Of course, empirical evidence supporting tins en tenon is not 
sufficient to conclude that the stages form a developmental pattern con­
cerning a particular dimension of development (cf van Geert, 1991) 
Negative evidence is oUen more conclusive In a critical study it was 
found (Brainerd, 1978, cf Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983) that a task 
(conservation of number) which, according to structural analysis (as pro­
vided by Piaget, 1952), should be mastered after another particular task 
(class inclusion), was in lacl mastered before m several subiecls If tins 
can be generalized to the associated subslages, tins is a relevant finding 
that casts doubt on the particular ordering proposed by Piaget It does not 
rule out Uiat in other cases there might be a neat ordering Incidentally, 
Piaget abandoned his earlier account of number development (Piaget, 
1977) 
Another empirical criterion used in longitudinal research is that no 
stages may be skipped This criterion is often used (in conjunction with 
die previous) by those who want to find support for stage-theories 
Kohlbcrg (1984, ρ 422), tor example, reports that no significant number 
of subjects skipped a stage in his longitudinal study However, had there 
been subjects that skipped a stage, he could have argued that the inter­
view interval was to») long IJnlortunalely, it is very dilficult to prove that 
a subiect has skipped a stage 
Naturalness I his third defining characteristic is closely connected to 
the requirement ot relative stability addressed in section 2 There are (wo 
associated empirical entena, both related to training studies 1 he first 
criterion is based on the assumed impossibility ot altering or speeding up 
development beyond what is natural This criterion is addressed in critical 
training studies when children are trained to succeed in tasks that are 
normally solved only by much older children It is often argued that if the 
pattern is highly susceptible to such efforts at changing the speed of de­
velopment and hastening the onset of a new stage, the whole idea of 
stage-patterns as a natural sequence is Üirown into question (cf Gelman 
and Baillargeon, 1983), since development is supposed to proceed 
slowly, relatively unallected by external interventions The second empir-
ical criterion actually used in research is based on the assumption that 
under normal circumstances and lor a normal subiect, transition can only 
be to the subsequent stage in the pattern This criterion is olten used to 
support stage-theories II it is possible experimentally to induce transfer 
to a subsequent stage, with some help, and given dial the subjects arc 
ready for it, dien dus is taken to support the idea ot a natural sequence 
(see review by Walker, 1983) Using training studies m dus latter way is 
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not intervening in the process itself That is, the effects ot these interven-
tions must be precisely indistinguishable from natural structural devel-
opment if they are to count as support (Kuhn, 1974) 
Conclusion with regaid to the empii icist point of view 
According to the empiricist point of view on the ordering of stages, the 
defining characteristics for a stage pattern are qualitative differences 
between stages, ordering in time of die stages, and a natural tempo of 
emergence of stages On the basis ot this view ot the ordering of the 
stages, much research has been conducted not only to ascertain whether 
particular proposals tor stage patterns hold but also to evaluate the notion 
of stage patterns in general In tins research the empirical criteria dis-
cussed above were used, with mixed results However, die following tour 
problems are frequently encountered in studies adopting tins perspective 
First, in many studies die conclusions that are drawn are more far 
reaching than die evidence warrants Often, when the empirical evidence 
does not confinn the theoretically expected sequence, not only a particu-
lar aspect of the stage-dieory is criticized, but die particular stage-dieory 
is declared untenable and even stage-theories in general are declared use-
less On the oüier hand, supporting evidence is sometimes used to draw 
unwarranted conclusions The research and die criteria mentioned above 
can only be indirectly relevant to the evaluation ot particular stage-dico-
ries, and Üiey are irrelevant in ascertaining how the stages in a develop-
mental pattern are or should be ordered 
Second, oüier characteristics ol the ordering of stages are often ig-
nored, or not assigned a proper role It is then merely assumed that the 
ordering of die stages cui be read off from observable sequences ol task 
behaviors An implicit precondition lor tackling die issue in dus way is 
that it must be absolutely clear which task behaviors belong to which 
stage This might have worked if stages dicniselves could be defined 
empirically and objectively However, tins obviously cannot be done (see 
section 2) and it is often just taken for granted that certain task behaviors 
belong to a certain stage, at least if a particular stage-dieory obtains 
Individual stages, as diey appear in Üieoretical descriptions, are highly 
abstract entities with complex and sometimes ìnsuftìciendy specified the-
oretically ïnterrelaüons widi odier stages in die pattern (or widi stages in 
oüier patterns) This makes it difficult to conduct empirical research It 
must be certain dial die task behaviors represent the right stage in die 
right pattern and not another stage, possible in a related but slightly dif-
ferent pattern (not to mention die possibilities ot branches) One must 
also think of the possibility diat stage and pattern specifications are not 
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optimal, and that a slighdy different description of die slage and pattern at 
issue might give better results I suggest dierefore diat it is belter to take 
up explicitly the requirement ol identity (sec below) amongst die defining 
characteristics 
A third problem is dial, since an empirically "found" or corroborated 
ordering does not rule out dial odier stage patterns might have been pos­
sible, arguments are required to single one out as die normal developmen­
tal padi It would seem belter dierefore to acknowledge a normative ele­
ment amongst the defining characteristics (see next perspective) 
Finally, often no clear distinction is made between die issue of classi­
fication of stages mid issues concerning actual processes, resulting in se­
rious confusion Many ot the aloremcntioned empirical criteria pertain to 
process laciors like timing, age ranges, susceptibility to manipulation, 
and diey arc misconstrued as evidence directly relevant to ordering and 
classification 
These problems point to a serious limitation of die empiricist perspec­
tive Although die characteristics and die empirical criteria discussed are 
important, they cannot be isolated from taxonomical decisions The order­
ing dierefore does not lollow from empirical data nor can it be justified 
by reference to such data 
b) Tcnonomical Point of View 
From dus second point ol view the ordering ol die stages is primarily 
conceptual or logical and not primarily chronological The ordering must 
be determined in a theoretical reconstruction according to particular, do­
main specific, criteria (hat hold tor die whole pattern Ί he subsequent 
stage should, for example, be more integrated and differentiated 
(Werner), more equilibrated, more decentcrcd or more reflective (Piaget), 
or more morally prelerable (Kohlberg). The prime consideration is taxo­
nomical adequacy Méllale and Lerner (1991) speak of a formal concep-
tual metric against which behavioral change is compared 
The point of departure, lor die taxonomie approach, is the need to or-
ganize utterances, actions, behavior, etc , of subjects in order to under-
stand and classify them Here, instead of die temporal iequentiahty of 
stages, die idea of a hierarchical ordering is central In the context of re-
search into cognitive development, classification in terms ol an hierarchi-
cal ordering is ollen unproblenutic and can remain unphcit However, let 
us suppose -tor the sake ol argument- diat non-conservation were con-
sidered a more advanced achievement than conservation of volume This 
example is far fetched, ol course, but consider working in a chemical lab-
oratory where it is important to reckon widi the fact diat some residue 
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will always remain in the retort, so that the volume or. a liquid is always 
less after pouring it into another container Clearly, such a proposal to re-
verse the ordering ot two stages would turn the interpretation of die re-
sults of empirical research upside down The example illustrates that 
classification and ordering must be argued for and cannot be taken for 
granted (cf die empiricist perspective) Tins problem of classification has 
been better recognized in the context of research into moral development 
(ct chapter 3) 
Although a high correlation can be expected wiüi the order of emer-
gence in real subjects of die psychological counterparts of diese theoreti-
cally distinguished stages, an exception cannot be ruled out In fact, all 
chronological considerations are taken to be only indirectly relevant This 
perspective is based on a notion ol development in which die organic ori-
gins of die metaphor ot growdi and stages are even less recognizable than 
in die oüier two perspectives This is evident from die tact dial die odier 
two quality dimensions (regarding ordering in time and transformation) 
do not play an important role here 
Characteristics and entena 
What are die main characteristics of stage patterns from dus point of 
view9 What kind of criteria are used to assess whether a particular stage 
pattern hypodiesis is useful or whether diese kinds of stage patterns make 
sense at all7 According to die taxonomical point of view, die essential 
characteristics are diat die stages are ordered hierarchically according to 
some domain specific criterion Tins presupposes diat die stages can be 
distinguished and diat diey belong to one pattern (identity in develop-
ment) FurUier characteristics, such as diat die pattern uselt should be 
necessary, universal, or unilinear are not essential Even die characteristic 
diat die subsequent stage is new, while based on die previous, could be 
omitted It is, however, not easy to formulate research entena for die 
defining characteristics trom dus point of view 
Qualitative differences Whedier die stages in a particular stage pat-
tern ditfer enough must primarily be assessed by conceptual analysis 
However, empirical considerations, such as given above in discussing die 
empmcist point of view, may indicate die need tor reanalysis of a partic-
ular stage pattern Two stages are qualitatively (structurally) different if 
die central ideas of one of diem cannot be understood in terms dial were 
adequate for die odier In contrast, quantitative differences denote no 
more than an increase or decrease in some central variable 
¡dentit\ Stages in л pattern must have some connection or have some­
thing in common Special care must be taken to ensure diat no stages be-
Systematic Reconstruction 79 
longing io dillereni patterns are mixed Careful analysis is needed For 
example, Gilligan (1982) has argued Uiat a male and a Iemale orientation 
in moral development must be distinguished and suggests Uiat Kohlberg 
was ordering stages in such a way that a specific female "airing orienta­
tion" appeared as a less advanced stage in pattern χ (stages of justice rea­
soning), while she believes that such reasoning by women represents a 
highly advanced stage belonging to pattern .r' (stages in "care" ethics) 
Another example is provided by Tunel He clauns that Kohlberg's stages 
of moral reasoning contiate stages in conventional development and 
stages in moral development proper He is convinced of tins partly on 
theoretical grounds and p.irtly because the empirical data he gathered 
were incomprehensible Irom the Kohlbcrgian scoring system Boüi ex-
amples show how difficult it is to decide which stage belongs to what 
pattern An example in another domain of development is conservation Is 
it justified to speak ol the development of the concept ol conservation? It 
ranges from die conservation ot obiects (ob|ect permanence) and object 
properties such as solidity, to conservation of volume and is assessed 
with totally ditterent tasks and procedures On what grounds can it be de-
cided that one and (he same developmental pattern (including forerun-
ners) is at issue m all these instances (cf van Geert, 1991)'' 
Hiera ι Lineal οι dering The most important characteristic of a stage 
pattern, seen Irom the taxononuc.il point of view, is that the stages are or­
dered according to some logical or conceptual criterion I he ordering 
might be based on die idea that the subsequent stage is more adapted, or 
more structured, equilibrated or integrated and dillerenliated Illese crite­
ria, however, are not easy to combine with die idea ot qualitative differ­
ences A stronger criterion in this respect is inclusion It, tor example in a 
series of stages, stage η includes stage n-1 the whole series is ordered. 
However, none of the actual slage-üieories takes sunple inclusion as its 
ordering principle, something more is required (cf the discussion of the 
terms, addition, integration, and reorganiAition on page 68) 
A criterion actually used m research concerning moral development is 
based on (he idea that a previous stage is integrated into the next It seems 
to be typical for the sorts ot development at issue here that the previous 
stage must be integrated into the new one in the sense that a subiect in 
suige η (who predominately displays die way ot reasoning ot stage n) 
knows what it is to be in the foregoing stages An interesting research 
question then is whether sub|ccls understand reasoning below their own 
stage (e g the classical study by Rest, Tunel & Kohlberg, 1969) 
It should be noted dial it no more is churned than (hat (he stages tonn 
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a hierarchy according lo some criterion, tins does not imply that the 
higher stages are superior Only if die additional claim is made üiat such 
development is desirable and that individuals should develop in the speci-
fied direction we have an evaluative ordering in which die higher stages 
arc taken to be better Jusutying such an evaluation is dillicull because 
referring to criteria just mentioned, such as becoming more structured, is 
not by itself sufficient to conclude that higher stages are better, certainly 
not in any moral respect (ct van Haaf ten, 1990, Chapter 6) 
Empirical criteria that would support the chum that a particular stage 
pattern constitutes a hierarchical evaluative pattern are diflicult to pro-
vide One empirical criterion related to such evaluative hierarchical order-
ing actually used is based on the idea üiat preference patterns should ob-
tain in which higher stages are preferred over lower ones provided some-
one can appreciate the diflerence In chapter 4 and 4 tins criterion is dis-
cussed in more detail 
Conclusion concerning the taxonomie pomi of view 
Seen trom die taxonomie perspective, die ordering of stages into a stage 
pattern is based on conceptual and logical connections between die 
stages I prefer dus perspective over the previous because die role of con-
ceptual and logical criteria is better recognized However, diere are still 
difficulties over ordering dial cannot be solved Irom dm perspective One 
example of such a dilficully is die debate over die question whedier die 
postconveniional level in moral judgement consists of two stages, as 
Kohlbcrg suggests, or can be seen as one stage wiüi subdivisions (cf 
Habermas, 1986) 
с) Developmental Point of View 
Central to Uns perspective is die developmental transition, which presup­
poses an entity ot development (a system) diat changes itself structurally 
The ordering of die stages is fixed by knowing how stage η develops mio 
stage n+1 It is required dial die process should be sufficiently under­
stood, or at least it is supposed üiat diere is a process dial might in princi-
ple be understood Tins point of view, in contrast to die previous, takes 
die organic metaphor ol growüi and stages more literally, in diat psycho-
logical and conceptual development arc considered to be governed by 
mechanisms analogous to biological processes 
Contiguity in lime (sec empiricist perspective) is nol enough lo derive 
die ordering, and neidier is it sufficient somehow to impose a classifica-
tion on die dala (sec taxonómica! perspective) From die developmental 
perspective, the ordering of stages is dependent on die specific character 
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of the structural-transformation from stage η to stage n+\. That is, it is 
not the invariant sequence of appearance, nor the hierarchical ordering of 
the classes, but the transition thai is central and primary. 
The basic idea is thai the nature of the transformation (e.g. reorganiz­
ing, reflection, reflective abstraction) must be such that die subsequent 
stage is more adequate. The transition mechanism is, for example, be­
lieved to be such thai die subsequent stage is superior precisely because 
in il contradictions are transcended and lacunae characteristic of die pre­
vious stage are filled (Piaget, 1985). Therefore, the process is regarded as 
central and intrinsically related to die ordering and classification of die 
stages. In addition, the fact thai the transition is die result of die construc­
tive activity of die subject is crucial. Habermas (1984) has identified Ulis 
as a constructive learning theory. 
Characteristics and criteria 
Seen from die developmental perspective, die most important characteris­
tics of die stage-pattern are related to structural transformations. It is es­
sential dial a subsequent stage is transformed from die previous according 
to some formal or rational principle. Furdier characteristics presupposed 
in diis are that die stages are distinguished as qualitatively different and 
that dicy are ordered in time. The subsequent stage is assumed to be more 
complex or more structured or more differentiated and integrated (see 
previous perspective), but these characteristics are relevant only if they 
can be related to transitions mechanism. However, I do not include die 
explicit requirement dial the subsequent stage is better in a general sense 
among the defining characteristics, because this would lead lo problems 
of justification that may be insoluble. In chapter 6 Piaget is interpreted 
from die developmental perspective. 
Qualitatively differences: Not only must the stages be different from 
each odier (as is recognized by each of the perspectives), but in addition a 
subsequent stage must be qualitatively new in respect to its forerunner, 
and diere must also be continuity. 'Ulis is expressed in die idea of novelty. 
These paradoxical requirements contained in Ulis characteristic are ad­
dressed in chapter 5. 
Self-transformation: A essential characteristic for die stage pattern is 
Üiat diere must be literally a Iransformation from the previous stage to die 
next and it must be a special kind of transition. The previous stage is a 
necessary condition for die next, logically and chronologically. Some of 
die old stage musi remain but the essential properties of the subsequent 
stage must be truly new and die result of an immanent transformation of 
die old stage. Several transformation principles are proposed: self-organi-
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zaüon, reflective abstraction (Piaget, 1977b) or die orlhogenetic principle 
(integration and differentiation) of Werner (1957) Because the transfor-
mation is taken to be the result of inherent processes there is limited room 
tor external influences and there are limited possibilities tor speeding up 
the process 
Although the idea of sudden transformations (discontinuities) plays a 
remarkably important role in the contemporary debate, I was unable to 
trace tins idea back further as to Wohlwill and Flavell (1969) Hie idea is 
that a sudden change in some relevant observable variable may indicate 
transformation and reorganization Ilns criterion might be better explain-
able in die context of selforgamzation models 
Selforganization does have its own specific criteria such as spurts in 
development, bimodality ol testscores, increased variability of responses 
in transitional phases over that during a period in which the stage is fully 
present With tins idea of self-organization some old themes ot the natural 
and inherent aspects ol development return in a more modern guise 
(Chapman, 1992, van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992) However, although 
these ideas are promising in that they support the notion ot transition pe-
riods and the idea ol reorganization, they say nothing about the ordering 
of stages and the form of the pattern, and are therefore liisutiicieni as idea 
upon which to base an ordering 
Reflective abstraction, as coined by Piaget, pretends precisely to give 
the general characteristics of a transition and to be at least part of the ex-
planation tor moving to a subsequent stage The subsequent stage reflects 
the form or structure of the previous stage and generalizes it However, 
there is still considerable conceptual obscurity surrounding tins notion 
that will be addressed in chapter 6 Unfortunately, it is ditlicult to find 
concrete criteria associated with reflective abstraction One possibility is 
the requirement that subjects in stage и must somehow be able to criticise 
the previous stages Since reflective abstraction is supposed to result in a 
more structured and more equilibrated new stage (see chapter 6), and is 
based in an individual act, subjects must consequently perceive the short­
comings ot the previous stage Another criterion might be the existence 
of hierarchical preference patterns (see chapter 3 and 4) Another kind ot 
criterion tor an ongoing process of tins kind is lound in "action accompa­
nying speech" (Schmid-Schonbem, 1989) 
Order in tune Ilie ordering in time is an important empirical indica­
tor but only at the individual level and lor the particular abilities under 
scrutiny Because tins criterion is understood, from tins perspective, to 
apply to individuals, comparisons between age groups make no sense and 
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differences between subjects can easily be accommodated. Therefore Ulis 
criterion is not understood in quite the same way as in the first perspec­
tive. 
Conclusion concerning the developmental point of view 
The developmental point of view provides an interesting way of ordering 
the stages since it integrates both developmental and classificatory as­
pects of developmental stages (see section 1). A pattern of developmental 
stages is defined here by the requirements that a subsequent stages must 
be new, must be transformed from the previous by a learning mechanism, 
and that this takes time. Much theoretical work still remains to be done 
and die problems are not yet completely clear, conscquenntly Ulis per­
spective is least worked out in research. Unfortunately, there is a ten­
dency in recent publications to isolate die problem of transitions, dial is, 
either stages are uncritically Uiken for granted and mechanisms of transi­
tion are looked for, or stages are totally ignored and transitions in them­
selves are focused on without knowing what is in transition apart from 
die specific tasks themselves (cf. Campbell and Bickhard, 1986). In die 
first case, it is not ascertained whether the stage description used is a 
fruitful one. 'Піе exact points of demarcation vary considerably in differ­
ent developmental theories, so that the search for transitions is likely to 
have variable success. In the second case the connection with stage-theo­
ries can be lost allogeüier. 
Understanding transitions must not be confused with knowing what 
stimulates or blocks transitions. Radier, a general explanation for transi-
tions is sought. An illustration of this kind of üieory is van Geert's (1991) 
proposal to build a transformation generator such that if it is fed widi 
contingent content it is able to proceed to die subsequent stage. The exact 
details of die subsequent stage for a given individual cannot be deter-
mined in tliis way, that is, no behavior predictions arc possible, but die 
peculiar characteristics of a stage pattern could perhaps be understood 
this way. 
Actual Theories 
If we consider actual stage-theories, it seems that the Uiree points of view 
on the ordering of stages and their associated quality dimensions are in-
deed alternatives, although some combined positions do occur. That is, 
most slage-dieories are highly involved in one or two dimensions while 
ignoring die other. Piagel in his early work (e.g. 1954) occupied himself 
mainly with the problems of classification and taxonomy (using logical 
structures as basis) while in his later work (1977b; 1985) attention shifted 
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lo ϋκ process of development Much research in main stream develop­
mental psychology (at least in cognitive development) in the seventies 
wa¡> devoted to lalsilying the empirical implications which were believed 
Ю lollow Irom Piagel's (1954) theory while largely disregarding ques­
tions about Uie why of a particular ordering or slicing up οΓ development 
(dius no taxonomie considerations), and without paying much attention to 
the processes involved (see die reviews by Gelman and Baillargeon, 1983 
and Halford, 1989) Most neo-Piagetians pay attention to die process and 
die empirical sequencing but not to the classification and the taxonomie 
problems (Case, 1986) Kohlbcrgians are concerned wiüi all direc qual-
ity-dimensions although the transitions are poorly understood llic know-
ing levels approach ot Campbell and Bickhard (1986) locus on the transi-
tion aspect to such an extent diat diey propose to do away widi structures 
Van der Maas and Molenaar (1992) also propose a strictly transition ap-
proach widiout paying much attention to die other points ot view 
Conclusion with regard to the Ordering 
The core ol a suge pattern is die ordering ol die st.iges There appear to 
be various ways of conceptualizing and ch.iracten/ing die relations be-
tween slages, and die ordering ol a developmental pattern I have con-
trasted three points ol view on stage ordering brom die empiricist point 
ol view die ordering ol the stages is taken to be evident from die data and 
die only unporlant issue is temporal sequentially Although popular, dus 
point of view is unsalislaciory Those who claim to adhere to dus point of 
view are either implicitly using considerations which are addressed ex-
plicitly in one ol the odier points ol view, or are m danger ol being incon-
sistent According to die taxononucal point ol view, die ordering of die 
stages is conceived as primarily a matter ot conceptual analysis mid is not 
taken to be directly connected to die individual biographical dala It is die 
taxonomie system diat is at issue, widi the liieiarclucal aspect most im-
portant This oltcn amounts to specifying overall criteria lor ordering 
According to die developmental point ol view, the ordering ol stages is 
intrinsic to die process of development and the locus is on transitions be-
tween slages 'Hie ordering of die stages results Irom the general charac-
teristics ot the transformation mechanism No overall classification crite-
rion is deemed necessary, but some invariant process characteristics are 
Each ol the direc perspectives defines developmental stages mid stage 
patterns slightly diflerently each perspective has its own set and hierar-
chy ol defining characteristics Given these defining characteristics, I 
have, where possible, identified criteria used in actual research to assess 
whedier a stage pattern so defined obtains or is useful 
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An example might be helpful to appreciate the differences between 
the perspectives. Remember the controversy between Kohlberg and 
Gilligan. 'Iliis controversy is extremely complex and can also be regarded 
from the three perspectives I distinguished above. From die empiricist 
perspective the question is whether diere really are empirically verifiable 
sex differences in die ordering and tempo of emergence of die moral 
judgment stages. The present state of the discussion is diat there are none 
and so there is no need to distinguish separate patterns of development 
(Walker, 1984). From the laxonomical perspective the main issue is 
whether there arc different sorts of morality and if so, whether it wouldn't 
be better to reconstruct two different developmental patterns. This last so-
lution gains support from a current philosophical debate diat relates to 
this controversy (e.g. Habermas, 1986; Vreeke, 1992). Seen from the de-
velopmental perspective, the more interesting question is whedier an al-
leged higher way of reasoning or judging (stage) can be seen as trans-
formed by a relevant mechanism out of the lower stage, in oilier words; 
can die step be reconstructed -with the intriguing alternative possibility, 
in this case, of a common beginning wiüi two branches? 
It can be argued, however, that all tliree perspectives should be integrated 
in order to fully appreciate the concept developmental stage. Each per-
spective then represents a different quality dimension. The adequacy and 
quality of a stage pattern depends on how well empirical data fit die pat-
tern, how useful the taxonomy is, and how well die transitions are under-
stood. It is evident that these quality dimensions are interrelated but it is 
less clear how üiey are related. 
It is clear, for example, thai temporal sequcntiality can be assessed 
only after taxonomie decisions are made. In turn, taxonomie criteria are 
no good unless they yield a coherent and comprehensive description of 
behavior and development. Classification and hierarchical ordering of 
stages are presumably related to general developmental processes in one 
way or another. In tum, focusing on die process requires both ordering 
criteria and observations relevant to die sequence but in an indirect way. 
However, although it may seem diat all tliree perspectives ought to be in-
tegrated, Ulis does not mean that all die suggested characteristics should 
be included uncritically and unmodified into one ultimate definition of 
stages or stage-like development. Depending on circumstances and die 
objectives pursued, some intuitions come to die fore and odiers disappear 
in die background. 
As a suggestion for a way of integrating the laxonomical and devel-
opmental perspective I propose (he following. Developmental stages have 
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a double character On Hie one hand, as far as conceptual development is 
at issue, stages pertain to "conceptual" objects with a supra-individual na-
ture On die other hand, actual developmental transitions can be seen as 
something belonging to the individual and not to conceptual systems The 
ability to use conceptual systems and the power to shitt to a subsequent 
system are achievements of the individual that probably have very gen-
eral properties Both die transitions related to individuals (best studied 
from the developmental perspective), and the conceptually defined 
classes (best studied from die taxonomie perspective), are therefore rele-
vant For example, in Piagct's equilibration theory the notion of reflective 
abstraction may be seen as combining individual abilities and mtersubjec-
tively shared knowledge within one framework and explains several 
things die convergence in development, the role of social interaction, die 
individuality oí development, adapliveness, die unilinearity, etc Taking a 
developmental step is an individual act using individual resources and is 
like reflection, but die object ol reflection consists in ideas and own 
functioning which are íniersubjectively constituted So lar, these are 
speculations In chapter 6 I will go deeper into the matter of reflective 
abstraction 
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4 General Conclusions 
I have presented a systematic reconstruction of the developmental stage 
concept used in contemporary theories ol" developmental psychology. 
According to my preliminary definition, a developmental stage serves to 
classify, from a developmental perspective, changes in human perfor-
mance and competence. Although stages have no meaning outside the 
pattern in which they arc ordered, I have separated questions and issues 
concerning single stages from issues concerning the pattern of stages, in 
order to grasp Ulis complex concept. 
Four issues were reviewed and for each several (varying between 
three to five) theoretical positions were distinguished. My main objective 
was lo structure and systematize the debate over stages of development. 
Although some critical remarks were made, no final evaluative compari-
son of the positions is given. 
The first issue, and the main point of section 2, was that there are dif-
ferences in what unity is thought to pertain to, as well as differences in 
what this unity itself is thought lo consist in. A developmental stage 
(apart from the pattern) is a theoretical construct that is supposed to ac-
count for the unity and coherence assumed behind acting, knowing and 
experiencing or behavior. However, in each of die three cases that were 
distinguished, the nature of the manifold or the surface (often the part-
whole metaphor and the surface-deep metaphor are mixed) was con-
ceived in an incommensurably different way: elementary parts of the 
structure in the first approach (elements can be anything but often opera-
tions are meant), behavior in the second, and narrative elements in die 
third approach. The nature of die unity varies correspondingly: a struc-
tural unity in the first case, a latent causal organization in the second case, 
and a foundational unity in the last approach. 
The advantage of defining the issue in litis way, is that it places die 
well-known problem of the relation between stage and behavior in 
broader perspective. It is clear that die Piagetian or Kohlbergian types of 
underlying structure are not suited to explain and predict individual be-
havior. Nevertheless they, and several odier Uieories, do provide an un-
derlying unity to developmenlally relevant acting, knowing and experi-
encing. For exiunple, by describing adequately die foundation of reason-
ing in a certain domain, for a certain stage, what makes acting, knowing, 
and experiencing possible is revealed. This foundation however in no 
way determines what is done or thought, in die sense that it would be 
88 Systematic Reconstruction 
possible to make predictions about actual behavior. It restricts what can 
be thought or done but what is thought or done is the own unique con­
struction of a subject. 
The second issue concerned the relative stability of a single stage. If 
relative stability is taken to be an intrinsic properly of die developmental 
process, it might be located at the biological-neurological level, at the 
level of ideas, or at the level of the structure and organization itself. 
Stability should not be understood so as to preclude small changes and 
more radical structural transitions. The possibility of small changes of the 
stage structure is necessary to allow for adaptation to the environment 
(physical and social), while radical structural transitions, in the sense of 
moving to a new stage, must also remain possible, and therefore stability 
must not be so strong that reasoning along the lines of a certain develop­
mental stage remains totally insensitive to anomalous information and 
conflicting experience. 
The pattern of stages has its own specific properties and problems. A 
steige pattern is a series of ordered stages constituting a developmental 
dimension in a certain domain of development. With regard to the pat­
tern, I first made a case lhal the concept of developmental siage cannot be 
replaced by the notion of sequence without loss of nearly all pretensions 
that may be attributed to stage patterns. Focusing exclusively on se­
quences either tends ю lead to detailed information about task specific 
sequences without much developmental relevance, or leaves us with less 
distinct but not principally different problems from those posed by stage 
patterns. 
The third issue bore upon the type of stage pattern. There are several 
types of pattern, from the more open branched, or additive models (e.g. 
Rest), through the classical subsequent displacement models of Piaget 
and Kohlberg, with or without substages, to the even more restrained 
(spirally) recurrent models (e.g. Eckensberger and Case). Which type of 
pattern is preferrable is mainly an empirical issue. 
The last issue concerned die comparison of Üiree perspectives on how 
developmental stages can be reconstructed and ordered. The empiricist 
claim thai reconstruction is unnecessary, mid that the ordering reveals it-
self in die empirical facts was exposed as a position fraught with concep-
tual difficulties. Two oüier points of view were next considered. The tax-
onomie perspective stressed the classificalory aspect and based the order-
ing on conceptual and logical criteria. According lo the developmental 
perspeciive, die ordering must be based on die general characteristics of 
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Ule transformation mechanism. As regards these three points of view I am 
inclined to think that some integration or combination can be found. 
This systematic bul not exhaustive reconstruction has resulted in a 
few theoretically fruitful conceptualizations for each of the four important 
issues regarding developmental stages. The definition of developmental 
stages, however, is still not completely fixed. However, it cannot be fixed 
without first having an adequate definition of development and this may 
require the choice for a particular developmental theory. One important 
result of lliis review, however, may be the elimination of some confusion 
based on the mixing of incompatible perspectives and approaches. 
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PART TWO 
THE STAGE ISSUE IN 
MORAL AND COGNITIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The systematic reconstruction undertaken in Part One led to a limited 
number ot acceptable conceptualizations ot the characteristics of devel­
opmental stages and stage patterns In the remaining four articles in Part 
Two, I will address a lew ot the problems encountered in chapter 2 in 
more detail In these remaining chapters my preference tor specific in­
terpretations ot the developmental stage concept will become evident 
The interpretations that seem most fruitful to me can be roughly charac­
terized by the hermeneutical approach, as regards the issue of unity and 
diversity, and by the developmental perspective as regards the issue of 
the ordering of stages However, the attractiveness of a theoretical con­
cept is often due more to the interesting problems it generates than to the 
solutions it offers 
'Пігее oí the four following chapters have been published elsewhere 
and all of them were written betöre Part One Because I preferred to take 
up the published articles without alterations, except for some minor typo-
graphical changes, I have to apologize for differences of style Although 
die references ol the formerly published articles immediately lollow the 
chapter, they are also included in die general references As each of the 
formerly published chapters begins widi its own abstract, I will introduce 
these chapters here only bnelly 
In chapter 3 a remarkable division within Uie field of developmental psy-
chology with regard to thinking about stages is taken up In one specific 
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area of developmental psychology (concerned with moral development) 
the notion of developmental stage has retained ILS original vigor, whereas 
in the mainstream of research (primarily concerned with the development 
of cognitive operations) the concept has been severely criticized and 
modified accordingly I try to give an explanation tor tins remarkable 
insistence on the "hard structural stage model" by Kohlberg 
The main conclusion is that due to differences in the adopted research 
methodology, researchers working in the tradition of Kohlberg were able 
to keep die notion stage alive, shifting interest from the sequencing prob-
lems and die invariance postulate to a comparison of different stages and 
the hierarchical integration postulate 
In chapter 4 (lie plausibility ot a hierarchical stage pattern lor moral de-
velopment is addressed Ihis chapter, which was written in collaboration 
with P C M Molenaar, is an empirical and methodological study 
Assuming a hierarchically ordered sequence ot stages, a hybrid develop-
mental model is proposed to explain the responses ot subjects to die 
Defining Issues Test This test is a questionnaire which asks subjects to 
rate the importance of prototypic statements representative ot all the 
moral stages in Kohlberg's dicory Using a causal modelling approach, 
the hybrid model is successfully applied in an empirical study 
After demonstrating die empirical plausibility of a hierarchical struc-
ture in die patterning ot die dunking ot actual subjects diere remains die 
problem of how to account tor such a development Por Uns question I 
tell dial I had lo return lo Piaget 
In chapter 5 a fundamental conceptual problem is addressed Any account 
of development dial sharply distinguishes stages as structurally different 
is vulnerable to die strong arguments against die idea of structural devel-
opment presented by Podor I hoped dial die notion of collective devel-
opment, as worked out by Miller, would be helptul to solve dus so called 
learning paradox However, my conclusion in dus chapter is dial Piagel's 
model of individualistic learning can be defended against die objections 
associated widi die learning-paradox in a way which is quite similar to 
Miller's Vygoiskian recourse lo collective learning However, I also con-
clude Qiat bodi Piaget's and Miller's dieones have a comparable weak-
ness in dial die siili unclear notion of reflective abstraction has lo bear die 
burden of explaining novelty 
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In chapter 6 the status and consistency of Piaget's model lor stage transi-
tion are examined and the repercussions for the concept of developmental 
stage are spelled out. Piaget claimed that with his theory of equilibration 
and the process of reflective abstraction, he had explained the emergence 
of novel mid improved forms of knowledge. However, the unclear defini-
tion of "improvement", together with die alternating emphasis on au-
tonomous constructions by the subject and interaction between subject 
and object, make this claim difficult to understand. Therefore I will con-
duct a detailed analysis of both processes. Seen from the developmental 
perspective, alluded to in chapter 2, this model of development by die 
later Piaget is die best example of what is needed to provide a base for 
stage-theories. 
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3 D I F F É R E N T C O N C E P T I O N S O F STAGE IN THEORIES OF COGNITIVE 
AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
Abstract: The concept "developmental stage " seems to be going through 
a revival (cf. Commons and Richards, 1984; Levin, 1986). Three posi-
tions regarding the conceptualization of developmental stages can be 
distinguished. Piaget's original formulations are presented as a starting 
point (Piaget, 1960). Trends in the sub-discipline of developmental psy-
chology concerned with the study of cognitive development are then 
shortly reviewed and contrasted with trends in the sub-discipline con-
cerned with the study of moral development. In the field of moral-
development research, Kohlberg has proposed a hard structural stage 
model which subscribes to Piaget's criteria while in the field of cognitive 
development most of the stage criteria specified by Piaget are regarded 
as untenable and the weaker notion of "sequence " has become popular. 
By relating this divergence in interpretation and appreciation to trends in 
the methodology and theory of research concerning moral development, 
reasons for maintaining a hard-structural stage model are made intelli-
gible. Characteristic of the Kohlbergian stage concept is an interest in 
meaning structures, structured wholeness and hierarchical integration. 
The concept developmental stage seems to be going llirough a revival (cf. 
Commons and Richards, 1984; Levin, 1986). In fact discussion about this 
concept was never entirely absent since Piaget and Inhelder formulated a 
set of five criteria for stages (invariant sequence, integration, achieve-
ment and preparation, total structure, and equilibrium; Piaget, 1960). 
It is surprising, however, that in one specific area of developmental 
psychology the notion developmental stage has retained its original 
vigour while in the mainstream of research (primarily concerned with the 
development of cognitive operations) the concept has been severely criti-
cized and modified accordingly. In spite of a common point of origin -the 
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five criteria- two radicíüly different and irreconcilable interpretations of 
the concept of developmental stage flourish at the sanie time In the field 
of moral-development research, Kohlberg has proposed a hard structural 
stage model which subscribes to Hie five criteria of Piaget, while in die 
field of cognitive development most ot the stage criteria specitied by 
Piaget are regarded as untenable and the weaker notion sequence has 
become popular I will oiler an explanation tor Uns divergence in 
interpretation and appreciation and argue that Kohlberg and his 
collaborators had reasons for maintaining a hard-structural stage model 
In section 1, I will first give the original formulations ol Piaget's claims 
concerning entena lor stages These formulations (1960) are the point of 
reference for all later interpretations and critiques Two clusters of 
interpretations ot this concept can be distinguished Secondly, the 
received view in the field of cognitive development will be reviewed 
Thirdly, the notion stage currently in vogue in the field ot research of 
moral development will be analyzed In section 2,1 will argue that dus 
difference is not «irbitrary because it can be related to trends in theory and 
methodology (pnm.irily resulting trom specific problems of investigating 
moral development) Finally I will conclude tli.it not all ot die critique by 
developmeniahsts in the pure cognitive domain is relevant lor Kohlberg's 
stage model of moral reasoning 
1 Different Conceptions of Stage 
The Concept Stage according to Piaget 
Because boüi interpretations ot die notion developmental stage to be dif-
lerentiated are based upon an often quoted passage in the proceedings of 
Uic "World IlealUi Organization Study Group on die Psychobiological 
Development ot die Child" (1953 - 1956) n may be in order to have a 
closer look at the exact formulations 
Constant ordei of succession 
The minimum programme lor establishment ol stages is die recog-
nition ot a distinct chronology, in die sense ot a constant order of 
succession The average age for die appearance of a stage may 
vary ( Ilns first en tenon is also known as die postulate of ìnvan-
ant sequences) 
Integration 
A further step is taken in establishing a programme of stages when 
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one succeeds in finding the equivalent of an integration in the tran­
sition from a lower stage to a higher one. 
Achievement and preparation 
The integration of (he clementi of a suge η into (lie achievements 
of stage л+1 gives rise to the supposition that if the stage я+1 is 
really new with respect to stage n, then in any stage η it should be 
possible to distinguish an aspect of achievement with respect to the 
stages going before and also an aspect of preparation with respect 
to the stages coming after. (This criterion is also known as consol­
idation, although üiis term covers only the first aspect.) 
Total structure 
We advance further towards the maximum programme of criteria 
of stages if we then say that it is justifiable to ascribe all die prepa-
rations leading to a stage and all die achievements characterizing 
Ulis stage, to die existence of a general (or total) structure in die 
sense defined above. (This is die well-known "structure d'ensem-
ble" criterion.) 
Equilibrium 
.. .die most general and elaborate programme for a Üieory of stages 
doubtless consists in representing die stages in die form of a scries 
of equilibrium levels, die fields of which would be always more 
and more extensive and the mobility always greater, but whose 
increasing stability would depend precisely on the degree of 
integration and structuration just discussed. 
(Piaget, I960, p. 13) 
These five criteria have been die source of inspiration for almost every 
later formulation (although not always very accurate quoted). Since then 
die interpretation of the notion developmental stage has evolved in differ-
ent directions. The first modification can be traced in die branch of 
developmental psychology concerned with pure cognitive development. 
Outside Genevian circles die discussion in diis field was dominated by 
Nordi American psychologists. The odier branch of developmental psy-
chology I want to review is concerned widi moral development. This dis-
tinction may be rough but is supported by citation patterns in die relevant 
literature. Recent Genevian developments have been left aside. 
The Concept Stage in the Field of Cognitive Development 
Noiwiüisianding die fact dial in die research tradition in die field of cog-
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nitive development many different opinions about the stage concept 
exists, all authors share some vital points in their interpretations. As far as 
cognitive development is at issue there seems to be a sort of consensus 
that the crucial feature of the stage concept is a specific interpatteming of 
responses. This implies a focus die underlying patterns of observable 
responses, in contrast for instance, widi a focus on meaning structures. I 
will briefly illustrate this point by reviewing die position of diree impor-
tant authors in Ulis field. 
Wohlwill, who was generally optimistic about the potential of die 
concept developmental stage, proposed to strengdien the usual descriptive 
use of the term stage by applying it to account for systematic forms of in-
terpatterning among sets of developing responses. Widioul explicitly 
mentioning die temi "structured wholeness" he maintained dial stages 
ensure a degree of harmony and integration in an individual's functioning 
over a variety of related behavioral dimensions. He preferred die term 
sequence if no assumptions about synchrony in functioning are being 
made. So, in his view, a series of qualitatively differentiated modes of 
activity which appear in a predictable order is a sequence but not yet a 
sequence of stages (Wohlwill, 1973). 
Flavell doubted wheüier the concept stage was useful. He contributed 
to die discussion a careful analysis of theoretical problems of synchrony 
of development, üiereby focusing on die interdependence between two 
isolated manifestations of a stage (Flavell, 1972). As a result of die fact 
diat empirical research did not reveal much coherence and homogeneity, 
Flavell abandoned the notion of structured wholeness and emphasized die 
sequential aspect of development. This also led him to view a very strict 
interpretation of the criteria of Piaget like a caricature. "Such a develop-
ment consists of a fixed and universal sequence of stages and sub-stages, 
each defined by a highly general cognitive structure of die Piagetian 
'structure d'ensemble' type. Predictability, consistency, and coherence 
abound." (Flavell, 1982a, p. 2). 
Brainerd, one of die most famous critics of die stage concept and es-
pecially of Piaget's criteria, was also interested in responses and specially 
in dicir predictability. According to him, die only legitimate and mean-
ingful use of die concept developmental stage would be to view stage as 
an explanatory construct. A stage must describe target behaviors and 
specify antecedent variables, diat should be independently measurable 
(Brainerd, 1978). According to him diese requirements are not (yet) met. 
Nodce however, diat even for diis critic diere is no doubt diat die notion 
stage is based on description of responses. 
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Regardless ol llieir positive or negative évaluation ol the stage con-
cept lliese authors share a tocus on behavior and more specific response-
patterns Structure is taken to be a description ol complex behavior which 
is ultimately reducible to simple elemcntaristic behavior The dispute 
about the usefulness ol stage concept still continues although л majority 
in this field is reluctant to use a strict stage concept (for an exception, see 
Case, 1985) Questions about the usefulness of the concept stage are pri­
marily regarded as empirical questions but unfortunately the empirical 
evidence seems to be ambivalent Illustrative of tins state of affairs is the 
fact that Flavell, in his Presidential Address for the Society for Research 
in Child Development, took back a previous rallier pessurustic view, and 
stated, "maybe there really is something general-sUige-like about the 
child's cognitive development, if only we knew how and where to look" 
(Flavell, 1982a) A possible way out ol tins impasse can be found m theo­
ries of moral development In this field the discussion about stages is 
better recognized as requiring a combination ol empirical and conceptual 
arguments An other way out ol these problems might be the model 
offered by Campbell and Uickhard in their knowing-levels approach 
However, because they suggest completely eliminating all the 
structuralistic elements they c<in no longer be said to offer a stage model 
(Campbell & Bickhard, 1986), therelorc 1 will contine mysell to the 
discussion m the field of socio-moral development 
The Concept Stage in the Field of Socio-Moral Development 
Research in the lield ol moral and social development is heavily influ­
enced by Kohlberg who in turn was inspired by Piagel In 1969 Kohlberg 
published his tirsi ma|or article on moral development in which he 
reterred to die aforementioned five criteria ol Piaget His table ol criteria 
-notice the dilterences- has been the reterence pomi tor workers in tins 
field ot research 
Qualitative cliff et enees 
Stages imply distinct or qualitative ditlerences in children's modes 
ol thinking or ot solving die same problem at différent ages 
Invariant sequences 
These dillerent modes ot thought form an invariant sequence, 
order or succession in individual development While cultural 
factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do 
not change its sequence 
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Structured wlwleness 
Each of these ditterent and sequential modes of thought forms a 
"'structured whole" A given stage-response on a task does not just 
represent a specific response determined by knowledge of and 
familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it Rallier it represents 
an underlying thought organization 
Hierarchical integrations 
Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations Stages form an order 
of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfil a 
common function The general adaplional functions ot cognitive 
structures are always die same Accordingly higher stages dis­
place (or rallier reintegrate) the structures found at the lower 
stages However, there is a hierarchical preference within indi­
viduals, that is, a disposition to prefer a solution of a problem at 
die highest level available to diem It is tins disposition which par­
tially accounts for the consistency postulated as our third criterion 
(Kohlberg, 1969, also 1984, ρ 14) 
These entena tor Uie notion developmental stage have been restated in 
recent publications of Kohlbcrg and his colleagues 1 hey defined their 
model as a hard structural stage model (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 
1983, ρ 29 It) The three most salient points ol divergence from the 
(heterogeneous) tradition ol research of cognitive development are first 
an accent on meaning structures radier than concern for behavior struc­
tures, second, the insistence on structured wholeness oí individu.il func-
tioning, and third, better recognition υί the special character of the 
"hierarchical integration" criterion 
a) Deliavioi -Structure versus Meaning-Structure 
In contrast to the idea that stage structure in the end is nothing but a sort 
of behavior description, or at least based on die behavior descnption, 
Kohlberg maintains dial assessing stage structure requires more than 
behavior description "Moral reasoning is the conscious process of using 
ordinary moral language"(Kohlberg, et al, 1983, ρ 69) which means that 
we have to know die reasons why someone acted die way he acted before 
we can asses die moral quality of die aci So Kohlbcrg is interested in die 
structure ot meaninglul material He maintains, furdiennore, dial struc­
tures "are diose consistent rational lorms ot thought organization logi­
cally abstracted from die use of sets of logical operations identified in 
diverse content" (Kohlberg, et al, 1983, ρ 36) So, although, Kohlberg 
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claims a relation between structure and action, structure is not conceived 
of as behavior description. The relation between behavior and structure is 
mediated by meaningful content. 
b) Structured Wholeness 
The second point of divergence involves the notion "structured whole-
ness". According to Kohlberg "Ulis general notion can be described as a 
conception of underlying thought organization that determines responses 
to tasks that are not manifestly similar... The empirical implication of this 
is that individuals' dunking will be manifested at a single, dominant stage 
when observed across instances of varying content." (Kohlberg, et al., 
1983, p. 34). It should be noted that it is exaeüy this kind of implication 
that is most disputed in discussions involving cognitive development. 
c) Hierarchical Integration 
Another point of divergence in the interpretations in bolli fields is the im-
portance attached to the hierarchical integration criterion. In research 
concerning cognitive development the question of the hierarchical nature 
of development has been reduced to a sequencing problem (cf. Wohlwill, 
1973) accompanied by a lack of clear distinction between the postulates 
of integration and invariant sequence. Illustrative for this is die following 
quote from Brainerd (1978, p. 173) "Three of the criteria (invariant 
sequence, integration, and consolidation) lead to the same sorts of empir-
ical prediction (culturally universal sequences in the acquisition of certain 
behaviors". In research concerning moral development the notion of 
hierarchical integration is construed as implying thai later stages are 
morally more preferable. Kohl berg explains "Hard structural stages, on 
the odier hand, replace earlier stages in the sense that each succeeding 
stage transforms the previous one into a more adequate reorganiza-
tion."(Kohlberg, et al., 1983, p. 32). The idea that a subsequent stage is 
morally more adequate is a very important and central claim for the 
theory of moral development. This claim is also to be distinguished from 
the claim that there is an invariant order in stage development. If it were a 
fact that stage Four is always preceded by stage Three in ontogenesis Ulis 
would not be a sufficient reason to conclude that stage Four is morally 
more preferable. For Kohlberg üiis has an important implication "to 
construct a model of hierarchical integrated stages is lo construct a 
normative model of development" (Kohlberg, et al., 1983, p. 38, my 
italics). 
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2 Explanation of the Differences 
Different views concerning die interpretation of stages between moral 
developnientalisls and cognitive developiiientalisls can be meaningfully 
related to different trends in methodology and theory in both fields. I will 
review relevant trends in die research on moral development (which 
result from Uic specific characteristics of investigating moral develop­
ment) In fact two such trends in moral judgment research can be identi­
fied first an evolution of die scoring-technique of Kohlbcrg's Moral 
Judgment Interview and second the emergence and development of other 
research techniques in which subjects have to compare or evaluate pre­
pared statements, which are representative ot a series of dilferent stages 
The Involution of Interview-Scoring 
Kohlberg and his colleagues have made a pioneering etlort in devising a 
methodology to analyse interview protocols Over die years diere have 
been diree m,i|or revisions resulting in a impressive scoring-manual Піе 
Moral Judgment Interview requires subjects to respond to several probing 
questions concerning a moral dilemma presented by die interviewer 
Experience wiüi scoring these interviews has triggered some interesting 
theoretical refinements (cl Colby, & Kohlberg, 1987) I will review Uiree 
such points 
a) Structure, Meaning and Behavior 
In moral judgment research it is common practice to use moral dilemmas 
to provoke responses A moral dilemma typically poses an ambiguous 
situation with several action choices available For instance in die famous 
lleitu-dilemma, Hein/, has to make die choice whedier or not to steal a 
drug Uiat would save lus sick and dying wile The crucial point is dial, at 
nearly all suge levels, reasons for boüi courses ot action can be given 
The same structure may generate arguments pro and con, and dierefore 
choices pro and con, a certain course of action And, on the oüicr hand, 
manifestly similar behavior (or at least behavior choices) may be based 
on structurally dissimilar points of view1 Anyway, in the Moral 
Judgment Interview information about die action choice made by a sub-
1
 Some qualifications arc in older here In tact there is no duect logical 
relation between behavior choice and moral-reasoning structuies according to 
Kohlberg, bul there mighl be a conelation For instance Kohlbeig and Ellenbein 
(Kohlberg 1981 ) lound a positive correlation between high moial-rcdsoning stage 
and rejection ot capital punishment 
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ject is nearly completely disregarded and the focus is on the reasoning of 
the subject. It appears that arguments for both possible choices can be 
given and are in fact given by the subjects. Therefore (lie position a sub-
ject takes in an interview is regarded as less imponimi than die underlying 
structure of the arguments. And what is more, this approach has turned 
out to be quite workable (cf. Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 
1983). 
In fact the use of an assessment technique based on moral dilemmas 
has kept the attention on the structure of meaning and led to a clear dis-
tinction between three levels: the underlying way of thinking (structures), 
actual reasons (meanings) and decisions or choices (responses). Whereas 
in cognitive development only responses and structures are being distin-
guished. 
/;) The Interpretation Problem 
Scoring the interviews is rather difficult. Identifying the structure of 
arguments a subject offers for his choices (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984, p. 186 ff) 
requires an interpretation of the interview material. In contrast, research 
on cognitive development, using modificated Piagetian tasks, poses no 
interpretation problem because results are clear-cut. A child either does 
conserve the volume of water in a systematical way, or he doesn't. In 
tasks like the conservation problem the only interpretation problem is 
encountered in the phase of task design, while, in the Moral Judgment 
Interview an interpretation is needed in each interview. 
In the Moral Judgment Interview a number of utterances have to be 
interpreted, for each interview again, as instances of a certain structure 
and ultimately as instances of a certain stage. The answers on die probing 
questions have to be sorted out and assigned to Five or six possible main 
scoring categories. The interpretation problem has led to recognition of 
the fact that analyzing meaning structures poses quite différent problems 
than analyzing response structures. It introduces a hermeneutic accent (cf. 
Kohlberg, et al., 1983, p. 10) not found in the study of cognitive 
development (statistical analysis being the main tool there). Interpretation 
of die reasons a subjects gives for his decisions poses more than a 
measurement problem, it is a principal problem with repercussions on die 
level of die philosophy of science. Some sort of rational interpretation is 
unavoidable (cf. Habermas, 1984; van Haaf ten, Korüials, Widdershoven, 
de Mul, & Snik, 1986). In order to judge whcüicr an interview does 
contain reasons and not merely acoustical patterns (or alphabetical 
characters), an interpreter is needed who knows what it is to give reasons. 
This interpretative analysis should be complemented widi a furüier 
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Statistical analysis This last tact has been obscured in the past decades, 
perhaps due to a lack of adequate statistical techniques 1 oriunatcly some 
new tools have become available recently (cl Levin, 19X6, Boom & 
Molenaar, 1989) 
с) Bootstrapping 
An other feature ol Uie evolution ol die scoring instrument is a growing 
awareness of the distinction (and the relation) between die empirical and 
the conceptual part of the Üieory Unexpected empirical findings and case 
material discrepant with Kohlberg's assumptions have led to Uieoretical 
and methodological reorganizations Revising the scoring system 
included reworking the stage descriptions A major revision consisted in a 
conceptual redefinition ot the stages as a consequence ol the introduction 
of the so called "social system perspective" Tins change was, amongst 
oüier dungs, motivated by die fact dial the "law-and-ordcr" orientation, 
used as defining characteristic lor stage 1 our, was also found by subjects 
who ш dieir remaining answers clearly exhibited α stage Three morality 
Nowadays, stage Four is defined by a "social system perspective" and no 
longer by die "law-and-order" orientation lins change can theoretically 
be delended because Uie "law-and-order" orientation appears, in hind­
sight, to be based on a mix of structure and content descriptions 
Redefining the stage in more structural tenus turned out to reduce the 
distribution of answers of one subject over more dian one stage 
(Kohlberg, 1984, ρ 189) Also some apparent stage reversals-subjects 
regressing from stage Tour to Three- could be seen as due to inadequate 
definition ot stage hour and redefinition eliminated diese cases In 
general a gradual elimination of content ideas Irom the stage descriptions 
accompanied the revision ot the scoring system 
I he interesting point is thai lcedback Irom the data into die theory 
was used to improve the account given ot development (Colby, & 
Kohlberg, 1987, ρ 36 If, Kohlberg, et al, 1983, ρ 33, Kohlberg, 1984, ρ 
301, ρ 424) The working back and tordi between uieoretical reflections 
and die analysis of actual responses is a kind of mutual bootstrapping In 
the light of dus it will be understandable diat anomalous empirical find­
ings W1Ü1 regard to die criterion "total structure" do not necessarily unply 
dial die notion is untenable, redefinitions of die stages and/or dieoretical 
refinements may be med first Especially in die moral realm, widi die 
problem of interpreting meaningful meaning structures, these conceptual 
refinements are ol utmost importance and they have been shown to be 
successful (Kohlberg, 1984) 
In light ol dus bootstrapping procedure it seems to be legitimate to 
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use the criterion total structure as a so called "assumption made prior to 
research" (as a research guiding notion). In that case the criterion is not 
subject to direct empirical tesis1. 
The Evolution of other Techniques 
An other trend in moral judgment research is an explicit focus on Ihe 
hierarchical aspect in die stage sequence. This is a consequence of die 
special character of die domain of development in question. Claiming that 
higher stages are more adequate is not problematic in die realm of cogni­
tive development and seems to require no further investigation apart from 
research directed at verifying die invariance of the sequence. In contrast, 
in the realm of moral development die claim is not so self evident. In 
order to examine a hierarchical pattern, attention had to be shifted from 
die order of stage manifestations, (with a concern for the inlcrpaiieming 
of responses) to the comparison of stage manifestations. Illustrative, in 
tliis respect, is research of moral reasoning where subjects in stage η were 
confronted widi statements of odier subjects representing odier stages 
(reviewed by Walker, de Vries & Bichard, 1984). According to die crite­
rion hierarchical integration subjects should display a preference for die 
highest stage in a comparison of diese statements of others. As a result of 
diis kind of research a more accurate definition of die criterion hierarchi­
cal integration appeared necessary. In die pioneering studies a cumula­
tive preference for higher stages was found by Rest (1973) but later two 
problems emerged. In some studies subjects exhibited preference for 
stages higher than they could understand. That is, diey preferred state­
ments Üiey were unable to reproduce correctly. As a reaction, attention 
shifted to the morally relevant aspects in the preference-patterns (e.g. 
controlling for language sophistication) (Walker, el al., 1984; Rest, 
1980). The second problem was dial some degree of preference for stages 
lower dian the subjects own stage remained. These problems required a 
clear distinction between the validity of the new and more complex posi-
tion and the validity of die insights of lower stages '"due to hierarchical 
iiitegraüon, lower stage judgments often retain their validity when seen 
from a higher stage perspective." (Colby, & Kohlberg, 1987, p.7). These 
developments stimulated die awareness that hierarchical integration and 
in fact also total structure were crucial notions in accounting for moral 
development and that only Üiose meaning-structures which are ulümalely 
Ml could appear to be a not very useful notion. Hut the research of Kohlberg 
does not point ш that direction (Colby, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983). 
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decisive for a subject are of importance in a moral dilemma Remnants of 
structures ot earlier stages are of less importance It is anyhow clear üiat 
the en tenon hieran lucai integration implies a distinct claim, to be inves-
tigated in it's own right and not to be conflated with sequencing prob-
lems 
3 Conclusion 
Three positions regarding die conceptualization of developmental stages 
have been distinguished The Genevian position is taken as a starting 
point (recent developments left aside) In die sub-discipline of develop-
mental psychology concerned widi the study of cognitive development, 
dominant North American trends were briefly reviewed and contrasted 
widi trends in the subdisciphne concerned widi die study ot moral 
development Dy relating the divergence in die notion developmental 
stage currently to be lound between the two sub-disciplines, widi trends 
in die methodology and theory ot moral developmental research I hope to 
have shown dial a strict stage model must be taken seriously 
'Ilie fact dial there is a tendency in moral judgment research to inter-
pret development as development ot meaning structures (instead of 
response structures) has been related to the use of dilemmas and the 
apparent usefulness of distinction between action choices (behavior 
level), reasons (meaning level) and ways of thinking (structure level) 
Confrontation with a interpretation problem revealed die special charac-
teristics of analyzing meaning structures as opposed to response struc-
tures Recognition of the fact that die criterion struawed wholeness is 
not a derivative ol empirical research but instead an assumption made 
prior to research (as a central research-guiding notion) has led to redefi-
nition ot the stages in Kohlberg's dieory resulting in a more homoge-
neous picture ol die response paitcnis in die interviews In die light of 
diese considerations stiuctuied wholeness seems to be a quite acceptable 
assumption (at least in die moral domain) 
Investigating die hierarchical aspect of moral development led to a 
more accurate definition ol die criterion hierarchical integration and to a 
shift in interest from the sequencing problems and die invariant sequence 
postulate (found in research concerning cognitive development) to a 
companson ol diflerent stages and die hierarchical integration postulate 
So diere appear to be good reasons tor maintaining a strict or "Hard 
Stage" model Critiques ol die hard stage model trom widnn die subdis-
cipline (eg Rest, 1У79) have been addressed elsewhere (Boom & 
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Molenaar, 1989). Il might be expected that due to the differences 
enumerated not all of the critiques attended to in discussions between 
developmentalists in the pure cognitive domain are relevant for the Hard 
Stage model. It might even be the case that in the light of refinement of 
the criteria many criticisms turn out to be inadequate even in relation to 
intellectual stage developments, but that is another issue. 
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4 A DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL OF HIERARCHICAL STAGE STRUCTURE 
IN OBJECTIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS1 
Abstract: A hierarchical structural model of moral judgment is proposed 
in which a subject is characterized as occupying a particular moral 
stage. During development, the subject's characteristic stage progresses 
along a latent, ordered dimension in an age dependent way. Evaluation 
of prototypic statements representative of moral stages below a subject's 
current stage are assumed to follow a cjuasi-Markov simplex pattern, 
whereas higher level statements are evaluated in a homogeneous, non-
hierarchical way. This hybrid developmental model of moral judgment 
converges with the usual simplex model if subjects reach the highest 
stage. Using a causal modeling approach, the model is applied in an 
empirical study of stage score correlations of Defining Issues Test impor­
tance ratings of moral issues. 
The cognitive-developmental approach to morality posits stages of moral 
judgment that are held to develop in an invariant, hierarchical sequence. 
The stages represent different deep-structures which are assumed to be 
increasingly adequate, in philosophical tenus, as justifications for moral 
choices and actions. Change from one stage to another involves a reorga­
nization of thought and structural transformations (Kohlberg, 1984). Boti) 
the assumed invariability of the stage sequence as well as the hierarchical 
ordering of suiges constitute strong predictions of the theory and have 
been subjected to extensive empirical scrutiny. 
Empirical support for die existence of an invariable stage sequence 
has been obtained in longitudinal studies (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & 
Lieberman, 1983; Kuhn, 1976; Page, 1981). The finding of an invariant 
stage sequence does not necessarily imply a hierarchical ordering of the 
stages. That is, in an invariant sequence of stages a later stage may or 
' Co-authored by P.С M. Molenaar, University of Amsterdam 
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may not be more preferable in moral terms. Consequently, the identifica-
tion of a hierarchical ordering has to be addressed by itself and as to tliis, 
empirical support has been found in experimental studies. According to 
Walker, de Vries, and Bichard (1984), the general pattern across several 
such studies was that subjects prefer the reasoning of stages higher than 
their current stage and reject lower stage reasoning (as measured by their 
ralings of stage-prototypic statements). But also, a subject's understand-
ing (as measured by the ability to paraphrase stage-prototypic statements 
accurately) was limited to no more than one stage higher than her current 
stage. Another kind of empirical support comes from questionnaires 
which yield score profiles that give way to a statistical pattern-analysis of 
evaluations (Davison, Robbins & Swanson, 1978). These score profiles 
are obtained by asking a subject to evaluate (e.g. in terms of preference, 
rejection, or importance) a series of items representing all the possible 
stages. This approach can be seen as a generalization of die experimental 
approach mentioned above and is explained below. 
Our approach in analyzing the hierarchical structure of moral stages is 
an instance of die analysis of questionnaire score profiles, but explicitly 
takes into account that, due to limited understanding, prototypic state-
ments representative of stages higher than a subject's current moral stage 
are evaluated according to nonhierarchical criteria. We illustrate Ulis 
model by means of an application to score profiles obtained widi 180 
Dutch high-school and university students. 
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1 A Hybrid Model for Hierarchical Stage Structure 
We describe a model which integrates aspects of Kohlberg's stage con-
cept and the model of moral development espoused by Rest. According to 
Kohlberg, at each occasion a subject either occupies a single moral stage 
or is in a transition between two adjacent stages (Kohlberg, Levine, & 
Hewer, 1983). On the other hand. Rest characterizes a subject by means 
of a profile across all morid stages which indicates the differential likeli-
hood of using moral criteria representative of each stage (Rest, 1979a). 
We show that both approaches can be reconciled yielding a hybrid model 
of moral development. 
Kohlberg's scoring system is designed to assess actual stage occu-
pancy. Accordingly, spontaneously produced moral judgments normally 
are assessed by means of ipsative stage scores (scores summing up to a 
constant) (cf. Damon, 1977; Kohlberg, 1984; Selman, 1980). However, 
the problem wiüi ipsative stage scores is Uiat they preclude statistical test-
ing of hierarchical structure in a nonexperimental context. Examination 
of the hierarchical structure, in a cross-sectional study, requires that indi-
vidual score profiles are available. Therefore, most research pertaining to 
die issue of the hierarchical nature of stages of moral judgment (all non-
experimental research as far as we know) made use of evaluations of 
moral judgments rather than spontaneous moral judgments. 
The concept of unique stage assignment in the sense of Kohlberg and 
the concept of a score profile across stages can be integrated if assess-
ment of moral development makes use of measures based upon reactions 
on moral-stage-prototypic statements. Depending upon die criteria widi 
which the subjects are supposed to evaluate diese statements, this leads to 
preference ratings (cf. Rest, Turici & Kohlberg, 1969), rejection ratings 
(Carroll & Rest, 1981), or importance ratings (Rest, 1979a). 
It is our claim that evaluations obtained by these techniques are 
generated in the following way. Each subject occupies a particular stage 
in die sequence of moral stages, in agreement with Kohlberg's moral-
stage-concept. Evaluations of moral-stage-prototypic statements are given 
from die point of view of a subject's current stage. In Ulis way, die model 
takes into account die research findings (reviewed by Walker et al., 1984) 
indicating dial evaluation of moral judgments is dependent on die current 
stage of each subject. Then, in so far as evaluations pertain to stages 
below a subject's current stage, it is expected that she will be able to 
discern their inherent hierarchical ordering because, during ontogenesis 
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she actually progressed through these stages and therefore understands 
their associated moral criteria Consequently, a subject's evaluations of 
statements representative of lower stages then her current stage should 
reflect their hierarchical ordering In contrast, a subject is not actually 
acquainted with stages above her stage and therefore will be unable to 
discern their inherent hierarchical ordering Hence, from the subject's 
point of view, statements representative ol higher stages th.ui her current 
stage may appear to be undifterentiated and elicit homogeneous 
evaluations In sum, the model yields score profiles ol evaluations as 
described by Rest (cf Davison el al, 1978), but these profiles are 
asymmetrical with relerence to a subject's current stage in die sense of 
Kohlberg 
Now consider a homogeneous group of subjects occupying the same 
moral stage m and denote evaluations ot statements representative of 
moral stages at or below their current stage by η, , ι = 1 , , m 
According to our model, diese evaluations will show the underlying 
hierarchical ordering of stages 1, , m I he ordering in question is 
conjunctive in dial moral criteria of stage t are integrated in die entena of 
stage » + 1 (Kohlberg, 1984) Consequently, stage/« is structurally more 
akin to stage in - 1 than to stage //> - 2, and tins Mruclur.il ordering will be 
reflected by die iniercorrclaiions of die associated evaluations cor(T|
m
 . ι 
. Лт) > corÍTlm - 2 · Лт) I" general, it tollows Üiat, for i,j < m , сог(т|,, 
T|
m
) > сог(т||, η
π 1) it ι >j Tins ordered pattern ot interconrclations, indi­
cating a hierarchical ordering of stages, is called a simplex structure 
(Davison, 1977) In contrast, it is expected dial die correlations between 
evaluations of statements associated widi stages higher than in will show 
a common tactor pattern, because such evaluations will be undifferenti­
ated for subjects at stage m 
In order to test this model we consider die following hypodieses (a) 
The matrix of mtercorrelations of evaluations obtained with subjects who 
are heterogeneous widi respect to stage-level is expected to show a sim­
plex structure In case there are relatively tew subjects at the highest 
stages, however, die simplex structure may be attenuated because die 
majority ot subjects will give indifferent evaluations of statements asso­
ciated widi die upper stages (b) Λ restricted, more homogeneous, sample 
of subjects occupying the lower stages is expected to yield evaluations 
widi a hybrid pattern of întercorrelations a simplex pattern tor die lower 
stages and for die upper stages a common factor pattern In die next 
section we will discuss lonnal tests of simplex structure (hypodiesis a) 
and a hybnd patterning (hypodiesis b) 
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A Formal Test of Simplex-Like Structure 
If the evaluations of slagc-prolotypic statements reflect the underlying 
hierarchical stage ordering then the intercorrclalions between evaluations 
should display a simplex structure. To test tins hypothesis it is common 
practice to order the rows and columns of the correlation matrix so that 
row and column 1 correspond to the first stage score, row and column 2 
correspond to the second stage score, and so on. If the values of these in-
tercorrelations tend to decrease as one moves away from the diagonal 
element in either direction, then it is concluded that the correlation matrix 
displays a simplex structure. However, visual inspection of simplex 
structure can be misleading (cf Kurtines & Greif, 1974) and docs not 
discriminate between the normal simplex model and alternative models in 
which a simplex pattern only partly holds 
Joreskog (1У70) has proposed a tonnai test of quasi-Markov simplex 
structure that enables objective evaluation of die hypothesis The test is 
based upon a general causal model of stage score profiles in which the 
predicted simplex structure is represented as a latent structure. 
In order to test the hypothesis that the evaluations of stage-prolotypic 
statements constitute consecutive steps (stages) along an ordered dimen­
sion, we consider a general causal model with two structural equations. 
The first equation defines a linear ordering along a latent dimension of 
die true ratings of consecutive stage-prototypic statements. 
Лі+1 = βι+1,ι Лі + Ci+1 < = ! . · .5 (la) 
where т^ is die true rating-score at stage /, and β,+ι,, is a regression coef­
ficient describing the linear dependence of η 1 + ι upon η ! , and ζι+ι 
denotes residual, î.c , stage-specific, true score variation at level ι +1. 
The second equation defines a decomposition of each observed rating 
into the associated true rating and measurement error. 
y, = λ | η , + ε1 i '= l , ,6 (lb) 
where y, denotes the observed rating of die i-tli level of a randomly 
drawn subject, η, is the corresponding true rating, λ, is die stage-specific 
loading associated with η , , and ε, is measurement error 
It is assumed thai measurement errors at different levels are uncorre­
cted and that stage-specific residuals at different levels are uncorrected 
A schematic drawing ot the complete model comprising Eqs (la) and 
(lb) is shown in Fig 1 
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Fig 1 Structural schema of quasi-Markov simplex model 
The specifications given above define a quasi-Markov simplex structure 
underlying a correlation matrix of score profiles (cf Joreskog, 1970) 
According to Eq (la), the linear ordering inherent to simplex structure 
pertains to the true scores η, and, hence, the pattern of mtercorrelations of 
observed scores y, may deviate trom uns structure Піе model is fitted to 
the observed correlation matrix by means ot the method ot maximum 
likelihood (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1983) and the goodness-ot-fil is deter­
mined from die usual likelihood-ratio lest It the χ 2 goodness-of-fit test 
does not indicate the presence of significant deviations from the assumed 
simplex structure, one can proceed with a consideration ol die obtained 
parameter estimates The most important parameters in our model, the 
regression coetficients β
ι +ι,! in Kq (la), reflect die proximities between 
consecutive stages ι and ι +1 along an ordered dimension and conse­
quently should have positive values In case one or more ol die estimated 
regression coefficients are negative, the assumed stage sequence is not 
supported One could then proceed wiüi plausible alternative structural 
models tor die observed pattern of mtercorrelations In die next section 
we will tum to one such alternative implied by our hybrid model of moral 
judgments 
The quasi-Markov model described by Cqs ( la) and (lb) has 6 (λι, 
λό) + 6 (var[Ei], , аг[еб]) + 5 фгл< · βό.5) = 17 tree parameters 
The variances of ζ, in Eq (la) are all fixed at var [ζ,] = 1, Í = 1, , 6 It 
can be shown diät uns model is not identified, ι e , die free parameters of 
the model cannot all be estimated widiout the introduction ot further 
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constraints Nouce thai such additional constraints neither affect the basic 
interpretation nor the gooclness-ot-lu of the model hollowing Joreskog 
(1979), wc fix var [ει 1 = var Іе^] = 0 in order to arrive at an identified 
quasi-Markov model As var ГуіІ = 1 and the variance or E[ has already 
been fixed at zero, it follows trom Eq (lb) thai the value of λι also 
becomes fixed at λ) = 1 Consequently, the identified quasi-Markov 
model has 14 I ree par.uneters 
Λ Test ot our Hybrid Developmental Model 
In order to test the assumptions about a subject's inability to evaluate die 
hierarchical ordering of stages higher than her current stage, we will con­
sider a restricted sample without subiects in the higher stages It can be 
expected that for the lower stages a simplex pattern will hold because the 
subiect is acquainted wiüi (hese stages (sec discussion above) In contrast, 
tor the higher stages the pattern o( evaluations produced by such a sample 
of subjects will show no hierarchical structure 
Specifically, let /// denote the highest stage actually present in die 
sample, where in < 6 Then, a test ol our model is given by 
for stages actually present 
1 l i+l=ßi+ | , i r l i + Ci+l 
Уі = М і
 + е
і 
for the stages not present 
Ήηι+Ι = Pm+l,m Im + Cm+1 
Уі = Vlm+l + e i 
Equations (2a) relate lo evaluations associated with stages that are hierar­
chically lower than, or equal to, die highest slage scores actually present 
in the sample Nonce thai bqs (2a) are identical with the original simplex 
model given by hqs (la) and (lb) In contrast, hqs (2b) relate to evalua­
tions associated with stages that are hierarchically higher than the highest 
stage scores actually present Equations (2b) constitute a common one-
factor model lh.it rellects (he homogeneous nonhierarchical rating 
behavior alluded to earlier Nonce dial Uns common factor T)
m + i is 
linearly ordered with respec( lo the highest true score r |
m
, whereas true 
scores at stages in + 1, , 6 have no internal hierarchical ordering A 
schematic drawing ol this model with m = 3 is shown in Figure 2 
i = l . 
1 = 1 , 
ι = in+l. 
, wi-1 
, m 
,6 
(2a) 
(2b) 
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Fig 2 Structural schema of hybrid model wilh «t = 3 
In tins example subject*» at stages 4, 5 and 6 are not present 
Consequently, stage-protolypic statements at higher levels appear undif-
ferentiated for die subjects in dus sample 
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2 Empirical Application 
In this section we present the results of an application of the above tests 
to a sample of 180 Dutch students We first consider the test of simplex 
structure with the complete sample and then proceed with a test of the 
hybrid model by considering a restricted sample 
Method 
Subject* Ine results are obtained with a sample of 180 Dutch high-
school and university sludcnLs (age range 14 to 24 years) With tins rela­
tively large age range we hope to find a hierarchical simplex pattern 
described by Lqs (1) If we restrict attention to a, more homogeneous, 
subgroup ot subjects occupying the lower stages, we expect that the sim­
plex ordering tor die higher stages will be replaced by a common factor 
structure as described by Hqs (2) 
Instrument We used a well-known instrument for measuring 
objective moral judgments, the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979a, 
1979b) The DIT is composed ot six hypothetical dilemmas describing 
situations which highlight competing social claims Following each story, 
subiccls are asked to decide on an appropriate solution to the dilemma, 
then rate 12 issues in accordance with that decision Finally, subiects are 
to rank the lour most important issues Subjects responded to a translated 
version ol the DIT (Dudink, Hoeks & Wouters, 1985) 
I he Ρ score utili/cs the ranking data and is defined as the weighted 
sum ol the ranked principled issues (moral stages 5 and 6) Λ translormed 
version ot tins score, percentage P, is the most common index of moral 
reasoning currently in use This Ρ percent score is recommended for 
group comparisons (Rest, 1979a) More information on die DIT can be 
iound in 'I homa ( 1986) 
Score profiles can be obtained because the sub]ecl is asked, after read­
ing each story, to rate each ol 12 moral issues (items focusing on stage-
characteristic properties) on a 5-point scale ol importance in deciding 
what ought to be done Each ol the moral issues was written to express 
reasoning characteristic ol either stage 2, 3, 4, 5a, 5b, or 6, (in our model 
description numbered Irom 1 to 6) in Kohlberg's (1969) dieory Also 
included are meaningless items in order to identity socially desirable re­
sponding No such responding exceeding the criteria suggested by Rest 
(1979b) was found 'llie 72 (6 χ 12) ratings yields score profiles which 
consist ot importance ratings ot moral reasons typical of consecutive 
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stages in Kohlberg's theory 
Results With the Complete Sample 
The fit ot Uie quasi-Markov simplex or hybrid model by means of the 
technique of maximum likelihood requires that observations constitute a 
sample from a multivariate normal distribution In order to investigate 
tins assumption, each pair ot DIT stage scores was tested for linearity A 
total ot 30 regression analyses was carried out in which no indication of 
nonlmearily was found Moreover, the skewness oí the marginal distribu-
tion ot each Dil stage score did not diller signiticanily from zero, 
although the kurtosis was slightly, yet significantly, negative In sum, 
diese tests indicate that the observations have an approximately normal 
distribution 
The average Ρ percent score for the complete sample is 36 0 
(SD = 13 6) According to normative sample data provided by Rest 
(based on a reference sample of 1080 subiects with average P% score 
34 77 and SD = 16 68) our sample is representative of low, medium and 
high scorers 
The obtained correlation matrix of DIT score profiles across stages 2, 
3,4, 5A, 5B, and 6 is shown in Table 1 
TABLE l 
STAGE SC ORB CORREI ATIONS FOR IMPORTANCE RATINGS (DIT) OF 180 D U T C H 
HIGH SCHOOI ANDUNivFRsirYSruDrNis 
Stage 
3 
4 
5A 
5B 
6 
2 
470 
420 
289 
110 
-010 
3 
394 
376 
175 
219 
4 
496 
236 
245 
5A 
615 
456 
51) 
452 
The fit of the quasi-Markov simplex model described by Eqs (1) yields 
die following results First, the χ 2 goodness-of-fit statistic is χ 2 = 14 72, 
df= 8 (p = 065)' The obtained value ot die goodness-ol-fit statistic does 
* These ïesults luve been obtained after fixing the vanance ot e4 at zero If 
the original model with 14 free parameters is fitted to the data, c2 = 12 87 (p = 
075) but the estimate ot vai [e4] has a (nonsignificant) negative value 
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not lead to rejection of the hypothesis that the correlation matrix of DIT 
score profiles has a simplex-like structure. Moreover, alternative indices 
measuring the deviance of the observed pattern of intercorrelations from 
the expected simplex structure (cf. Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1983) also show 
that the fit is acceptable. The most pertinent parameter estimates in the 
model involve the regression coefficients in Eq. (la) (ßi+i,i). The esti-
mates are | i2 , l = -909 , ß3,2 = -873 , β 4 > 3 = .537 , β5,4 = -983 , 
β 6 5 = .437. Recall that each regression coefficient ßi+i,i reflects the 
degree of linear dependence of тц+i upon r\\. Consequently, a small value 
of ßi+i,i is indicative of a ditto linear dependence. The obtained estimates 
of the regression coefficients are all positive, as required, mid show that 
die stages are well separated. 
Results With a Restricted Sample. 
In order to test the hybrid model described by Kqs. (2) one needs a re-
stricted, more homogeneous, group of subjects occupying the lower 
stages (stratification by stage-level). As only DIT score profiles are avail-
able, we selected such a group by means of die following criteria. First 
wc examined DIT score profiles of high-school students only 
(stratification by educational level; η = 84; age range 14-18 years; aver­
age P% score 29.3 SD = 11.8). The matrix of intercorrelations üius 
obtained is presented in Table 2A. Alternatively, we selected subjects 
showing die lowest degree of principled moral reasoning (stratification by 
Ρ percent score; cutoff point 36.7; η = 84; average P% score 24.8 
SD = 7.9). The associated matrix of DIT stage score intercorrelations is 
presented in Table 213. 
TABLE 2 A 
STAGE SCORE CORRELATIONS ГОН IMPORTANCE RATINGS (DIT) OF 84 DUTCH 
HKiH-sqU)()],Sll|URTS 
5B Stage 
3 
4 
5A 
5B 
6 
2 
.454 
.258 
.264 
.284 
.172 
3 
.329 
.519 
.428 
.372 
4 
.558 
.488 
.365 
5A 
.730 
.476 .445 
As to die correlation matrix in Table 2Λ, the fit of die simplex model 
given by Kqs. (la) and ( lb) docs converge to a solution widi χ 2 = 483.09, 
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df= 8 (p = 000), thus indicating ihat the observed pattern of ïniercorrela-
tions does not conform to uns model (cf Joreskog & Sorbom, 1983) In 
contrast, die tit of die modified model given by Eqs (2a) and (2b), where 
«i = 2, is quite good χ 2 = 4 05, df = 9 (p = 908) The estimated regres­
sion coefficient in Eqs (2a) is ß2,i = 509 In addition (lie estimated coef-
ficient in the regression of the common factor on 1)2 (Eq (2b)) is 
ß3>2= 613. 
These results show that the simplex model given by Eqs (1) does not 
apply to the stage-score correlations obtained with this restricted sample 
of subjects. In contrast, the modified model given by Eqs (2) fits quite 
well and has reasonable parameter estimates Specifically, we find that m 
= 2, indicating Uial subjects occupying stages above stage 3 in Kohlberg's 
stage sequence are absent in Uns restricted sample ot high-school stu-
dents Furthermore, suige-specific statements at higher levels (presently, 
stages 4, 5A, 5B and 6 in Kohlberg's [19691 sequence) appear to be rated 
in die homogeneous, nonluerarchical way described by the common fac-
tor model given by Eqs (2) In a nutshell, (hen, Uiesc results support our 
modified developmental model ot moral judgments 
TABLE 2B 
STAGE SCORE CORRELATIONS FOR IMPORTANCE RATINGS (DIT) OF 84 
SUBJECTS wrm LOWEST Ρ SCORE (A suns AMPLE он 1 lib 180 DUTCH HIGH-
SCHOQI, AND UNIVhRSI ΓΥ STUDFNTS ) 
Stage 
3 
4 
5A 
5B 
6 
2 
481 
349 
.326 
.305 
207 
3 
339 
552 
.401 
.484 
4 
613 
465 
375 
5Л 
720 
541 
5B 
.360 
The correlation matrix in Table 2B yields comparable results. The fit of 
die simplex model appears to be acceptable, χ 2 = 11 34 , (ρ = 125), but 
the estimates of р4,з and ßs4have inadmissible values Hence the 
observed pattern of intercorrelaiions does not conform to tins model The 
fit of (lie modified model given by Eqs (2a) and (2b), where m = 2, is 
quite good χ 2 = 12.07, df=9(p = 209) 'I he estimated regression 
coefficient in Eq (2a) is ß2,i = 549 The estimated coefficient in die 
regression ol die common laclor on r\-¿ (Eq (2b)) is βι,2 = 6 1 5 
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3 Conclusion 
Most research pertaining to the issue of the hierarchical integration of 
stages of moral judgments makes use of evaluations of moral judgments, 
rallier than referring to spontaneous moral judgments, Earlier research 
(reviewed by Walker et al., 1984) indicated thai the evaluation of moral 
stage-protolypic statements is dependent upon the current stage of a sub­
ject. Accordingly, we proposed a model of hierarchical structure thai 
accounts for the asymmetrical pattern of evaluation of moral stage-proto­
lypic statements due lo the actual stage occupied by each subject. 'Ulis is 
a developmental model in so far as a subject's own stage is conceived of 
as progressing along a latent, ordered dimension in an age dependent 
way. Furthermore, this model is a modification of the original simplex 
model based upon the hierarchical integration hypothesis. Specifically, 
our model converges to the simplex model if moral evaluations are 
obtained with subjects at ihe upper levels of the stage sequence. In this 
case, in = 6 in ihe modified developmental model specified by Eqs. (2) 
and, consequently, this model is now indistinguishable from the quasi-
Markov simplex model defined by Eqs. (1). 
In an empirical study of moral judgments of a Dutch sample of high-
school and university students, we found support for the plausibility of 
our modified developmental model. In particular, the pattern of stage 
score correlations of DIT importance ratings in a restricted srnnple is sat­
isfactorily explained by our model, whereas the simplex model fails in 
this respect. Apparently, the lack of subjects at ihe higher stages in both 
the restricted samples (Tables 2Λ and 2B) yields the asymmetrical pattern 
of score profiles as predicted by the modified developmental model. That 
is, evaluations of stage-proiolypic statements below the highest stage 
level actually present in the sample follow a simplex pattern, whereas 
higher level statements are evaluated in a homogeneous, nonhierarchical 
way. In contrast, the pattern of stage-score correlations of DIT impor­
tance ratings in the complete sample of high-school and university stu­
dents is satisfactorily explained by the simplex model. Apparently, a sig­
nificant number of universily students now included in die sample is 
characterized by highest stage, implying that in = 6 in ihe modified 
developmental model. The results are in agreement with the conclusion of 
Walker el al. (1984) that subjects prefer higher over lower statements if 
they are capable of appreciating the difference. Stratification of a sub­
group by Ρ percent score yielded no improvement in the fit of the hybrid 
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model. This could be due to llic fact that the Ρ percent score is not 
designed to stage-type individuals. A more direct assessment of stage-
level by means of interview techniques may be more effective but is very 
demanding. 
We used a causal modeling approach to the evaluation of hierarchical 
pattemings of moral judgments. The concerning theoretical point of view 
according to which stages obey a conjunctive ordering is directly repre­
sented by the simplex model or, for the lower stages, by a hybrid model. 
In contrast, conjunctive stage ordering cannot be faithfully represented by 
means of a restricted factor model, although this model sometimes can 
yield an acceptable fit to d)e data (see Wohlwill, 1973, pp. 269 - 273 , for 
an extensive critique of factor analysis of conjunctive orderings). Our 
approach enables a consideration of objective tests of the simplex model, 
the hybrid model, and alternative versions thereof. Only if the common 
one-factor part of a hybrid model is restricted to the upper two stages, 
such an objective test cannot be carried out because the common factor 
then is exactly identified. It has been common practice to assess the pres­
ence of hierarchical pattemings of stage-score correlations by means of 
visual inspection, hence the present approach constitutes a significant im­
provement in üiis respect. Although the usual interpretation of DIT score 
profiles denies the possibility of subjects "having" a stage, the results of 
our causal modeling approach show that such an interpretation, in line 
witli Kohlberg's theory, is plausible. In sum, causal modeling is a power-
ful anrf flexible technique for the investigation of Mie hierarchical nature 
of stage sequences in moral judgment. 
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C O L L E C T I V E D E V E L O P M E N T A N D 
THE LEARNING PARADOX 
Abstract. The learning paradox, which dates back to the Sophists, illus-
trates how difficult it is to give an adequate account of the emergence of 
novelty in cognitive functioning. More recently Fodor has raised the 
same problem, criticizing Piaget on the grounds of the "impossibility of 
acquiring more powerful structures". Convincing counterarguments to 
Fodor's (or the Sophist's) objections are sparse. Recently, however, 
Miller has argued that the learning paradox is a corollary of 
individualistic models of learning such as Piaget 's and he has proposed a 
theory of collective learning in order to escape the circularity inherent in 
most learning theories. However, Piaget's model for individualistic 
learning can be defended against the objections associated with the 
learning-paradox in a way which is quite similar to Miller's Vygotskian 
recourse to collective learning. Nevertheless both Piaget's and Miller's 
theories have a comparable weakness in that the still problematical 
notion of reflective abstraction has to bear the burden of explaining 
novelty. 
"Novelty" is a persistent and fundamental problem for all theories thai 
address the (pre)conditions and mechanisms of the ontogenesis of knowl-
edge. In developmental psychology, the problem is to explain the emer-
gence of novel cognitive slruclures. It is surely strange that this question 
is often treated as a side issue. Sternberg (1984) estimated thai less than 1 
% of die literature in developmental psychology is devoted to Ulis ques-
tion. Nevertheless, it addresses a theoretical issue of central importance 
and tremendous practical relevance. 
The classical explanation of novelty has been provided by Piaget 
whose constructivism purports to explain true novelty in cognitive func-
tioning. Recently, some fundamental criticisms have been advanced 
against Piaget's (1985) developmental theory (and by implication against 
Kohlberg's (1984) theory of moral development). These criticisms derive 
5 
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from Plato's so-called Meno paradox, which seems lo render learning 
impossible. Fodor (1980) has provided a more modem formulation of the 
problems involved in this paradox, making it directly relevant for stage 
development. He concludes dial it is impossible to lean» something fun-
damentally new. Piaget of course, has strongly opposed Üiis nativistic 
conclusion. 
In light of this controversy, I wish to evaluate die contribution of Max 
Miller (1986, 1987), who has proposed a sociological model of learning. 
Miller claims diat "learning something qualitatively new" is possible only 
on die basis of collective learning. He contends that Piaget's and 
Kohlberg's positions (instances of what Miller calls genetic individual-
ism) cannot fulfil their promise to explain novelty, whereas his own posi-
tion (genetic inleractionism) can. Miller does not deny dial it is an indi-
vidual who is learning, but he maintains diat collective processes are in-
dispensable in order to learn something fundamentally new. Fundamental 
learning he defines as the development of novel standards or conceptions 
of rationality. It typically results in a change in die way new content-
knowledge can be acquired (Miller, 1986, p. 140). It can also be 
described as a movement toward die subsequent stage of development, as 
understood by Piaget and Kohlberg. Fundamental learning is distin-
guished from relative learning, which is the accumulation of 
(proposilional) knowledge within a given conceptual framework. 
In die first part of dús paper, I describe die paradox in more detail. 
Second, I review Piaget's position. Third, Miller's critique of Piaget is 
addressed. Fourdi, I reconstruct Miller's proposal for solving die Meno 
paradox. Fiftli, I show how Piaget's model of development can be elabo-
rated to accommodate die problem of novelty as adequately as Miller's 
model. Finally, I conclude that Miller's arguments (and arguments deriv-
ing from Vygotskian approaches) against die paradox are not principally 
stronger Uian arguments derivable from Piaget's position. Bodi positions 
indicate a way of conceptualizing fundamental learning so diat acquiring 
(learning) novel insights is not paradoxical. Neverdieless neither account 
is fully satisfactory because, in die end, a full explanation of such learn-
ing hinges upon a still problematical account of interiorization, or reflec-
tive abstraction. 
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1 The Meno Paradox 
The paradox of learning only occurs in the case of specific kinds of 
learning, such as the learning involved in stage transitions. Novel knowl-
edge cannot be derived completely from old knowledge, or it would not 
be new. Yet the new transcending part of it cannot be completely new 
cither, for then it could never be understood. These irreconcilable condi-
tions are probably the grounds for the ancient "Meno-paradox". 
According to Miller (1986), several important developmentalists have 
avoided the epistemological and developmental problems involved by 
ignoring one of these conditions. Nativism, which is derived from 
rationalism, denies all novelty (structure without genesis), while 
behaviorism, which is derived from empiricism, denies the importance of 
previous structuring (genesis without structure) as Piaget recognized. 
Miller (1986, p.254) wants the paradox solved, not ignored. He regards 
this objective as the essence of his book that addresses the issues. 
In Plato's "Meno" dialogue, the paradox is brought forward by Meno 
but the arguments underlying it originated with the Sophists. They used 
the paradox to argue against the view thai learning is an activity of learn-
ing persons themselves. They tried to convince their opponents thai 
learning is completely dependent upon instruction. For if it were true that 
learning depended on asking and searching, learning would not be possi-
ble - asking for something means that you already know what you are 
looking for, in which case you do not need to leam it anymore. However, 
if you do not know it yet, you cannot learn it either, because then you 
cannot know what il is thai you are looking for. Plato did not agree with 
the conclusion that learning is exclusively dependent on instruction. 
Although he admitted that some knowledge must be presupposed, he 
maintained that this knowledge could be donnant. The immortal soul 
already knows everything before being boni; learning is a matter of recol-
lection (Bruggen, 1988). 
More recently die same controversies have re-emerged. Fodor (1980, 
p. 142) maintains that learning something genuinely novel is impossible 
and therefore that all essential structures must be present at birUi. As he 
defends his extreme nativistic position in explicit reference to stage-theo-
ries of development, his formulations will be used here (but see also 
Campbell and Burkhard, 1987; Flanagan, 1984; Molenaar, 1986). 
Fodor is primarily concerned wiüi the issue of concept learning, 
which he believes to be a confused notion. He claims that all actual 
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learning theories are based on inductive extrapolation, and therefore must 
acknowledge hypothesis formation and confirmation among the processes 
involved in learning, lie then shows (hat given such premises, there can 
be no such tiling as concept learning, or achieving a new stage in devel­
opment as Piaget would have it. 
The line of argument entertained in such learning theories 
(specifically within the empiricist tradition), and Fodor's objections to it, 
can be reconstructed in three steps: (a) First, a subject has to have an idea 
of what he or she wants to learn. A representation of it (e.g. a hypothesis 
specifying a general rule) must be present. I will call this Die input, (b) 
Second, the subject should test whether these ideas conform with experi­
ence. For example, the hypothesis must be put to lest. That is why it has 
to be representablc in the first place. Fodor's main examples involve con­
cept learning. Testing would amount to verifying whether the concept is 
used correctly after the inference of a rule that specifies the right use. 
Correction, in this case, is carried out by other competent speakers (in 
this model considered its environmental feedback). The predicate learned 
(novel knowledge) is only justified after confirmation of the hypothesis, 
so something is learned if and only if this step has been completed. I refer 
to this confirmed knowledge as die output of the learning process, (с) A 
problem of circularity will occur in the special case when the input and 
output arc of die same kind. In this case, the learning-process presupposes 
as input that which is only available as output. 
Fodor points out two instances of circularity. A problem arises when 
we want to learn a "primitive" concept (concepts having no further inter­
nal structure and hence nol representable in terms of other concepts). It is 
impossible (by definition) to form a hypothesis about them without the 
use of die primitive concepì itself. Bui since this is exactly the concept 
lhal is to be attained, the paradox follows (Fodor, 1981). The problem 
likewise arises in the acquisition of a new stage-structure (in the Piagetian 
sense). Forming a representation thai contains a hypothesis concerning a 
new structure presupposes an initial stage structure that is sufficiently 
complex to permit die representation. But the new -still to be attaincd-
structure typically transcends die old structure and thus can never be 
adequately represented by die old structure (Fodor, 1980). In bodi cases, 
die input paradoxically requires essential parts of die output. Notice that 
all of the three steps or conditions are necessary for die paradox to occur. 
If one is omitted, diere is no paradox. For example, if condition (c) is not 
met, it is perfectly possible that something is learned. Fodor admits Uiat 
complex concepts might be learned because Uiey can be represented ini-
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tially by oilier (i.e. primitive) concepts (Fodor, 1981, p. 271). Also, rela-
tive learning is possible because input and output are of a different order. 
The initially available cognitive structures are powerful enough to gener-
ate new hypotheses (new content), as long as these hypotheses do not 
transcend the boundaries of the present framework. As we will see. 
Miller's solution of (lie Meno paradox is also based on a definition of die 
input as of a different order than the output, such dial condition (c) does 
not apply. 
If there existed a form of learning in which conditions (a) or (b) were 
not required, the paradox likewise would not follow. If a lest and confir-
mation are not required to learn something truly new, a representation is 
not necessary prior to the acquisition of Ihe new knowledge. In the 
absence of condition (b), die emergence of a representation of something 
novel and learning something novel arc die same phenomenon. The 
attainment of a mathematical insight might be an illustration of such a 
learning step. It may be unclear how such a step can occur, but the point 
is that there no longer exists a paradox ! 
Note, therefore, that Fodor's (1980) basic argument that it is impossi-
ble to represent a richer logic in tenus of a weaker logic, while being true, 
is not sufficient to allow the conclusion that learning a richer logic is im-
possible. Only if learning is defined in such a way that step (b) is indis-
pensable is Ulis conclusion warranted. Fodor is very clear about this 
because he adds: "if what you mean by learning is hypothesis formation 
and confirmation." (p. 148). Of course, giving up the notion of 
confirming ihe new insight is a heavy price to pay to avoid die paradox. 
But it is logically possible thai a form of learning exists thai involves 
neither hypothesis formation nor confirmation. In fact, I shall argue for 
such an alternative mechanism (reflective abstraction). 
Fodor (1981) does not subscribe to the empiricists' account of learn-
ing. Instead, he maintains dial all primitive concepts (and fundamental 
structures) must be innate, although he admits that experience plays a role 
by triggering die concepts. Triggering is considered to be a causal process 
and for that reason not a form of (constructive) learning. In Ulis way 
Fodor avoids die paradox. 
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2 Piaget's Position on Novelty 
Piaget (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) never answered Fodor's arguments in 
detail He merely pointed out that Fodor's extreme nativistic position 
would lead to absurd consequences Nonetheless Piaget's (1980, 1985) 
theory regarding the construction of negations and lus equilibration the­
ory include a model lor transcending contradictions thai seems to offer a 
viable alternative to nativism 
For Piaget, overcoming contradictions in natural thought is a vital 
developmental mechanism In his view, logical contradictions are not of 
immediate relevance for development He claimed that all sorts of con­
tradictions in the thinking ol the children he had studied could be reduced 
to one basic formula "incomplete compensations between affirmations 
(attributing the qu.ility a to the class A) and negations (attribution of non-
a to the complementary class A' under В = A + A' )" (Piaget, 1980, ρ 
288) An incomplete compensation might take the lonn ot an incomplete 
opposition between classes ol objects dial should be disjunct because one 
entails die negation of certain properties ot the oilier For example, the 
images of capital letters seen in the mirror are reversed .is children readily 
notice However when shown an M in the mirror, some children insist 
dial it is not reversed Others are aware ot die problem and deny that the 
M can be a real letter Here we have two classes (normal letters and 
reversed letters), which should be disjunct Contradictions arise when a 
symmetrical letter like M is thought to belong to both classes or when die 
class of reversed letters is judged to lack an M It tins is accepted, tran­
scending contradictions comes down to "completing die compensation" 
between alfirmalions and negations A child may readily perceive affir­
mations, but die dilficulty lies in arriving at the proper negations (taken in 
Piaget's "technical" sense) Illese negations have to be constructed by die 
child Only when affirmations and negations are available within a sys­
tem, compensation is possible and a new level ot equilibrium may be 
attained In die preceding example, die contusions .ire overcome when a 
subject is able to construct die concepts reversed and non-reversed as 
necessary complements Ihus understood, die negation always reters to 
somednng not directly observable The negation has to be constructed (is 
not relatively easy to observe) because it is precisely its general or neces­
sary (unobservable) nature dial counts 
In general, disturbances can be handled m diree ways At first a sub­
ject can try to ignore die contradiction, tor example by simply forgetting 
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what has happened. In die second phase, a subject is aware of some con-
tradictions bul is only capable of inventing ad hoc solutions and excep-
tions in order (o neutralize die disturbance (e.g. such a child concludes 
that some letters just do not turn around in die mirror while others do). 
Nol until die diird phase do subjects reconstruct these disturbances as 
negations of at least some part of their already attained knowledge. For 
example, the idea that each letter necessarily has a reverse must be con-
structed. Only then can it become clear that sometimes the reversed capi-
tal letter appears (but not is) die siime as the normal letter. 
Handling disturbances in üiis üiird way is thus crucial for develop-
ment. According to Piaget (1980), a new transcending point of view is 
constructed in this way, and a new stage in development can thus be at-
tained. 
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3 Miller's Criticism of Piaget and Resolution of the 
Meno Paradox 
Miller (1986) argues that Piaget's theory is flawed because it contains a 
circularity that is characteristic ol genetic individualism When subjects 
are in a transitional phase, they have to construct negations in order to 
overcome the limitations ol their lower-level knowledge But tins con­
struction ot negations precisely requires an anticipation of the higher-
level knowledge (Piaget, 1980, ρ 296) 
Miller cites an example in which children were asked about the 
behavior of a balance scale with a varying number ol wcighti mounted at 
varying distances trom the tulcrum (Inhelder & Piaget, 19S8, Siegler, 
1976) He focuses on the transition trom the stage in which only one 
variable is acknowledged to the stage in which both variables (distance 
and number ol weights) are coordinated Suppose a child acknowledges 
only the weight on each arm ol the scale and is asked to predict in which 
direction the scale will move He or she will be right some, but not all of 
the time, as the weight on each arm is determined by both the number of 
weights and their position relative to the tulcrum Similarly, a child 
locusing solely on distance will also sometimes be wrong I he fact that 
bolli rules are incorrect some ol the unie can lead to disturbances and can 
be highly contusing for the child What children need to learn is that it 
the arm with the greater number ot weights does not tip the balance (as 
expected), this does not imply thai die weights by some mysterious cause 
have become lighter The negation involved requires recognition that the 
"rule" in use (e g , greater number ol weights means heavier) is not vio­
lated It only means Uiat this rule is not sufficient as an explanation The 
negative attribute not being sufficient ol this particular rule is tar more 
difficult to understand than the more salient positive tact that the rule 
applies in tins case Miller points out that in a Piagetian Iramcwork the 
construction ot the negation requires an anticipation of an insight belong­
ing to the subsequent stage (which in this case specifies the interrelation 
ol bolli variables) Therefore, Miller claims that in Piaget's individualistic 
variety ol genetic structuralism, it is not possible to explain die construc­
tion ot the proper negations 
It Miller is correct, then Piaget gives us nothing but a circular argu-
iiienl, similar to the one criticized by Fodor (see above) Miller's critique 
focuses primarily on this "pernio pnncipn" which he equates with the 
Meno paradox He suggests thai widi a solution to this problem the Meno 
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paradox can be resolved I will contend thai more is needed 
Miller otters an interesting aliemative to Piaget's genetic individual­
ism His arguments, which arc rallier complex, will be reconstructed m 
three steps 
Step 1 Developmental Experience 
Miller claims that it is possible to experience disturbances in a relevant 
and meaningful way without reference to the subsequent stage However, 
tins is only possible by inc.ms ot discussion by a group of peers who seri­
ously try to solve a dispute In faci, Miller no longer wishes to explain 
development exclusively m terms of dispositions, structures and pro­
cesses Uiat inhere in the mind of the individual subject who seeks knowl­
edge of his or her environment He maintains that cognitive development 
can be explained adequately only it Uic structures and processes of social 
cooperation «ire taken into account as a "reality sui generis" and as a nec­
essary tactor in development (Miller, 1987) In collective argumentation 
- which is the model lor all argumentation- the primary goal is to 
develop a joint argument (hal answers a disputed question by relating it to 
collectively accepted knowledge 
Ot grealesl relevance is a discussion between peers sharing the same 
developmental level (Miller, 1986) On the basis of theoretical considera­
tions as well as empirical research. Miller states that under such circum­
stances a disturbance can be understood and something novel can be 
learned (fundamental learning) He claims that such collective arguments 
are regulated by a very specific set of rules and more specifically three 
coordination principles These three basic cooperation principles of 
argumentation can be in operation (in some tonn) between very young 
subiects They I unction as a coordinating device thai determines the 
processes ot argumentation in such a way that, in principle, a set of 
collectively valid statements can be found and agreed upon 
The pi maple o/ genei ah:ubihl\ specifies that a statement is justified 
it (a) it is either immediately acceptable (belongs to the collectively valid) 
or (b) it it can be converted to the collectively acceptable The pnnciple 
oj objectivity stales that it a statement cannot be denied (ι e , ils denial 
cannot be converted into a collectively valid statement), it belongs to die 
realm ot the collectively valid, whether it confirms or falsifies die point 
of view ot some participons 'I he pi maple of a)nsistenc\ torbids thai 
contradictions enter into - or (once they have been discovered) remain 
in- die realm ot the collectively valid (Miller, 1987, ρ 2321 , 1986) 
These conditions governing collective argument arc much more resine-
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live than those governing individual dunking An isolated individual 
could easily ignore conflicting information However, in a collective 
argument tins is not acceptable as long as the goal -developing a joint 
argument dial gives an answer to a disputed question- is retained 
Assuming diese principles arc indeed in operation, it is conceivable 
thai one participant m the argument asserts proposition A while an other 
participant asserts proposition B, with both statements mutually exclusive 
and bodi traceable to die same shared base of collectively accepted 
knowledge. Consider die balance scale task again II two or more children 
address Uns problem, one child may claim thai the one arm is heavier due 
to a greater number of weights, while another child maintains dial the 
oilier ann is heavier because of die greater distance of die weights from 
the fulcrum Since bodi children arc at a stage in which diey acknowledge 
only one of the variables, they must in principle be able to understand 
each oUier's reasoning (albeit with difficulty) What diey are unable to do 
is to coordinate bodi points ol view and to see Qieir lnterconneciedness 
The tirsi conclusion thai Miller draws trom tins example is that a 
child can no longer simply ignore what is going on and is bound to expe­
rience some form ol contradiction At least he or she will be made aware 
of die fact dial his or her current knowledge is not sufficient lo reach a 
consensus (Miller, 1986. ρ 417) Collectively accepted knowledge is 
knowledge dial cannol be denied and yel is not necessarily completely 
comprehended It Uius creates die possibility of experiencing contradic­
tions without relcrence lo die subsequent stage 
In contrast, in die Piagelian model, a contradiction gains relevance 
only it die observations dial constitute die contradiction are perceived to 
be violating a necessary rule (ι e , allow no exceptions) Hie sub|eci must 
be aware of the contradiction, although not necessarily be able to explain 
it in words Hence it is not sufficient if an expectation is violaled dial was 
only highly probable. In the balance scale example, die necessary rule 
consists of knowledge that an argument addressed to why the right side 
should go down implies (negatively) an argument as to why die left side 
must go up This negative relationship and its necessary character are 
presupposed in experiencing the contradiction, according to Piaget. 
However, dus relationship requires knowledge diat constitutes die subse­
quent stage, which, Miller rightly observes, is precisely what remains Ю 
be learned 
In Miller's case, subiects have a much easier task lo accomplish They 
can experience a relevant contradiction widioul л necessary negation 
because as parucipants in a discussion diey are bound by die principles of 
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argumentation, specifically the principle of objectivity and the principle 
ot consistency These principles lunclion as an alternative source for ex-
periencing contradictions, without reference to necessary relations known 
only at die subsequent stage It we accept Miller's point ol view üius far, 
we have an alternative for Piaget's model of stage transition dial elimi-
nates die circularity inherent in Piaget's account 
I contend, however, that die Meno paradox is not yet resolved by 
Miller because he has not explained how the boundaries of the cognitive 
stage can be transcended by the peers He has explained only how die 
shortcomings of the current knowledge can be recognized, but dus does 
not bring the subiect to the subsequent stage Miller claims dial it is con-
ceivable diat die participants in the discussion, when Uiey find dicmselves 
in a deadlock, experience die shortcomings of the present foundation of 
the collectively known and thai this might encourage reflective abstrac-
tion (Piaget, 1977b), with die possible outcome ol transcending die 
boundaries ot the present stage But it is as yet not all clear how dus 
would be possible For Piaget, experiencing die contradiction in a mean-
ingful way could lead to the subsequent stage because die subsequent 
stage is already involved in a way, but dus is precisely die circularity 
Miller wants to avoid 
Step 2: Intermental Structures 
The second step in Miller's arguments concerns the noveltv issue directly. 
I low can die boundaries of die individual's structural knowledge and 
abilities be transcended7 Untortunately, Miller is not very clear in relat-
ing this problem to the Meno paradox, probably due to his assumption 
diat widi die solution tor the problem ot developmental experience (step 
1), the paradox is resolved But that conclusion is not warranted This 
second step and even a third step are indispensable in resolving die para-
dox 
Miller assumes dial the arguments behind die Meno paradox are to a 
large extent correct Tins is not surprising as he uses those arguments to 
criticize genetic individualism, nativism and social learning Uieory, which 
he claims provide no adequate solution or simply ignore die problem 
However, Miller challenges die relevance ol die arguments for his own 
model because, inspired by Vygotsky's distinction between inter- and 
lnlra-mental structures, he sketches a quite unorthodox picture ot learning 
processes Inicniienial structure is die structure that regulates die collec-
tive (between- person) search tor a solution to a "questio" by means of 
collective argument Intramenial structure stands tor cognitive structure 
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(in the usual sense) and pertains to the individual 
Now Miller's solution to Fodor's problem -in my reconstruction, 
because Miller does not reler to Fodor- consists ot diüercnlialing input 
and output ol the learning process in such a way that the former does not 
presuppose the latter The output consists of knowledge on die structural 
level, but it is a different kind of structure than die structure Uiat charac-
terizes die input The input is taken Irom the realm of die interínenla! 
structures, whereas die output is die lntramcntal structure diat is to be ac-
quired From dus point ol view, it is possible dial something can be rep-
resented in die miennenial realm while it is not yet available in die înlra-
mental structures ol any ol die participants Miller (1986, ρ 313) states 
Novelty initially exists for die individual subject in an abstract 
and opaque way -in that which gives coherence to the 
objectively available network of interrelated problems that 
mediates the diesis and anti-thesis (translated trom the 
original) 
If we accept dus claim, it follows diat condition (c), noted earlier, does 
not apply, and the paradox is resolved 
Miller (1986, ρ 306) seeks additional support for his arguments by 
sketching similarities between die concept ol liitermcntal structure and 
Popper's concept ot obiectivc problem context, but as I do not see how 
tins contributes anything essentially new, 1 omit further discussion of it 
However, Miller's position can be clarified by acknowledging die change 
in his level ot analysis Miller leaves, so to speak, die physical side of die 
task (e g die balance scale) for what it is and concéntrales on the way in 
which the peers are arguing 1 his tocus makes clear why Miller is not in-
terested in die question ot wheüier subjects are able to apply the correct 
formula in balance scale problems He maintains that die mteriorization 
ol die practice of argument by die individual is responsible tor die shift to 
a new way ol arguing This new form ot arguing may have repercussions 
lor dunking and die world view of die subjects concerned, such diat diey 
eventually become able to master die balance scale task 
If dus account is to be plausible, two conditions must be met First, it 
is imperative that die so called "actual ongoing argumentation" be able to 
embody, in one way or another, a higher-level insight Second, individual 
subjects must be able to profit from dus higher-level insight m dieir own 
development I begin widi the first condition 
Whereas in genetic structuralism lormal constraints on individual 
dunking are considered to be die proper object ol developmental change, 
Miller locuses on die structure ot argumentation Intermental structures 
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regulate the process ol finding a collective solution for a questio They 
therefore can be explained in relation to the logic of argumentation, 
which comprises the (orinai conditions or rules on which the participants 
in an argument rely or which they (implicitly) reter to in evaluating the 
legiumacy oí an answer to a questio This logic ot argumentation is iden-
tified by Miller as the relevant entity thai undergoes developmental 
(structural) change The three principles of argumentation indicated ear-
lier can be considered as the functionally invariant -inherently social-
device for the coordination of collective argumentation, a device that 
makes development in ternis of a renewal of the logic of argumentation 
possible Due to tins coordinating device, a pint argumentation becomes 
possible that surpasses the abilities of individual subjects and can be con-
sidered as a social reality sui generis (Miller, 1987, ρ 235) 
Miller's main contribution to the novelty problem is the intuition thai 
the logic ol argumentation reilected in "actual ongoing argumentation" 
(a) can be structured in such a way that the intermenlal structure can tran­
scend mdividu.il abilities and be relevant in terms ot fundamental learn­
ing, (b) can be an object tor lurther reflective abstraction and (c) can be 
constructed by the participants themselves 
Miller claims that the structure of the liilermental mode of argumenta­
tion can be developmentally more advanced than the structure of the 
intramenuil abilities ot the participants "More advanced" implies that the 
structure ol Hie intennental abilities is capable ol generating solutions to a 
task not reproducible by die (liilramental abilities ot the) individual sub­
jects Consider, tor example, two children in die balance scale task If 
each oí them acknowledges a diltcrent variable and they are seriously 
arguing over die problem, they are in a primitive way coordinating the 
two variables It one child locuses on weight and the other on distance 
and bolli try to delend their positions in a mutual exchange ol (primitive, 
elliptic and implicit) reasons (Miller, 1986, ρ 196), they might arrive at a 
theory ol greater validity Note that it is not required dial die subiects 
have attained the new stage .liter participating in the discussion 
Intennental structures must be accessible to the participants, since 
reflection must be possible (see step 3) Reflective abstraction makes 
sense only it subiects .ire not already aware of die relevant intermenlal 
structures This implies dial, in such a case, die factual coordination diat 
exists in an actual argument is not comprehensible to diose involved 
Such an insight still remains to be acquired dirough reflective abstraction 
II die participants in a dispute lollow die rules lor discussion as far as 
Uiey explicitly know diem (e g il üiey trace all propositions back to die 
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collectively accepted, either directly or indirectly), they nevertheless can 
lind themselves in a deadlock, not understanding why Such a situation, 
which is consistent with Miller"s argumentation principles, is in principle 
open to and stimulates reflection on the part of those involved 
The new intcrmcntal structures do not emerge in an arbitrary way. 
They are |ointly constructed by the participants and they result from a 
directed process thai is m a certain sense rational Neither were they (or 
needed they to be) completely préexistent in the individual minds of any 
of the participants (Miller, 1986, ρ 320) 
For Miller, the Mcno-paradox is now as good as solved Although I 
have some reservations, I admit that by dilierenluling between inter and 
iniramcntal structures condition (c) noted earlier is no longer relevant In 
a collective argument among peers, die contributions ol the participants 
might be meshed in such ways that a structure (intermental), that tran­
scends the individually attained structure (intrainenial) can be said to ex­
ist Intermental structures are constructed by the participants but never­
theless transcend their abilities brom an inlramenlal structure not exceed­
ing stage \ an mtennental structure can result with a latent level x+l 
(Miller, 1986, ρ 320) Therefore, novel insights can be represented 
intermentally without previously being available No logical 
contradiction or paradox is involved 
Step 3: A Possible Objection 
Even if we accept (he thus reconstructed steps, the question still remains 
as to wheUier the Meno paradox is resolved because it is not certain 
whether the individual subject is able lo profit Irom ihe lalenily present 
higher structure in the intermental space The second step led to a sharp 
division between inter- and mtramental structures Can (he gap between 
llicm be closed'' Miller is not clear aboul die mechanism by which a la­
tent x+l structure in ihe intcrmenial realm leads lo an mtramental struc­
ture of л+1 level Simply stated, can the subject reach the subsequent 
stage in cognitive lunctioning in this way'' Miller claims that die partici­
pants in a dispute can reflect over iheir own argumentative praxis, as a 
sort of reflective abstraction (lnterionzation) In dus way diey might be 
able to grasp die objective context (den objektiven Sinnzusammenhang) 
which they have brought about themselves through iheir collective eltorts 
(Miller, 1986, ρ 422) However, this account seems to beg die question 
It can be objected dial this achievement is logically impossible, because 
ot ihe Meno paradox Sub|ects are not able to see or represent die iran-
scending part ot lnlenncnial structures Isn't this precisely die problem 
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we sel oui to solve in the beginning? 
Miller does not mention this objection and consequently offers no 
solution Nevertheless, I think tins objection can and must be answered If 
I understand Piaget correctly, newness in cognitive development comes 
about through the interplay of several factors One of these is experience 
gained in interaction by equilibration and reequihbration Miller's argu-
ments -as presented thus tar- also concern the role of experience in 
achieving newness In contrast, reflective abstraction, which pertains to 
Uie individual's own action and cognitive abilities, forms anoUier part of 
the more broadly defined learning process (Piaget, 1977b, Boom, 1990). 
This latter part is in itselt a strictly endogenous process Although it is 
extremely difficult to specify in more detail its working, it is clearly not a 
process thai requires external testing and confirmation It comes down to 
learning something about one's own action capabilities by reflecting on 
them, whereas the empiricist account of learning was designed to under-
stand learning something about a reality existing outside one's sell -an 
entirely different aim In the case of reflective abstraction, no testing ot 
whether a newly attained level corresponds to an external reality is at 
stake This does not exclude the possibility ot testing whether a novel 
procedure is working But testing in tins case is aimed at the correction of 
(logical) errors 
Another problem remains Assuming that reflective abstraction forms 
an acceptable mechanism as regards individual learning, the question still 
remains as to whether such a mechanism can mediate between inter- and 
intrameiital structures I doubt the strength of Miller's position in tins re-
spect. Miller's only argument relers to die inherently social character of 
development, but that is precisely one of die chums under scrutiny 
In sum, I contend that Miller's claun of having solved the Meno para-
dox is not tenable without some serious qualification A positive evalua-
tion is possible only alter supplementing the argument contained m die 
third step and acceptance ot relleciive abstraction as a satisfactory expla-
nation ol a certain part ot the learning process The difference between 
Piaget's and Miller's Üieory is thus not so vast after all The difference, as 
I have reconstructed u, rests primarily in die second step The first step of 
Miller's solution does make a difference, but not directly relevant to tlie 
paradox As regards the third step, Miller is entirely dependent upon 
Piaget's notion of reflective abstraction In tlie next section I consider tlie 
possibility ol avoiding the paradox, similar to Miller's move in step two, 
by elaborating the Piagetian approach 
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4 Miller versus Piaget 
Miller (1986) near Hie end of his book, moderates his claims about 
resolving die learning paradox lie does, however, maintain that Piaget, 
and in taci all instances of genetic individualism, necessarily lail in tins 
respect Evidence for this claim is primarily taken trom Piaget's (1980) 
book on contradiction Contrary to Miller, I think I think it is possible to 
construct an interpretation ot Piaget that also avoids the paradox birst, I 
generalize Miller's approach and next I try to make plausible that Piaget's 
(1977b) recent writings can be interpreted along die same lines 
First, resolving die learning paradox requires a differentiation of two 
sorts of cognitive structures Miller differentiated intra- and mtermental 
structures and so avoided die circularity Uiat arises when input presup­
poses output Even nativism contains a distinction between innate and 
actual (triggered) structures Second, some interaction must take place in 
gaining knowledge about the external world The sort of structure identi­
fied by Miller must partly be an accomplishment ol die subject and partly 
come from outside ITirough interaction between sub|ects a |omt argu­
ment can emerge that is constructed by die participants and has a struc­
tural quality that transcends their own initial cognitive structures 
Λ distinction between dillerent kinds ot cognitive structures, however, 
is also possible in Piaget's model ot learning Although Piaget does not 
explicitly make such a distinction, it is possible to discern a structure that 
underlies die competencies and a structure that describes the possibilities 
lor performance 1 he tirsi can be attributed to die subiect and 
corresponds, at die higher stages ol development, to conscious knowl­
edge The second can be described as the structure seen from the per­
spective ol an observer The crucial point is diat subiects eventually must 
be able to observe dieu- own activities and reflect upon them 
Now die parallel with Miller's model can be spelled out In die inter­
action of a subiect wiüi die spatiotemporal world, new patterns and pos-
sibilities can emerge dial were not contained in die structure of die exer-
cised operations diemselves, just as interinenial structures can be 
developmental^ more advanced than intrainenul structures By reflective 
abstraction die structure in the sell's activity (which is influenced by self 
and environment) can be abstracted Piaget's lavorile example is die 
repeated act of adding, which has a structure (and properties) surpassing 
die power ot die structure dial underlies die ability to add Reflection then 
leads to die concept ol multiplication Ol course, the subject is not im-
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mediately aware of tins Dut that is a problem that, as we have seen, has 
to be faced by Miller no less than by Piaget With tins distinction in mind, 
die characteristics ol Miller's model of learning, especially those charac­
teristics relevant to die second step described earlier, become just as rele­
vant for an individualistic model ol learning 
Abilities in interaction with their object embody a structure thai can 
be developmental^ more advanced than die structure dial is underlying 
(and making possible) die procedures For example, a subject able to 
classify obiects might someday become able to exercise Uns scheme on 
classes This opens up a lot of new possibilities It is not learning some­
thing about die external reality (which would reintroduce die need for 
confirmation), it is learning about one's own cognitive abilities This is 
relevant ю stage transition (at least according to Piaget) Ί he interactional 
structures can be an obiect ol further reflective abstractions The structure 
of die interaction with the environment would have to be accessible for 
the participants, ι e reflection on it must be possible Hence, although die 
actual practical interaction embodies a structure that cm be advanced m 
die sense that new coordinations are m eftcct, these structures reside at a 
lower level of abstraction (trom the perspective ot the subject involved) 
The new interactional structures do not emerge in an arbitrary way Iliey 
arc constructed, and they result trom a directed procedure dial is in a cer­
tain sense "rational" Neither were Uiey (or needed Uiey to be) préexistent 
in the individual mind 
According to Miller, Piagel's position is not completely coherent It is 
impossible, or incoherent at least, that a structure is a precondition for all 
experience while at the same lime capable of being disturbed by experi-
ence Piaget seems to hold л strictly endogenous and rationalistic position 
because the experience is ultimately completely dependent on the subne­
t's cognitions With l'odor, we have seen that this leads to nalivism 
However, Uns interpretation ol Piaget is correct only in so tar as Piaget 
maintains that there c;ui be no experience widiout presupposing some ac­
tivity of cognitive structures or schemes But this is not entirely correct as 
Piaget also assumes thai structures can be elaborated by interaction and 
experience Piaget's equilibration theory in fact is precisely designed to 
describe how cognitive structures become finely tuned to die external 
environment 
Therefore, only a minor ditlerence remains between Miller and 
Piaget Both positions can be reconstructed as instances of die sanie 
"second order" constructivism in which die properties of the knowing 
system are changed by constructive activity 
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5 Conclusion: Collective or Individual Learning? 
'Піе learning paradox poses a persistent problem for developmental psy­
chology It suggests that an alternative to individualislical, psychological 
theories of development is needed Yet, approaches stressing the social 
character of development often do no more then slull the problem of nov­
elty to the sociocullural plane In tins case, either all novelty is denied or 
novelty remains unaccounted lor For example, if children learn new 
ways of thinking from their parents and their parents have learned them 
from their parents, and so forili, we get an infinite regress Miller (1986) 
offers a more interesting version of (lie Vygotskian social approach 
(Werlsch, 1985) Willi his model of collective learning, he claims to be in 
a belter position than Piaget with respect to the learning paradox Three 
steps are involved First, Miller eliminates the circular arguments appar­
ently accepted by Piaget in Ins theory regarding negations and contradic­
tions Second, by distinguishing between inter- and miramenlal struc­
tures, the circle that underlies the learning paradox can be broken But 
this way out is only convincing if lnienncntal structures can become 
effective for the individual through interionzation (or reflective abstrac­
tion) Therefore, third, reflective abstraction should be possible without 
reintroducing the problems of the learning paradox 
It we accept dial reflective abstraction does not require a representa­
tion beforehand, the paradox is indeed eliminated But because the con­
cept ot reflective abstraction is not as clear as it should be (Boom, 1990), 
it could be argued thai neither Miller nor Piaget can resolve the paradox 
So, in the final evaluation, Miller gives no convincing argument as to 
why genetic interactionist» is better oil than genetic individualism He 
argues iliiii Piaget's theory about negations is circular, but die relevance 
of Uns claim can be doubted Arguments as to why individual lonns of 
learning cannot lead to fundamental learning (or stage transition) have 
been smoothed over by invoking the analogy between individual and col­
lective learning This reduces die last point ol divergence belween Miller 
and Piaget to only a gradual one 
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6 REFLECTIVE ABSTRACTION AND EQUILIBRIUM IN STAGE-
TRANSITIONS 
Piaget was, throughout his enure career, motivated by the wish to explain 
how novelty and piogiesswn in cognitive development come about He 
has claimed that with his latest theory of equilibration (Piaget, 1985) and 
specifically by invoking reflective abstractions (Piaget, 1977a, 1977b) he 
had to a large extent succeeded in explaining the emergence ot new and 
better tonus ol knowledge Recently it has been recognized that tins is a 
more adequate characterization ol Piaget's lilcwork than the association 
of his name with strictly universal teleologica! and homogeneous struc-
tural stages (ci Chapman, 1988b) In fact the theory of equilibration con-
cerns a focus on stage transitions and not on stages themselves Tins 
chapter evaluates the status and consistency of Piaget's model for stage 
transition and examines the repercussions for the developmental stage 
concept Issues ot universality and homogeneity of stages are ignored in 
tins chapter As has been argued by Chapman (1988b) universality and 
progressivity should be carefully distinguished 
Let us start with an ex.unple In early development a child perceives 
die world only trom his own perspective, possibly to such an extent that 
he isn't even aware ot oilier perspectives Such a child might believe that 
an object ceases to exist when it is no longer visible Later in develop-
ment die child can overcome tins egocentncity Objects now are believed 
to exist even when not visible Still later, multiple perspectives may be 
recognized Everyone will agree that important steps in cognitive devel-
opment are at stake here But how should we conceptualize these impor-
tant changes in the child's cognitive abilities'' Can we speak of novelty 
here and what exactly is (he nature ot the alleged new stage in develop-
ment'' As regards these questions opinions difler 
As far as it is accepted Huit noveltv is characteristic in development, 
some theoreticians attribute ihc appearance ot uns novelty to maturation 
and they define development accordingly, while others stress environ-
mental influences and use an entirely different definition ot development 
Piaget, however, invoked selt-orgainzing principles (mainly to be ex-
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plained in ternis of equilibrium and reflective abstraction) in addition to 
maturalional eftects and environmental influences and tins led to a more 
complex and more interesting definition ol what novelty and stages in 
cognitive tunclionmg are 
Even more difficult is the question of whether and in what sense new 
stages are better than Uieir forerunners With regard to impiovement opin­
ions diller radically Many developmentahsb take it as selt-evident that 
development implies progression, others acknowledge only change and 
deny the possibility of making a normative evaluation of such a change It 
appears very ditficult to justify evaluative claims regarding progression 
or regression (van Haatten, 1990) flus problem is even more pressing in 
regard to moral development 
For Piaget improvement and novelty arc intrinsically related They are 
the key features of his developmental model 1 his model, however, has 
been severely cniici/ed In my opinion, the core-problem is Piaget's un­
clear way of integrating construction and adaptation in development 
However, by reconstructing stage transitions as a multi-step process 
related to interactions between subicct and ob|ect, Piaget's claims about 
novelty and improvement can be better understood and stage transitions 
as defined above seem to be theoretically te.isible 
In section 1,1 will clanly die exact nature ot the problem at issue and 
define the most important concepts In section 2, 1 will describe Piaget's 
position by introducing his theory of equilibration In section λ, the 
theory of reflective abstraction is analy/cd In section 4, die process of 
achieving equilibrium is reconstructed In section 5,1 will identify some 
difficulties in understanding Piaget's position with respect to the problem 
ol novelty and improvement by consisting two interpretations ot reflec­
tive abstractions 1 he dilemma thus created can be eliminated by 
acknowledging the role ot interaction In section 6, Piaget's position is 
reconstructed as a three step-process ot acquiring a new structure in 
cognitive development And finally, in section 7,1 evaluate the model and 
conclude dial, although it tails short in explanatory power and cannot 
solve all conceptual problems surrounding the notion of improvement, it 
is nevertheless a plausible model 
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1 Background 
Piagct's view ol sl.ige-wise cognitive development can be reconstructed 
as follows in regiird lo certain human competencies (but not necessarily 
all), stages can be discerned A sequence ol these stages forms a devel­
opmental pattern with the following properties the differences between 
the stages arc ol a qualitative, structural kind, each subsequent stage 
builds on the previous one but also adds something essentially new 
(novelty), development in such a pattern has a direction, development in 
such a pattern entails improvement As regards diese basic assumptions 
about stage-wise development, three sorts of increasingly fundamental 
critique can be distinguished die first based on doubt whether it is desir­
able to define stage-wise cognitive development in such a way, the sec­
ond based on doubt whether such a kind of development does actually 
exist, and thus whether this deluiition ol development is not empirically 
void, and die third based on doubt whether a comprehensive and consis­
tent model ol development with the stage properties mentioned above can 
be provided at all 
The critique thai it is not desirable to define stage-wise development 
in tins way was probably justified in relation to die suggestion (e g by 
19th century Utopians, see chapter 1) that every development necessarily 
must conform to such a pattern and thai every development automatically 
leads to improvement and goes in a fixed direction with a fixed final 
point However, il no more is claimed than that development sometimes 
is stage-like with a cert.un direction and only sometimes leads to progress 
or possibly in incomplete fashion, die objection looses torce As regards 
die second sort ol critique, it appears dilficull to assess die extent of ac­
tual existence ol the proposed sort of developmental stage patterns 
Empirical research (by Piagciians and critics) has generated a persistent 
debate, which seems ю continue because diere is no consensus as regards 
die criteria which should be used (ct Па еіі, 1982a, Gelman and 
Baillargeon, 1983, Chapman, 1988b, Chapter 2) Such criteria probably 
could be specified more adequately il we had a cle.irer picture of how 
cognitive development comes about 'I his brings us to die durd and most 
fundamental point of doubt and die main topic of dus paper Can a coher­
ent model ol the how and win of cognitive stage transitions be given at 
all, provided thai stages can be discerned which can be ordered in a pat­
tern widi die aforementioned properties'' I will address this form of cri­
tique by assessing whether Piaget s "explanation" ol the dynamics of 
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development is so designed that it is theoretically possible for stage-wise 
development to be characterized by novelty mid progress. 
This concerns die hard-core of the Piagetian research-program. The 
main idea is thai -globally speaking- die mechanisms responsible for 
attaining a new stage in development are also responsible for the 
properties of the developmental pattern, viz. novelty (structural 
qualitative differences), directionality and improvement. In tum this is 
related to Piagel's preoccupation widi some major cpislemological 
questions. As Chapman, in his excellent study of Piaget, rightly observed: 
Piaget attempted to "provide a standard for judging the relative adequacy 
of different models of reality wiUiout recourse to correspondence theories 
of trudi..." and tins "...is perhaps one of die most important contributions 
of genetic epislcmology to the general theory of knowledge" (Chapman, 
1988b, p. 415). These models of reality (in a broad sense) mentioned by 
Chapman, of course refer to stages in development (cf. van Haaften, 
1990). 
Unfortunately die notion improvement is used by Piaget in at least 
diree senses. Improvement can be taken as a form of adaptation, which 
implies feedback from an external environment or improvement can be 
used in a logical or a formal sense. The criterion for this formal kind of 
improvement is not found in external reality. An often cited criterion for 
this formal kind of improvement is inconsistency reduction (cf. Snik, 
1990). However, lo complicate matters furüier, adaptation has Iwo kinds. 
First, adaptation in the context of within-slage development, thus without 
addressing structural change. Second, die form of adaptation which is at 
stake when different stages are compared. If a subsequent stage is sup-
posed to be more adapted (to whatever it must be adapted to) more pro-
found structural changes are at issue. To avoid confusion I will denote 
this kind of adaptation as increasing fitness. St) we have formal improve-
ment which must be distinguished sharply from both adaptation proper 
and increasing fitness 
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2 Equilibration as Construction and Adaptation? 
The joint emergence ot constructive novelty and adaptive improvement in 
cognitive functioning is the main theme in Piaget's (1985) equilibration 
theory I use the tenu adaptive improvement to denote Piaget's as yet 
unclear combination Although novelty and improvement are logically in-
dependent in thai a novel stage is not necessarily a better one, and a better 
stage is not neccss«inly qualitatively and structurally new (however, it 
must be different in some respect), Piaget insisted on their intrinsic relal-
edness Tins makes his position interesting but problematical too 
Equilibration concerns a tendency to overcome disturbances and 
lacunae in cognitive functioning and a tendency towards progressively 
better equilibrium (Piaget, 19HS) Thus equilibration (or equilibration 
majorante) is not die same as striving for equilibrium, alUiough striving 
for equilibrium is part ol the equilibration process Another part concerns 
radically constructive activity leading to higher and novel levels Piaget 
was well aware ol possible epistcmological pitfalls associated with the 
objetives ot his equilibration theory lie constructed a rather complex 
model of development in which he sought to avoid the problems of both 
empiricism and rationalism In dus model, however, a residue of both can 
be found in (hat development in the epistemologica! realm, according to 
Piaget, involves two inseparable processes The first concerns an 
autonomous process ol construction leading to new stages The construc-
tions build on previous stages and at die same time transcend Uicin, and 
as a result they .ire supposed to lead to new and belter stages This first 
part, which I reter to .is novelt\ and impiovement by construction is 
addressed in his theory ol reflective abstractions The second process is 
related to compensation ol perturbations coming directly or indirectly 
lrom outside the subiect It results, according to Piaget, in increasing 
coherence or equilibrium in relation to die world external lo the subject 
It could be considered improvement in the sense ol adaptation as far as 
within stage change is concerned This process ot adaptation through 
interaction is addressed in his theory on achieving equilibrium. 
The mam task -apart lrom clarifying these bold chums- is to show 
how both processes (pure endogenous constructions made by the 
epistennc subiect and compensation lor disturbances from outside) can be 
integrated into one Üieory such that novelty and improvement are plausi-
ble characteristics ol stage-wise development The two processes when 
taken in isolation are not sufficient The theory of reflective abstractions. 
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in which Üic endogenous constructions of the (epislcmic) subject are 
strongly emphasized, seems suitable to explain novelty in development, 
but as regards improvement in development, the role played by tins 
mechanism is less clear Reflective abstraction can say nothing about 
adaptation or fiüiess, though it is important (but not sufficient) tor under-
standing improvement in the rationalistic sense The theory of achieving 
equilibrium is confined to within-slage development Uns is suitable to 
explain adaptation, because it provides a very detailed description of 
how, by regulations (e g leedback and feedforward loops), cognitive 
structures become belter adapted However, increasing fitness cannot be 
explained in tins way and claims about novelty arc dilficult to uphold 
The way out thai suggests itscll is a combination of bolli dieory-
picces, and the theory which should bring tins about is the equilibration 
theory in the broad sense Lquilibration is the name Piaget employs for 
the joint working ol reflective abstractions and compensations by regula-
tions Although structures have to be relatively stable ihey can change 
and trans tonn themselves I hal is, structures nol only regulate interac-
tions and transformations (e g operations), they are open and gradually 
adapt themselves to the ' material ' ihey structure 1 his implies that striv-
ing tor cognitive equilibrium is a source ol (limited) creativity Schemes 
make it possible lo repeal an action while considering leedback provided 
by previous execution ol that action In uns way schemes become gradu-
ally elaborated Nevertheless there might be perturbations that are still not 
assimilable I hen die subject might try to undcrsLmd why (although not 
necessarily on a conscious level) and come to reorganize ihe structure 
completely An important distinction musi be made, therefore, between 
modifying die structure by integrating new elements, which leads to 
slight elaboration of the structure, on the one hand, and more fundamental 
reorganizations of ihe structures by reflective abstractions, eventually 
leading ю a stage transition, on the oüier hand 
In this way, by adapting and reorganizing themselves, diese structures 
are supposed lo counter disturbances and potential disturbances and re-
store equilibrium at a new and unproved level with a new balance be-
tween attinnations and negations According lo Piaget this cycle contin-
ues (under certain conditions) when new disturbances occur Uns pro-
cess, in Us totality, is designated by him an optimizing equilibration 
First, I will address the mechanism ol reflective abstraction in inore 
detail and then, in the next section, die mechanism involved in achieving 
equilibrium When I use die temi "mechanism" Uns should not be inter-
preted in ihe restricted sense it has in mechanistic theories 
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3 Reflective Abstraction 
I begin by considering the more familiar concept of reflection and then 
describe the two steps involved in reflective abstraction in more detail 
ending Willi a first attempt to answer (he question of why these two steps 
are supposed to lead to improvement by construction 
In order to understand what reflective abstraction is let us consider die 
following if we reflect on something, we take something we did or 
soineüiing we observed in a pre-reflexive manner out of its normal 
context by thinking about it Usually this implies that we become 
conscious about what is involved in what we at first took for granted By 
dunking about it we see new connections and new distinctions These 
same elements can be lound in Piaget's definition of reflective 
abstraction But, whereas teflection typically pertains to adult dunking 
and is used in the context ol becoming conscious of something, Piaget 
tried to define a more general mechanism -not only a mechanism that can 
be invoked for the cognitive processes ot very young children and also 
lor adult thinking winch is not conscious at all, but also a mechanism Uiat 
preserves die idea ot structuring previous cognitive structuring I take it 
diat if conscious reflection is the one extreme variety ot this mechanism, 
die other extreme would be sell-organization 
The geneial delinition given by Piaget reads "reflective abstraction 
begins W1Ü1 the actions or operations ol a subiect and transfers what is 
taken from a lower level ot activity to a higher level Because of dus 
transfer, the ditlercntialions necessarily bring about novel compositions 
and generalizations at the new level" (Piaget, 1977a, ρ 1, my translation). 
Reflective abstraction thus involves two steps firsdy, proiecling (or 
bringing, or reflecting) the structure implied in die coordination to die 
next higher level where the coordination ceases to be a coordination and 
becomes an action-observable, secondly, reorganizing this structure, 
which meanwhile has become a substructure Piaget gives a detailed 
description ol the dillerent lonns tins process can have and distinguishes 
it lrom empiuteli ab\ti actum winch is the name tor a process by which 
material properties ol an ob)ect or action are abstracted Empirical 
abstraction (concerning e g weight, color, movement, and force) does not 
go beyond the observable leatures, is not by Uscii creative and is always 
dependent on earlier reflective abstractions 
The/f/i/ step consists in bringing structures of die lower level to die 
next level, diereby constituting this higher level In die more technical 
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description tins is the process by which a coordination pertaining to 
actions of a subject at le\el ν becomes an action-observable for level r+1 
In this way a new level is linked to the foregoing level The step is 
constructive because a new level of abstraction is constituted To give an 
example of an elementary form of tins kind ol projection, consider the 
case when a concept is lormed Concept here taken in the elementary and 
restricted sense ot а с lens lake, for example, the concept toy, defined as 
every small tiling one can play with The sensorimotor equivalent for tins 
concept toy is the collection of objects thai can be assimilated to the 
action scheme of playing In tins first step, projection, die observable 
properties of these actions are liuerionzed and a reunion of these objects 
in a whole is possible, based on their common qualities The projection in 
this example thus comes down to the formation of a concept (Piaget, 
1977b, ρ 304) 
The second step, reorganization or the so called reflexion, is needed 
because the transfer ot the content of the lower level to the higher level 
introduces multiple disequihbria Illese disequilibna are the result of all 
the kinds of new relations which must be accounted for due to die first 
step 11ns second step is constructive in a double sense according to 
Piaget In the first place, with the protection, generalization over several 
instances has become possible "Even il a coordination, which is pro-
lected trom the level ot action to the level ol conceptualization, remains 
the same, tins projection creates a new homomorphism or correspondence 
between die conceptualization ot the coordination and die practical situa­
tions wherein the thus coordinated action is repealed" (Piaget, 1977b, ρ 
308, my translation) In the second place, diese first organizations also 
lead to die discovery ot related content which was not assimilable into die 
earlier structure but winch has now become assimilable, by turdier slight 
transformation ol the structure, and so becomes integrated within a larger 
and therelore partly novel structure (ci Piaget & Garcia, 1989, ρ 2) In 
other words this step consists in reciprocal assimilations and accommo­
dations between .substructures 
It is relatively clear dial reflective abstraction leads to novelty This 
tollows directly from its constructive character However, it is less clear 
exactly what arguments Piaget olfcrs tor his claim to improvement, 
despite die lacl dial he has written numerous volumes that concern dns 
issue Піе question first of all is in what sense are diese constructions, 
described as reflective abstractions, supposed to lead to improved forms 
ot knowledge7 Part ot the answer to dns question is related to die lact 
dial only die purely internal tormal relations between the previous form 
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of knowledge and the next are at issue, as will be explained below. But 
this part is of limited use if we want arguments as to why these 
improvements are tiot confined to pure subjective criteria and why they 
are relevant in ternis of adaptation. This latter issue will be taken up in 
subsequent sections. 
Several suggestions as to what the formal structural improvement 
might consist in have been offered. 'Піе conceptual grasp of a subject 
grows because reflective abstractions make explicit what had been liilli-
erto implicit, through the "objectivation" of a coordination, which means 
that the coordination becomes an object of thinking (instead of a means 
of thinking). Closely connected to Ulis is Piaget's claim that constructive 
generalizations (involved in reflective abstractions) are constructive pre­
cisely because they lead to generalizations which grow in extension as 
well as in intension (Piaget, 1978, p. 222). Growing in extension means 
that more elements are involved, growing in intension (compréhension) 
means that more meaningful implications are involved. However, simply 
a greater number of elements and relations between diem in a higher 
structure is not a necessary nor a sufficient requirement to speak of struc-
tural improvement. 
'Піс closure of a structure is also important. The new structure might 
be better precisely because it is closed whereas the former structure was 
not. Take for example the conservation task: there arc four possible trans­
formations in the task with the sausage of clay: becoming thinner, thicker, 
longer, shorter (see figure 1). 
Length 
Thickness 
Affirmation Negation 
longer shorter 
thicker thinner 
Fig. 1. Incomplete compensation of affirmations (longer, thinner) and 
negations (shorter, thicker). Adapted from Chapman, 1988b. 
Only after all the intrinsic relations between them are seen by the subject 
does he conserve the volume. Making the sausage longer is the observ­
able and affirmative. Піе fact that this implies as negation that the 
sausage is becoming less short, is more difficult to grasp. Nevertheless 
156 Reflective Abstiactions and Stage Ttansitums 
affirmations need lo be balanced by complementary negations, for only 
then it is possible to discover all the relations between variation in length 
and variation in thickness (see figure 1 and 2) and only then we can say 
dial die structure is complete and closure is achieved In figure I (lie af-
tirmative poles of each dimension (making longer and making thicker) 
are compensated sep.iralely by their respective negations (making shorter 
and making thinner) and only one salient dimension is compensated with 
negation of the other dimension (making longer and thinner at die same 
time) In figure 2 the remaining compensations (e g making lthicker and 
shorter) are noticed Important for conservation is that each transforma-
tion now coincides wiüi anodier translonnation that is equivalent to its 
own negation with respect to the total quantity (cf Chapman, 1988b, ρ 
301, see chapter 5) 
Length 
Thickness 
Alfirmation 
Ion 
thic 
»er 
:кег 
Ne* ,ation 
shorter 
Fig 2 Complete compensation of affirmations (longer, thinner) and 
negations (shorter, thicker) Adapted lroni Chapman, 1988b 
A structure might be better structured also in the sense that diere are well 
differentiated substructures and sub-ordinated structures (cf Chi, 
Hutchinson & Robin, 1988) resulting in a hierarchically structured struc­
ture 
Drawing lroni diese sources, die alleged improvement resulting from 
reflective abòtiaction may be conceptualized as die result of a combina-
tion of (a) subsuming a greater number ol elements under die same 
scheme or structure and providing a greater number of relations and com-
positions (relative per element), (b) completing some ol die substructures, 
which means having a substructure which exhausts all possible relations 
between elements, and (c) by hierarchically structuring diose relations (or 
possible transformations) so dial a more comprehensive picture emerges 
The result is a more lightly structured conceptualization Thus a new 
stage might be "belter" in die sense dial it can be more structured 
However, it could also be said dut reflective abstraction has lo do 
Reflective Abstractions and Stage Transitions 157 
with finding the (implicit) reasons for success or failure of actions m the 
previous stage This follows at least from Piaget's suggestion UVA finding 
leasons means fitting the lacls in a structural framework in which it is 
possible lo distinguish necessary from actual and possible relations, 
which in turn implies a balance between affirmations and negations 
involved (see chapter 5) As long as an action (implying a certain 
scheme) can be executed successfully without bothering why it is 
successtul, and an unsuccesslul action can become successlul by slight 
variations in the procedures used, also without knowing why, reflective 
abstractions are obsolete But sometimes more is needed In trying to find 
the reasons behind success or failure there is a refocusing on the activity 
(or operations etc ) itself Trying to find the reason for failure might be 
facilitated by encountering disturbances, but tins is not necessary 
Avoiding contradictions and disturbances is not a condition for the 
working or occurrence of reflective abstractions According to Piaget it is 
possible, along these lines, ю arrive at a totally new perspective 
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4 Equilibrium 
The second mechanism, striving lor equilibrium, has three tonus. The 
first form is the equilibration related to the assimilation of objects to 
schemes of action and vice versa: the second is related to interactions 
;uiiong the various subsystems of a total system, ;uid the third is related to 
interactions between subsystems and the total system of winch they are a 
part. Only the first concerns us here. In order to understand Uns form of 
equilibration better we must first explain what equilibrium is for Piaget. 
In my interpretation ol Piaget's later work, equilibrium concerns a 
scheme or a cognitive structure in mutual exchange with something else. 
That is, a structure is thought ol as something which сші interact. Or to 
put it more precisely, a structure is implied in the active exchanges of the 
subject wiüi the environment. The structure interacts with external ob-
jects or rallier widi characteristics of them Therefore, structures are al-
ways structures ol transformations equilibrium lias been achieved when, 
in relation to die characteristics dial are relevant for the structure, there 
can be no more disturbance of dial structure 
The notion of a disturbance has a very specific meaning in Piaget's 
work. It comes about when a scheme is used erroneously (used where it 
in fact doesn't apply) or when a scheme leaves relevant characteristics 
unnoticed Schemes presuppose a framework in which tliey must be re-
lated to each oilier (to like and unlike schemes) in order to work, 
'llierefore, in order to be able lo apply a given scheme or structure cor-
rectly, a coherent system of affirmations and negations is required. For 
example, in assimilating an object to a scheme, the subject must distin-
guish between those characteristics a of die ob|ecl by virtue of which it is 
assimilated and die other characteristics of the object noi-i/, as well as 
between the scheme thai assimilates diem A and other schemes not-A 
(Chapman, 1988b, p. 292). The difficulty for the subject lies in die fact 
dial the negations must be constructed whereas the positive characteris-
tics present themselves as observables Uns is evidenl in the exiunple of 
the conservation lask given above. If die ability to construct diese kinds 
ol die negations is not yet properly developed, contradictions may 
emerge. Hie reasons for the initial primacy ol positive characteristics are 
obvious. In die initial perception only positive observables are registered. 
Knowledge of an absent object is produced only secondarily as a function 
of expectations or predictions arising from action as a whole and not 
through perception. 
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Achieving equilibrium thus implies a highly sophisticated relation 
between subject and obiect According to Piaget Hiere is a cyclical form 
of interaction between the subicct and the object, which lies at the heart 
of all cognitive progress 'On the one hand die subject never achieves 
clear knowledge ol his own actions except by way ot their results on 
objects, on the oilier, he succeeds in understanding objects only by means 
ol inferences linked to coordinations of his actions" (Piaget, 1985, ρ 45) 
What Piaget proposes is «ι kind ol hcrmeneutical relation between object 
and subject in which understanding and observation mutually support 
each other like part and whole (cf Deihn, 1992, ρ 7) But how can 
structures become accommodated to Uie environment and equilibrium be 
achieved9 On the one hand Piaget claims thai external disturbances (e g 
failure to achieve one's goal) are possible but at the same time he admits 
that external reality is only known through cognitive structures This 
seems to reduce external disturbances to internal ones However, this is 
loo simple a conclusion Wc have to look at the detailed description 
Piaget has given ot striving tor equilibrium 
Because the object cannot be known m a direct, unmcdiatcd fashion, 
Piaget introduced die distinction between observables лпа cooidinations 
in his theory I he notion observables pertains to what tor a given subject 
looks like (he perceptual I acts I he notion of coordination, m contrast, 
stands tor interences dial go beyond the readily perceptible For example, 
two events can be observed and Uiose two observables might be coordi­
nated by invoking a causal connection between them Hie causal connec­
tion is not something lh.it cm be seen, it is mlerrcd Exactly what is per­
ceptible and what needs to be interred, however, depends on the stage of 
development ol the concerned subject What is ditficull to construct for a 
4 years old might be so evident for a 10 years old child that for tins older 
child it is a tact It should be noted, however, dial coordinations may be 
implicit and perceptions may be illusory In addition to Uns distinction, 
Piaget also distinguishes (except tor babies) observables related to die 
own actions ol a subject and (hose related to objects (and die same goes 
tor coordinations) Піе point is thai what is to count as observable is not 
absolutely given, it is stage dependent (based on previous constructions) 
Neverdieless, lor any person concerned, or seen lrom die perspective of a 
certain stage, it is a given And more important, it functions as a given in 
die sense that it can be at variance with accompanying coordinations 
Disturbances do nol result I rom discrepancy widi some absolutely given 
external reality, but derive lrom discrepancy between what is observable 
(e g as indicated by changes to die object) on the one hand and knowl-
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edge and expectations derived from the actions of the subject on the other 
hand. Restoring the balance (e.g. between expectations and observables) 
may require differentiation of the schemes employed. Action scheme χ 
can be used in situation y but not in situation ζ , but action scheme x' (x 
with a slight modification) might be adequate for г. According to Piaget, 
each compensation of a disturbance is always also a construction since a 
successful reaction to a disturbance is always a differentiation of a 
scheme. Previous scheme χ is not so much wrong and need not be thrown 
away; on the contrary, the disturbance is precisely due to the fact that die 
scheme χ is employed in a situation where it is not entirely adequate. A 
more adequate reaction might therefore be a differentiation of die scheme 
in schemes χ and .r', a precondition being that die difference between 
what is needed mid what has been available is not too great. 
Compensations, therefore, cannot be understood as motivated by 
adaptation to a fixed, subject-independent, reality. Although Piaget has to 
admit thai there is a subject-independent reality at die ontological level, 
and he assumes that ihe overall stage pattern is such thai this ultimate 
reality is approached as a limit, il can play no role in die construction of 
knowledge. On die epistemological level he remains a constructivist. 
Compensations are instrumental for the adaptation to a subject-dependent 
reality. Nevertheless, objectively seen, interaction possibilities increase. 
A very important result of this is that the categorical distinction 
between die logico-mathematical and empirical domains is relativized. In 
this interpretation die elaboration of die structures of logico-mathematical 
knowledge corresponds to the elaboration of the causal-empirical struc­
tures because Uiey bodi contribute to the increase in interaction possibili­
ties (e.g. conservation). The subject is increasingly able to realize his 
potentialities by grasping die structure of the interaction possibilities. 
What makes Piagel's position difficult to understand is that the 
fundamental interaction possibilities themselves develop, diey are not 
fixed. 
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5 Novelty and Improvement? 
Kquihbralion requires llie |oini working of extermüly motivated adapta-
tions and internally motivated constructions, as we have seen above 
However, the claim ol the possibility ot novelty and improvement 
through alternating dominance ol reequilibration and reconstruction is not 
yet an explanation ol the transitions A more thorough integration of boüi 
processes is required But this integration, when examined more closely, 
is paradoxical how can the novel constructions, in so lar as they are due 
to reflective abstraction, be compensative, or adaptive, or lead to increas-
ing fitness'' We have seen how disturbances can be compensated by small 
adjustments to die existing structures as long as they do not require a new 
structure too far "removed" from the original structure However, Uns 
mechanism is valid exclusively lor widnn-stage adaptation What remains 
is the question ol how the kind of constructions that play a role in the 
Üieory ol reflective abstraction can be responsible for the fact thai the 
subsequent (stage) structure is more fit than die previous cognitive struc-
ture How can лнс/ί truly novel constructions compensate lor disturbances 
even before they are again hue tuned through new elaborations and 
reequilibrations7 We should notice that Piaget strongly disapproved of 
die idea that new constructions are mere hypotheses based on random 
variations, which have to prove their wordi afterwards The process of 
reflective abstraction is, according to Piaget, directed towards increased 
fitness from die first step on 
Nevertheless, Piaget's general answer to the question и7д reflective 
abstractions are compensating is insufficient " because reflective ab­
stractions lead to more compositions and this added richness permits bet­
ter guidance Uian before" (Piaget, 19X5, ρ 140) As he admits, Uns does 
not explain win these new constructions occur The only explanation he 
provides, as lar is I know, is disappointingly simple and short He claims 
that the kind ot constructions under scrutiny always are -at the same 
time- compensations This claim is supported by the claim that his 
empirical studies have sufficiently demonstrated dial a compensation, 
which is always a reaction lo a disturbance, can be invoked for potential 
disturbances too (Piaget, 1985, ρ 141) In this way he tries to fit all die 
pieces together potential disturbances are felt as lacunae which motivate 
a search lor compensations Whereas an actual disturbance might be re­
acted to by constructing a new structure which integrates thai which was 
formerly a disturbance, but is now become one of the internal variations 
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recogm/ed by die structure, the constructive elaboration of structures by 
reflective abstraction anticipates potential disturbances, by reducing them 
to variations which are internal tor the system, even before the distur­
bance has actually emerged Piaget assumed that in tins way he had 
avoided a pure evolutionism (but see chapter 5, Miller, 1986) 
In fact Piaget's answer to the question ol how the constructions of the 
subject can be compensating implies an extra task lor reflective abstrac­
tion (ct Mosjunan, 1990, Bickhard 1990) In addition to leading to more 
structured stages tliey somehow have to anticipate potential disturbances 
associated with an external environment (at least tor causal-empirical 
knowledge) and thus contribute to increasing fitness 
From Piagel's writings two interpretations ol rellective abstraction 
seem possible if rellective abstractions are -in their pure lorm-
complelcly internal and independent ol influences trom outside the 
subject then this additional task is problematical, and Piaget's answer 
given above begs (he question If however, experience is permitted to 
play a role, a solution may be near 
On the one hand, there are good reasons to assume that rellective 
abstractions are purely internal Only cognitive structures and schemes 
arc involved Reflection (in the common sense meaning) could be 
understood as some lorm ol cognitive structuring that is applied to 
another piece ol cognitive structuring In the same vein, Piaget speaks 
about "regulations ol regulations" as an alternative description ol what is 
involved m reflective abstraction (although this description is only valid 
tor the less advanced lorm s ol leflective abstraction the term ι emulations 
must be substituted by operations and still later by leflettions to cover all 
the lorms) When die only mechanism is such a reflection or a lorm of 
self-application, development is reduced to an entirely internal process in 
which experience plays no inicial role whatsoever "Essentially such 
elaborations remain endogenous "(Piaget, I98S ρ 140) Llscwhere he 
wrote "in as lar as rellective abstraction succeeds m discovering the 
intrinsic reasons lor the coordinations which are reconstructed and 
elaborated in their being proiected, this leads to the curious result that a 
new product ot reorganization never shall contradict the previous one" 
(Piaget, 1977b, ρ λ2λ, my translation) II tins is true it remains quite 
mysterious how anticipation ol potential disturbances can be accounted 
lor in this model, since it is unclear whether relevant contact with an 
external environment is possible at all in tins model 
On the other hand the role ol experience is stressed by Piaget 
Reflective abstraction is a process which is mediated through experience 
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because structures need exercise. Piaget gives an example concerning one 
of the more advanced forms of reflective abstraction "...in a process of 
thinking in which only the goal mid the result are consciously available in 
advance, variations that might occur in a situation open up a possibility of 
taking consciousness of the intermediary mechanisms. The thematization 
of the operations used as instruments thus becomes the object of think­
ing" (Piaget, 1977b, p. 315, my translation). Here we see the importance 
of real experience. The question of course is whether this kind of experi­
ence is important for understanding reflective abstraction. Is development 
in this respect strictly internal and are experience and exercise no more 
than the "material" base, which has no essential contribution to offer, or, 
in contrast, is experience non-trivially involved? This last option seems 
more in line with Piagel's overall theoretical pretensions. He opens his 
book on equilibration with the following remark: "The central idea pre­
sented here is that knowledge does not proceed from experience with 
objects alone but neither from an innate program preformed in the 
subject, it results, instead, from a succession of constructions producing 
new structures" (Piaget, 1985, p. 1, my italics). Piaget even wams 
theoreticians not to forget the necessary contact between subject and 
characteristics of the object which existed already before these 
characteristics were framed within logico-mathematical structures 
(Piaget, 1У77Ь, p. 322, my translation). Piaget and Garcia (1990, p. 9ff.) 
stress the contribution of experience. However, apart from the fact that 
Piaget sometimes quite explicitly states that pure reflective abstractions 
are internal, this interpretation is problematic. If reflective abstractions 
;ire not wholly internal the formal improvement discussed in section 3 is 
questionable. That is, under this interpretation Uic workings of reflective 
abstraction cannot be understood as in section 3, and it is unclear how it 
must be understood instead. 
We are therefore in a dilemma. Neither interpretation, completely 
internal or partly based on experience, seems an acceptable 
characterization of reflective abstractions. In the first case it is difficult to 
see how the mechanism results in systematical adaptation, while in the 
second interpretation, the formal improvement is jeopardized. 
The dilemma can be eliminated, I suggest, if we keep in mind that the 
structures on which new reflective abstractions must operate are struc­
tures of interaction. They are mediated through activity and elaborated by 
the working of regulations. I will speak of interaction structures to stress 
this particular point. For Piaget the structures are structures of transforma­
tions and these transformations are always the product of activities of a 
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subject. But it is important that activities -at least in so far as their result 
is concerned- depend not only on the intentions of a subject and his 
schemes, but also on environmental constraints (the environment can 
consists in objects or oilier subjects). They are not the result oí pure sub-
jective creation. Interaction structures represent more "information" than 
a subject either implicitly or explicitly introduces through the use of pro-
cedures and operations (at that particular moment in his or her develop-
ment). Because reflective abstraction involves objectifying the subject's 
own activities and thus pertain to what I call interaction structures, they 
lead to novel possibilities of interaction. 
Earlier, adaptation due to elaboration was identified as an increase in 
interaction possibilities and now wc may add that reflective abstraction 
leads to an even more profound increase in interaction possibilities in that 
new possibilities become available. 
In lliis way the epistemologica! problems can be avoided that would 
have followed from suggesting some sort of direct knowledge of the 
environment by the subject. Interaction structures are not to be equated 
with the structure of the environment. Interaction structure concerns the 
structure of action possibilities. With Piaget's model of the cyclic 
interaction between subject and object, which states that in order to know 
(become conscious of -or conceptualize) the coordinations we must 
observe the effect our actions have on objects and compare them to our 
intentions, environmental constraints can be accounted for without 
presupposing direct knowledge of Uie external world (cf. Campbell and 
Bickhard, 1986). 
Reflective Abstractions and Stage Transitions 165 
6 Stage Development Revisited 
Interpreting reflective abstraction as a mechanism which is related to 
interaction siruciurcs helps to clarity Piaget's claim about anticipation of 
potential disturbances However, even if we grant Uiat between time 1 
and time 2 an individual has attained a qualitatively new and better 
cognitive stage in development, it is still difficult to identify an exact 
turning point It is not very fruitful to try to do so In fact we have 
touched upon three different steps (elaboration, projection, 
reorganization) which all contribute to achieving a novel and better 
cognitive structure To single out one of those steps as die principle 
turning point would be arbitrary Since this would only reflect the 
definitions involved and no substantive theoretical insights The 
emergence of novel and improved structures is at least a three step 
process lliesc three steps involved in reaching another structure can be 
reviewed with the interpretation of reflective abstraction lust suggested in 
mind Stage transitions are an even more complex matter since not every 
emergence of a new structure results in a new stage 
Three Steps 
Elaboration This first step in constructing a new cognitive structure (or 
scheme) consists in elaborations, which are due to regulations (feedback 
and leedforward mechanisms) that govern die interaction between subject 
and object According to Piaget "every assinulatory scheme tends to 
incorporate external elements that are compatible widi it" and "every 
assinulatory scheme has to be accommodated to the elements it 
assumlates, but the changes made to adapt it to an object's peculiarities 
must be effected without loss of continuity" (Piaget, 1985, ρ 5) Because 
of this constant activity and repeated use of the structures, diese 
structures (or schemes) arc elaborated in such away diat diey become 
more finely tuned to the environment but without losing dieir identity 
This is importimi lor the Iwo other steps (projection and reorganization) 
in achieving a novel stage in development for two reasons In die first 
place because die odier two steps -although by themselves not regulated 
by die interaction with the environment- are constructions which use 
previous constructions as пшіегыі to build on, constructions which can be 
traced back to very elementary structures or schemes that were fine-tuned 
to die environment In the second place, because every elaboration of 
structures in the causal-empirical domain (including those related to 
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sophisticated structures) involves interactions between subject and object 
I he subject can never completely determine the outcome of this 
interaction process To appreciate tins lundainental point it is useful to 
come back to Uie notion oí interaction structures as defined above 
Elaboration means that properties ot the interaction structure are slowly 
discovered, which can also be seen as a gradual enrichment of the 
subject's repertoire Піе interaction structure defines the space of 
possible actions associated with the developmental level of the subject 
concerned Ot course, the subject is not mmiediately aware of all these 
possibilities because these possibilities do not depend up on the subject 
alone I think Piaget may be right in thai such a situation might be 
experienced as the feeling ііыі there is something left to do As soon as an 
activity begins a lacuna is lelt which motivates the search for new 
solutions (et Piaget, 1987) 
Projection lins second step in achieving cognitive novelty lies at the 
heart of the mechanism of reflective abstraction It is the projection or 
reflection ot the structure of a lower level to a higher level and thereby 
constituting a new level ot abstraction "But it is no less evident that, 
trom a psychological perspective, each new reorganization presupposes 
the formation of a higher level of projection, where, what remained 
instrumental tor the process ot thinking at the lower level, becomes an 
object of thinking and thus is thematic rather than remaining instrumental 
or operational' (Piaget, 1977b, ρ 304, my translation) It only the 
sub|eclive abilities as such were projected or reflected then, since no new 
information has entered the scene, the result could only be lormed by a 
kind ot logical implication, and consequently there would be no reason to 
assume thai die result is more fit in relation to the external world But, in 
my view, it is not the case that the coordinations as such are projected to 
a higher level When the coordinations of level χ arc reflected upon and 
their Jorm becomes content tor level t+1, it is the interaction structure 
which is involved Which basically means thai before tins can happen a 
new cognitive ability (e g a scheme) must be used to such «ш extent that 
at least some (potential) characteristics of tins ability are explored In 
tact, reflection on the possible is only feasible it diese possibilities have 
been sufficiently actualized Remember that a possible suite of affairs is 
never observable by itself Therefore each tune the entire cycle is 
repeated a new level ol interaction structure is at stake and each tune the 
contact with the external world is insured 
Reorganization In the final step a reorganization must take place As 
said betöre, the projection leads to new relationships Note, lor example, 
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the difference between the separateness in time of a sequence of actions 
and the instantaneous natine ot л mental representation that relates to the 
same things New relationships lead to new possibilities, which in tura, 
lead to new problems (disequilibna) What now becomes available as ob­
ject lor thinking must be connected with everything else thai is already 
subiectively available Conceptualizing an action necessarily implies 
connecting it with other conceptions which it resembles, or which it does 
not resemble In tins way the original abilities are transformed again 
Suppose action χ (which is sufficiently successful) implies the trulli of 
proposition ρ (in the sense thai it is effective because ρ is true), then re­
flecting on il could reveal proposition ρ (ρ becomes potentially conscious 
as a proposition) Now proposition ρ can be subject to all kinds of modi­
fications which are appropriate to the manipulation of propositions For 
example, in due time the negation of ρ might be formulated In short, ρ 
now functions in a richer environment This reorganization is very impor­
timi for the claim that tins kind ot development is improvement, because 
this step is responsible lor the construction ot more highly structured 
structures Together with ihe claims about the contact with the external 
world, tins reorganization is supposed to account for improvement in 
understanding and dealing with the external environment 
Stage Transitions 
Piaget's account ol the relationship between the emergence ot novel and 
better structures on the one hand and stage-transitions on the other, is 
radier complicated lor three reasons 
Firstly, Piaget did not explicitly address the problem in terms of 
stages, in his later work, although implicitly he still made use of Uns 
tramework (ct Beilin, 1У8У, see chapter 3) Secondly, I have tried to 
lormulale the pi maples underlying cognitive renewal in a general sense 
I was looking lor a common mechanism which could be invoked for each 
stage or substage transition However, Piaget gives a more detailed 
description in which he stresses the differences m transitions at die lower 
end ol die developmental range as compared to diose at the higher end 
For example, the relative contributions to development by reflective ab­
straction and empirical abstraction change profoundly with age 
Unfortunately this detailed description obscures the general aspects of the 
transitional mechanisms involved Thirdly, not every emergence of 
novelty leads to stage transitions In order to clarify a stage transition (in 
general), the three sorts ol equilibration must be considered again 
Interaction and conflict, but also disequilibrium and equilibration are pos-
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sible between, (a) subject and object, (b) the various subsystems of a total 
system, and (c) interactions between subsystems and the total system 
(between integration and ditierentialion) In the interaction between sub­
ject and object (equilibration a) the lirsl step towards novelty 
(elaboration) is involved I he equilibration between substructures (b) 
does for the logico-malhematical domain the same sort of tiling that the 
interaction with external world (equilibration a) does for causal knowl­
edge (Piaget, 1985, ρ 139) A new stage is established as a result of inte­
gration and diflerenliation when a new form ot a total system is reached 
(equilibration c) Sometimes a reorganization due to reflective abstraction 
may lead to Uns result The second step in achieving novelty (projection) 
would seem not to be regulated by any of the equilibration tendencies 
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7 Conclusion 
Novelty and improvement are closely related in Piaget's model for stage 
transitions. Piaget's later work can be characterized by the insistence on 
lliis particular combination. 1 have isolated the components of his theory 
relevant to the emergence of novel and improved stages and omitted other 
interesting aspects of it. 
Piaget provided a very detailed description of how, by regulations 
such as feedback and feedforward loops, cognitive structures become 
better adapted in within-stagc elaborations. But, although these mecha-
nisms can explain improvement in die sense of adaptation, no novelty is 
at stake in that. Another mechanism proposed by Piaget -reflective 
abstraction- is also insufficient. In fact, two contrasting interpretations of 
reflective abstractions were examined. In die first, the endogenous con-
structions of the (epistemic) subject explain novelty in development and 
may also explain a kind of formal, improvement, but tliis emphasis on en-
dogenous constructions makes it difficult to defend the claims about 
adaptation and increasing fitness. In die second, adaptation and increasing 
fitness are seen as derived from experience, but diis emphasis on experi-
ence seems to make the formal improvement, which is at the core of 
reflective abstractions, irrelevant. 
This dilemma was resolved by clarifying the notion of interaction 
structures. Coordinations, enriched through experience, are projected to 
the next level and reflected upon. The structures intentionally used by a 
subject leave plenty room for discovery of unforeseen action possibilities. 
Conceptualizing the workings of reflective abstraction in diis way has die 
advantage that contributions from sources outside the cognitive apparatus 
of die subject can be better understood (see chapter 5) while die formal 
kind of improvement (better structuration) can be retained. 
In view of the above it seems wordiwhile to try to generalize the steps 
involved in reflective abstraction to other domains (e.g. the moral 
domain). Increasing structuration is general by itself. If also an equivalent 
of die elaboration of structures in interaction can be found, die entire 
model is generalizable. Such an alternative, which substitutes die subject-
subject interaction in the place of die subject-object interaction, is 
described by Miller (19X6) and is crilized in chapter 5. 
In section 1 it was asked, first wheüier the proposed mechanisms and 
model can explain development in an interesting sense, and second 
wheüier this model is consistent with Piaget's ideas about novelty mid 
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improvement 
The explanation of stage transitions offered by Piaget was recon­
structed in three steps elaboration by feedback and feedforward regula­
tions, projection by lifting coordinations to another level in which their 
status is changed as they become observables, reorganization by recipro­
cal assimilations and accommodations between .substructures This model 
is, as lar as I can see, the most thorough attempt to explain structural 
change consistent with the ideas about novelty and improvement 
Nevertheless it still is too global to be completely satisfactory as explana­
tion 
Novelty in stage development would seem to be a plausible character­
istic given the model for stage transition Novelty implies that each sub­
sequent stage is qualitative and structurally new compared to the previ­
ous stage The subsequent stage is not a simple continuation of die old, 
but involves a radically new perspective built on the previous stage. 
Because the involved constructions by themselves do not depend on 
overcoming contradictions, there is nothing paradoxical in the emergence 
of novelty (cl chapter *>) 
However, improvement in stage development is the more problematic 
claim First к must be clear that die explanation 1 have been seeking is 
not to explain vv/)v, or lustily that, die subsequent stage is better (on the 
problem ol justification, see van Haaften, 1990) but to show how a sub­
sequent stage with such properties could be attained How plausible is it 
that a transition leads to a belter stage? The main argument, very briefly, 
is that die subsequent stage is belter in the sense that die central deficits 
of die previous stage are resolved in the subsequent one Tins is not the 
case merely because Piaget defined his terms in dus way I he new stage 
fills lacunae and compensates for obstacles (contradictions and distur­
bances) indeed by definition but Piaget has also explained -in a global 
sense- what dus involves Furthermore, it should be kept in mind diat tins 
progress is very restricted in meaning The clami defended by Piaget only 
pertains to underlying cognitive competencies 1 he cognitive structures 
ol the higher stage contain the structures ol the previous stage ai> sub­
structures in a reorganized and better orgam¿ed lonn In addition, diese 
structures arc fine-tuned to die problems dial a subject may come across 
in interacting with the world around him or her 
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SUMMARY 
Stage-theories are often associated with die work of Piaget and Kohlberg, 
although the concept oi developmental stage is much older Currently, the 
concept ot developmental stage plays a central role only in the domain or 
moral development and tor a few neo-Piagetians, while in mainstream 
developmental psychology the concept has earned itself a bad reputation 
over recent decades I low could it be that dus concept, that was so central 
to developmental psychology, and which has been picked up by others, 
has lost its preeminence in recent decades? Have we finally freed our-
selves from residuals of 19th century believe in progress, or is there the 
danger ot throwing out the baby with the bathwater9 It is clear why the 
concept became unpopular, as tins study testifies, there are a large num-
ber of serious problems connected with tins notion, and in addition all 
19th century thought seems suspicious in tins post-modern era The main 
question oí this study, however, is whether there are reasons for keeping 
the concept ot developmental stages in some form, despite all these 
problems 
In chaptei I the development ol the concept of developmental stage itself 
was at issue In a schematic reconstruction, theories of social evolution 
and biological evolution were traced through the history of ideas of west-
ern culture since, both diese kinds ot dieory have had considerable influ-
ence on die concept ot developmental stage 
Describing development on α societal scale, Irom antiquity onwards, 
has been based on the metaphor ot organic growdi During us use to 
describe social evolution, however, tins metaphor itselt became modified, 
probably due to die specific character of social evolution and historical 
change The cyclical conception used by die Greeks implied recurrence 
(circle or cycle) St Augustine used an epic model diat was supposed to 
reveal one grand design (die upper half of a circle) The modems, finally, 
conceived ot scries ot cumulative achievements (an upward straight line) 
These modifications in die concept of growth have in turn influenced die 
emerging developmental psychology of die 19di century Virtually all 
contempor.iry stage-dieones still use stage patterns diat can be typified 
more adequately by straight upward lines dian by one semicircle The en-
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lity of development in most theories of cognitive and moral development 
is conceived of as an abstract whole not unlike that invoked for social 
evolution Λ final example of tins influence relates to the fact that the 
idea ot progress as employed by Piaget shares some interesting features 
with die notion of progress as used by the social evolutionists 
Accounus oí biological evolution belong to more recent centuries, 
since nature was long believed to be something fixed and eternal 
Although, the emergence oí Darwinism stimulated developmental psy-
chology, Hie early developmcntalists were not really Darwinians In their 
work, non-Darwinian ideas ot design and progress in a unidirectional 
single track wiüi qualitatively dilterent stages were still important These 
ideas were rooted in older conceptions ot nature such as die idea of the 
"Scala Naturae", from which were borrowed the ordinal and hierarchical 
characterizations of die pattern of development It seems likely Üiat these 
pre-Darwmian ideas about nature, together with die ideas borrowed from 
social evolutionism, have had a considerable influence on early develop-
mental psychology, while only a lew genuine Darwinian ideas were em-
ployed A Darwinian idea that did have some influence was that of 
"adaptation", which provided a new interpretation ot progress that 
seemed scientifically more acceptable and more objectively founded Qian 
die speculative normative ideas oí die social evolutionists 
The chapter ends wiUi the proposal to consider carefully the worth of 
each oí the assumptions and connotations discussed because they may 
prove to be more useful than is currently recognized 
Chapter 2 provided a systematic reconstruction oí die developmental 
stage concept Developmenl.il stages serve to classify, from a develop-
mental perspective, changes in human performance and competence In 
order to grasp dus complex concept, two issues concerning single stages 
have been separated Irom two issues concerning the pattern of stages It 
was argued that die concept ol developmental stage cannot be replaced by 
die notion "sequence" wiüioul loss ol nearly .ill interesting pretensions 
The first issue concerned die conception ot unity and diversity within 
a single stage The nature ol die mamlold or die surtace is, in each of die 
diree cases dial have been distinguished, conceived m an incomniensu-
rably diilerent way elementary parts ot die structure in die first approach 
(elements can be anything but olten operations are meant), behavior in 
the second, and narrative elements m die durd approach The alleged 
nature of die unity or stage structure vanes correspondingly a structural 
unity in die first eise, a latent causal organization in the second eise, and 
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a foundational unity m the last approach 
The second issue concerned die relative stability of a single stage In 
as far as relative stability was taken to be an intrinsic property of the 
developmental process, it might be located at the biological-neurological 
level, at the level ol ideas, or at die level of the structure and organization 
itself It was concluded that stability should not be understood so as to 
preclude small changes -necessary to allow for adaptation to the envi-
ronment- or more radical structural transitions -such as moving to a new 
stage 
The third issue bore upon the type of stage pattern A stage pattern is a 
series of ordered stages The types range from die more open, branched, 
or additive models, through the classical subsequent displacement models 
of Piaget and Kohlberg, with or without substages, to die even more 
restrained (spirally) recurrent models Which type is preferrable is mainly 
an empirical issue 
The jourth issue concerned the comparison of three perspectives on 
how developmental stages can be reconstructed and ordered The empiri-
cist claim that reconstruction is unnecessary and that the ordering reveals 
itself in die empirical facts was exposed as a position fraught widi con-
ceptual difficulties Hie taxonomie perspective stresses die classificatory 
aspect and bases die ordering on conceptual and logical characteristics 
According to die developmental perspective, die ordering must be based 
on die general ch.iracterislics of die transformation mechanism Possibly 
some integration or combination can be found 
The systematic but not exhaustive reconstruction resulted in a few 
theoretically Iruillul conceptualizations for each of die four important 
issues regarding developmental stages The definition of developmental 
stages, however, could not be fixed dus way Hopetully, however, uns 
review has eliminated contusion due to uncontrolled mixing of incompat-
ible perspectives and approaches 
In chaptei 3 diree positions regarding die conceptualization ot develop-
mental stages were contrasted Piaget's formulations trom the early six-
ties were presented as a starting point Next, trends in die sub-discipline 
ol developmental psychology concerned widi the study ot cognitive 
development were contrasted with trends in the sub-discipline concerned 
with die study ot moral development In dus last sub-discipline Kohlberg 
has proposed a hard strucluial stage model, which subscribes to Piaget's 
entena, while in die field ot cognitive development most of die stage en-
tena specified by Piaget are reg.irded as untenable and the weaker notion 
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of sequence has become popular By relating tins divergence in interpre-
tation and appreciation to trends in the methodology and theory of 
research concerning moral development, reasons tor maintaining a hard-
structural stage model could be provided Characteristic of the 
Kohlbergian stage concept is an interest in structures oi meaning, struc-
tured wholeness, mid hierarchical integration 
In chapter 4 an empirical and methodological study concerning a hierar-
chical structural model of development in moral judgment was reported 
A model was proposed in which a subject is characterized as occupying a 
particular moral stage During development, die subject's characteristic 
stage progresses along a latent, ordered dimension in an age dependent 
way Evaluations of prototypic statements representative of moral stages 
below a subject's current stage are assumed to follow a quasi-Markov 
simplex pattern, whereas higher level statements arc assumed to be eval-
uated in a homogeneous, non hierarchical way Using a causal modeling 
approach, the model was applied successlully in an empirical study of 
stage score correlations of Defining Issues lest importance ratings ol 
moral issues The results are in agreement with the conclusion of Walker 
that subjects prefer higher over lower statements it they are capable of 
appreciating the dillerence Although die usual interpretation of DIT 
score proliles denies die possibility of subjects "having" a stage, the 
results of the causal modeling approach show that a subject can be plausi-
bly characterized as occupying a particular moral stage 
In chapter 5 die learning paradox was analyzed ïliis paradox, which 
dates back to die Sophists and is also known as the Meno-paradox, sug-
gests it is impossible to le<im something novel A modern variant of the 
paradox WAS used by Г-odor to critizise Piaget's dieory of development A 
generally accepted relutalion ot I-odor's arguments lor die "impossibility 
of acquiring more powerlul structures" is still lacking 
Recently Miller has argued th.it the learning paradox is a corollary ot 
individualistic models ol learning and development such as Piaget's and 
he has proposed a Üieory ol collective learning in order to escape the in-
herent circularity ol individualistic models Tins proposal to a solution for 
die paradox is interesting because it is based on recognition ot Uie inher-
ently social character of development, but without recourse to die infinite 
regress which occurs when "novelty" is reduced to cultural transmission 
However, after a careluI analysis ot Miller's arguments it was con-
cluded that Piaget's model lor individu.ilisiic learning could be defended 
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against die obieclions associated with the learning-paradox in a way that 
is quite similar to Miller's recourse to collective learning Nevertheless 
boüi Piaget's and Miller's theories have a comparable weakness in that 
both make use of a central but not sufficiently clear part of Piaget's later 
theory In both cases the siili problematic notion ol "reflective abstrac-
tion" has lo bear ihe burden ol explaining novelty 
In chapler 6 Piaget's claim that his theory of equilibration explains die 
emergence of novel and improved forms ol knowledge was examined 
According to my interpretation ol Piaget, stage transitions can be recon-
structed in three steps lirst elaboration, then projection, and finally reor-
ganization Whether (his may lead lo improved and novel forms of think-
ing was next considered 
Piaget provided a detailed description ot how, by regulations such as 
feedback and feedforward loops, cognitive structures become better 
adapted in within-stage elaborations Bui, although Uns may explain im-
provement in the sense ol adaptation, no novelty is at stake yet Another 
mechanism proposed by Piagel -reflective abstraction- is also insuffi-
cient In tact, two contrasting interpretations ol reflective abstractions 
were examined In the firsl lnicrpietalion, the endogenous constructions 
ol the (epistemic) subiect explain novelty in development and may also 
account for a kind ol formal improvement, but Uns emphasis on endoge-
nous constructions m.ikcs it difficult to defend the claims about adapta-
tion In (he second interpretation, the role of experience is emphasized, 
but tins seems to m.ike (he Iormai improvement, which is at die core of 
reflective abstractions, irrelevant This dilemma was resolved by clarify-
ing (lie notion ot interaction slruciurcs II coordinations, as enriched 
through experience, are pro|cc(cd to the next level and reflected upon, 
contributions Irom sources outside die cognitive apparatus ot die subiect 
can bc beller understood while the idea of a formal kind of improvement 
(better structuration) can be relamed In tins interpretation reflective 
abstractions and regulations can supplement each odier 
Piaget's model is die mosl (borough adempì ίο explain structural 
change consistent with strong claims about novelty and miprovement but 
it is still too global lo be satisfactory as an explanation Novelty in stage 
development would seem to be a plausible characteristic given die model 
tor stage transition since die subsequent stage is not a simple continuation 
ol (he old 'I he subsequent stage otters a radically new perspective built 
on die previous stage Impwvement in stage development is a more prob­
lematic claim 1 he main argument is that the subsequent slage is "belter" 
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because the central deficits of the previous stage are resolved This can 
mean no more, however, than that the cognitive structures of the higher 
stage contain the structures of the previous stage as substructures in a 
belter (re)orgaiiized lonn and that these structures arc fine-tuned to the 
problems that a subiect comes across in interacting with the world 
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SAMENVATTING 
Stadiumtheoneen worden vaak in verband gebracht mei het werk van 
Piaget en Kohlberg, maar het concept ontwikkelingsstadium is al veel 
ouder Tegenwoordig speelt het concept ontwikkelingsstadium nog 
slechts een centrale rol in het domein van de morele ontwikkeling en bij 
enkele neo-Piageliancn, terwijl het m de hoofdstroom van de ontwikkel-
ingspsychologie in een kwaad daglicht is komen te staan Hoe is het mo-
gelijk dat dit concept, dat zo centraal was voor de ontwikkelingspsy-
chologie en dat ook opgepikt werd daarbuiten, zijn faam verloren heeft in 
de laatste decennia7 1 lebben we ons eindelijk bevrijd van residuen van 
19e eeuws vooruitgangsgelool ot staan we op het punt het kind met het 
badwater weg te gooien'' Het is begrijpelijk dat het concept impopulair 
werd want er zijn, zoals deze studie laat zien, een groot aantal ernstige 
problemen aan verbonden en bovendien /ijn 19e eeuwse ideeën in dit 
postmoderne ti)dperk bil voorbaat verdacht De vraag die echter in deze 
studie voorop stond was ot er redenen ζιμι om het begrip 
ontwikkelingsstadium te handhaven, in enigerlei vorm, ondanks die 
problemen 
In hoofdstuk 1 was de ontwikkeling van het concept ontwikkelingstadium 
zelf aan de orde In een schematische reconstructie werden theoncen over 
de sociale en biologische evolutie gevolgd ш de ideeëngeschiedenis van 
onze westerse cultuur omdat beide soorten theorieën het concept 
ontwikkelingsstadium in ruime male beïnvloed hebben 
Het beschreven van ontwikkeling op maatschappelijk niveau was, 
vaimi de Oudheid, gebaseerd op de metafoor van organische groei 
Gedurende haar gebruik voor het beschrijven van de sociale evolutie 
veranderde de melaloor /elt, waarschijnlijk als resultaat van het speci-
fieke karakter van sociale evolutie en historische verandering In de oud-
heid ging het nog om een cyclisch model met de implicatie van eeuwige 
herhaling (cirkels) Bi| Augustinus was er sprake van een episch model 
dat een groots ontwerp ol plan moest suggereren (bovenste helft van een 
cirkel) In de moderne Lijd tenslotte, ging het om een serie cumulatieve 
presumes (stijgende rechle lijn) Deze veranderingen in hel concept gioei 
hebben op hun beurt de opkomende ontwikkelingspsychologie in de 19e 
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eeuw beïnvloed en werken nog steeds door Vrijwel alle hedendaagse 
stadium theoncen gebruiken nog steeds stadium patronen die beter 
gekarakteriseerd kunnen worden als een rechte stijgende li|n dan als een 
halve cirkel In de meeste theorieën over cognitieve en morele 
ontwikkeling, is datgene wat zich ontwikkelt een tamelijk abstract geheel 
net als bij de sociaal evolutionisten Een derde voorbeeld van hel resultaat 
van deze invloed is de gedeeltelijke overeenkomst lussen Piaget's ideeën 
over vooruitgang en hel begrip vooruitgang zoals dat door de sociaal 
evolutionisten werd gebruikt 
Het gebruüc van het begrip ontwikkeling voor de biologische evolutie 
is een fenomeen van de laatslc eeuwen want er werd lang gedacht dat de 
natuur eeuwig en onveranderlijk was Alhoewel met name de opkomst 
van het Darwinisme de ontwikkelingspsychologie slerk bevorderd heeft, 
waren de vroege ontwikkclingspsychologen geen echte Darwinisten 
Belangrijker in hun werk waren de nicl-Darwinislische ideeën zoals plan-
matigheid, vooruitg.ing, richting en kwalitatief verschillende stadia Deze 
ideeën 7i|ii geworteld in de oudere concepties van de natuur zoals het 
idee van de 'Scala Naturae" waar het ordinale en hierarchische karakter 
van ontwikkelingspatronen aan ontleend is Fón van de weinige 
Darwiniaanse ideeén die wel enige invloed hadden op de vroege 
ontwikkelingspsychologie was het idee van adaptatie Het voorzag in een 
nieuwe interpretatie van vooruitgang die wetenschappelijk acceptabeler 
toescheen en ook meer gelundeerd leek in de objectieve werkelijkheid 
dan de speculatieve en normatieve ideeën van de sociaal evolutionisten 
Hel hooldsiuk eindigl met het voorstel om de waarde van elk van de 
besproken assumpties en connotaties nog eens /orgvuldig te overwegen 
onidal ze wellicht toch bruikbaarder /ηη dan tegenwoordig erkend wordt 
Hoofdstuk 2 bestond uit een systematische reconstructie van hel concept 
ontwikkelingsstadium Een ontwikkelingsstadium dient om -vanuit het 
oogpunt van ontwikkeling- veranderingen in menselijke competenties en 
gedrag te klassificeren Om het concept beter in de greep te krijgen 
werden twee kwesties betreffende de stadia zelf gescheiden van twee 
kwesties betrcllende hel patroon van stadia Hierbij kan het concept 
stadiumpatroon mei vervangen worden door het concept "sequentie" 
zonder verlies van bijna alle interessante pretenties 
De eerste kwestie belrof de conceptualisering van eenheid en ver­
scheidenheid binnen een stadium De aard van de verscheidenheid werd, 
in elk van de drie gevallen die onderscheiden werden, onvergelijkbaar 
.inders geïnterpreteerd elementaire delen van de structuur in de eerste 
benadering (.dies kan element zijn maar va.ik worden operaties bedoeld), 
Samenvatting 191 
gedrag in de tweede, en narratieve elementen in de derde benadering. De 
veronderstelde eenheid van stadium structuren varieerde correspon-
derend: een structurele eenheid in het eerste geval, een latente causale 
organisatie in het tweede geval, en een onderliggend conceptueel funda-
ment in de laalsie benadering. 
De tweede kwestie betrof de stabiliteit van een stadium. Voorzover de 
relatieve stabiliteit gezien werd als een intrinsieke eigenschap van het 
ontwikkelingsproces kon deze gelocaliscerd worden op het biologisch-
neurologische niveau, op het niveau van ideeën, of op hel niveau van de 
structuur en organisatie zelf. Geconcludeerd werd ook dal stabiliteit niet 
begrepen mag worden op een manier die kleine veranderingen 
-noodzakelijk voor adaptatie aan de fysieke en sociale omgeving- en 
meer radicale structurele transformaties -zoals stadium overgangen-
uitsluit. 
De derde kwestie betrof de verschillende typen van sladiumpatronen. 
Een stadiumpalrixHi is een geordende serie van stadia. De typen patronen 
lopen van het meer open vertakte of additieve patroon, via de klassieke 
opeenvolgende vervangings modellen van Piaget en Kohlberg, met of 
zonder subsladia, naar de meer ingeperkte spiraal vorm ige herhalings 
patronen. Welk type de voorkeur verdient is vooral een empirische vraag. 
De vierde kwestie betrof een vergelijking van drie perspectieven op 
ordening en reconstructie van ontwikkelingsstadia. De empiristische 
claim dat reconstructie onnodig is en dat de ordening zichzelf toont in de 
empirische feilen werd ontmaskerd als een positie beladen met con-
ceptuele moeilijkheden. De taxonomische benadering benadrukt het 
klassificerende aspect en baseert de ordening op conceptuele en logische 
karakierislieken. Volgens hel ontwikkelingsperspectief moet de ordening 
gebaseerd worden op de algemene karakteristieken van transitie mecha-
nismen. Misschien is integratie van de drie perspectieven mogelijk. 
Deze systematische maar niet uitputtende reconstructie resulteerde in 
enkele theoretisch vruchtbare conceptualisalies voor deze vier belangrijke 
kwesties betreffende ontwikkelingsstadia. De definitie van ontwikkel-
ingsstadia kon echier niet via deze weg gefixeerd worden. 
In hoofdstuk 3 werden drie theoretische posities betcffendc de conceptu-
alisering van ontwikkelingsstadia gecontrasteerd. Piagets oorspronkelijke 
formuleringen uil begin zestiger jaren werden gepresenteerd als startpunt. 
Vervolgens werden trends in de sub-discipline van de ontwikkelingspsy-
chologie die zich met cognitieve ontwikkeling bczighoudl, vergeleken 
mei trends in de sub-discipline die zich met de morele ontwikkeling bezig 
houdt. In deze laalste sub-discipline heeft Kohlberg een zogenaamd "hard 
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studium model" naar voren gebracht dat de criteria van Piaget onder-
schrijft, terwijl op het terrein van de cognitieve ontwikkeling de meeste 
van Piagel's criteria als onhoudbaar ge/icn worden en de veel zwakkere 
notie "ontwikkel ingsscqeniies" opgeld deed Door deze divergentie in 
interpretaties en waardering in verband te brengen met alwijkende trends 
m de methodologie en theorievorming binnen onderzoek naar de morele 
ontwikkeling, konden redenen gegeven worden voor Kohlberg's 
vasthouden aan hel harde stadium model Kenmerkend voor het 
Kohlbergiaanse stadium concept zijn de belangstelling voor betekenis-
structuren, structurele gehelen en hierarchische integratie 
In hoofdstuk 4 werd verslag gedaan van een empirisch en methodologisch 
onderzoek betretende een hierarchisch structuurmodel voor de 
ontwikkeling van morele oordelen Er werd een model voorgesteld 
waarin een subject gek<ir<iklerisecrd kan worden door een bepaald moreel 
stadium Tijdens de omwikkeling zal liet karakteristiek stadium van het 
subject verschuiven langs een latente, geordende dimensie op een lecf-
lijdsafliankelijke wi|/e Evaluaties van prototypische uitspraken die 
reprcsentaliel zijn voor stadia beneden iemands huidige stadium worden 
daarbij geacht een quasi-Markov simplex patroon te volgen, terwijl 
uitspraken van een hoger stadium op een homogene, niet hierarchische 
wijze geëvalueerd zullen worden. 
Met behulp van een zogenaamde "causal-inodeling" benadering, werd 
dit model succesvol toegepast in een analyse van stadium-scorc-corre-
laties van bclangnjkheids oordelen inzake morele problemen uit de 
Defining Issues lest De resultaten zijn in overeenstemming met de con-
clusie vim Walker dal subjecten hogere oordelen prefereren boven lagere 
als ze hel verschil kunnen begrijpen Alhoewel de gebruikelijke interpre-
tatie vim de Dl I score profielen de mogeli|klieid ontkent dat subjecten in 
een stadium /uien, laat hel resultaat van de causal-modelmg benadering 
zien dat een subject wel degeh|k plausibel gekarakteriseerd kan worden 
door één bepaald stadium van morele ontwikkeling 
In hoofdstuk 5 werd de zogenaamde leerparadox nader geanalyserd. Deze 
paradox, die ook wel bekend is als de Meno-paradox en die teruggaat op 
de Sofisten, suggereert dal het niet mogelijk is om iels werkelijk nieuws 
te leren Een hedendaagse en beruchte variant van de paradox is door 
Fodor in slelling gebracht legen Piagcts Üieorie Een algemeen geaccep-
teerde weerlegging van Hodors argumenten voor "de onmogelijkheid om 
rijkere structuren ie verwerven" ontbreekt vooralsnog 
Recent heell Miller geargumenteerd dal de leerparadox een gevolg is 
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van individualistische modellen van leren en ontwikkeling (zoals in 
Piaget theorie) en heeft hij een theorie van collectief leren voorgesteld, 
juist om aan de inherente circulariteit van individualistische modellen te 
ontsnappen De/e poging de paradox op te lossen is gebaseerd op de 
erkenning van het sociale karakter van ontwikkeling maar zonder in de 
oneindige regressie (c vervallen die ontstaat als "nieuwheid" gereduceerd 
wordt tot culturele transmissie 
Echter, na een /orgvuldige analyse van Millers argumenten werd 
geconcludeerd dat Piagets model voor individucel leren verdedigd zou 
kunnen worden legen de be/waren rond de leerparadox op een manier die 
sterk lijkt op Millers teruggrepen op collectief leren Niettemin bleken 
beide theorieën een vergeli|kbore zwakte te kennen omdat beide moeten 
terugvallen op een centraal, maar onvoldoende helder, stuk van Piagets 
latere theorie Het concept "reflecterende abstractie" moet in beide 
gevallen in feite de verklaring voor "nieuwheid" dragen 
In Hoofdstuk б werd Piagets claim dat zijn equilibrane theorie het 
ontslaan van nieuwe en betere vormen van kennis kan verklaren nader 
onderzocht Volgens mijn interpretatie van Piaget kunnen stadium over­
gangen in drie Mappen gereconstrueerd worden elaboratie, projectie en 
reorganisatie 
Piaget geeft een zeer gedetailleerde beschrijving van hoe door regu­
laties, zoals leedback en teedtorward loops, cognitieve structuren beter 
aangepast kunnen geraken door uitbreiding binnen een stadium Maar, 
hoewel deze mechanismen misschien wel verbetering in de betekenis van 
adaptatie kunnen verklaren, is er nog geen sprake van nieuwheid. Een 
ander mechanisme dal door Piaget genoemd wordt -reflecterende abstrac­
tie- is ook onvoldoende In leite zijn er twee interpretaties van 
reflecterende abstractie onderzocht In de eerste interpretatie maken de 
interne constructies van hel subject de nieuwheid binnen de ontwikkeling 
aannemeli)k en mogelijk ook een soort tormele verbetering Maar deze 
nadruk op interne constructies maakt hel veel moeihiker om claims over 
aangepastheid te verdedigen In de tweede interpretatie, wordt de rol van 
ervaring meer benadrukt, maar dit maakt de formele verbetering, die de 
kern van de rellecterende abstractie uitmaakt, irrelevant Dit dilemma 
werd opgelost door liei begrip "interactiestructuur" te verhelderen 
Hierdoor werd duideh|k dal wat naar het volgende niveau geprojecteerd 
wordt en gereflecteerd wordt eersl door de ervaring vem|kt is Op deze 
manier is de invloed van buiten hel subject beter te begrijpen terwijl toch 
het idee van formele verbetering (betere structurering) behouden kan 
blijven In dc/c interpretatie kunnen reflecterende abstractie en regulaties 
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elkaar aanvullen. 
Piageis model is de meesl vergaande poging om structurele verander-
ing te verklaren op een manier die past bij sterke claims betreffende 
nieuwheid en verbetering, maar is nog te globaal om bevredigend te zijn 
als verklaring. Nieuwheid in stadium ontwikkeling lijkt een plausibel 
kenmerk te zijn gegeven het model van stadium overgangen, want het 
volgende stadium is niet slechts een eenvoudige continuering van het 
oude. Het volgende stadium biedt een radicaal nieuw perspectief dat 
voortbouwd op het vorige. Verbetering in stadium ontwikkeling is een 
problematischer claim. Het belangrijkste argument is dal het volgende 
stadium beter is omdat de centrale problemen van het vorige stadium 
opgelost worden. Dit betekent echter niet meer dan dat de cognitieve 
structuren van liet hogere stadium de structuren van het vorige stadium 
als substrucluren bevatten in een beter gestructureerde vorm en dat deze 
structuren nauwkeurig afgestemd zijn op de problemen die een subject 
tegen kan komen in zijn interacties met de wereld. 
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STELLINGEN 
Bij het proefschrift 
The Concept 'Developmental Stage' 
Jan Boom 
1. Het meeste onderzoek in de ontwikkelingspsychologie gaat niet over ontwikkeling. 
2. Alhoewel de ontwikkelingspsychologie onder invloed van de opkomst van het 
Darwinisme ontstaan is, is de feitelijke invloed op de vroege ontwikkelings-
psychologie, van ideeën die we nu tot het Darwinisme zouden rekenen, gering. 
(Dit proefschrift, hoofdstuk 1) 
3. De meeste ontwikkelingstheorieën negeren het probleem van 'nieuwheid' in 
ontwikkeling. 
(Dit proefschrift, hoofdstuk 5) 
4. Een stadiumtheorie is pas interessant als er een poging gedaan wordt om de 
overgangen tussen de stadia zodanig te conceptualiseren dal de notie van verbetering in 
het ontwikkelingsverloop recht gedaan wordt. 
(Dit proefschrift, hoofdstuk 6) 
5. De felheid waarmee postmodernisten ageren tegen het met het modemisme 
geassocieerde vooruitgangsdenken, doet vermoeden dat zij stilzwijgend menen een 
hoger stadium te vertegenwoordigen. 
6. Het enkele feit dat bepaalde ideeën uit de 19e eeuw zouden stammen, mag geen reden 
zijn tot afwijzen van die ideeën. Een dergelijke discriminatie zou een verwerpelijke 
vorm van vooruitgangsgeloof impliceren. 
7. Het operating system van Macintosh computers verhoudt zich tot MS DOS als een 
hoger ten opzichte van een lager stadium van structurering en organisatie. 
8. Decentralisatie in de universitaire organisatie verschuift de verantwoordelijkheid voor 
lastige beslissingen naar de vakgroepen (waar de benodigde deskundigheid veelal 
ontbreekt) terwijl tegelijkerlijd de verantwoordelijkheid voor het onderzoeksbeleid van 
de vakgroep naar hogere organen zoals onderzoeksscholen wordt overgeheveld. 
9. Raadseltjes die beogen te laten zien dat misleidende context-informatie het kunnen 
maken van formele gevolgtrekkingen bemoeilijkt, tonen strikt genomen niet alleen aan 
dat context-factoren in het cognitief functioneren van belang zijn, maar dat -voorzover 
het raadsel uitgelegd en dan alsnog begrepen wordt- het uiteindelijke begrip juist 
contekst-onafhankelijk is. De werking van het voorbeeld berust daar juist op. 
10. De afname van reële invloed van inspraak op stadsvemieuwingsprojecten in de 
historische binnenstad in Amsterdam gaat gepaard met een onverantwoorde toename 
van de hoogte van nieuwbouw. 
11. Het is een wonderlijk Nederlands fenomeen dat een wet die geafficheerd wordt als 
'anti-discriminatie wet' voornamelijk gebruikt lijkt te gaan worden om discriminatie te 
bevorderen en te legitimeren. 


